Problems of Communism

JULY-AUGUST 1974

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Inside Albania
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Book Reviews
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Cover: (top) Soviet party leader Leonid I. Brezhnev exchanges greetings with Yugoslav President Tito on arriving in Belgrade, September 22, 1971; (bottom) Romanian soldiers in downtown Bucharest, 1974. Photos by Wide World and Lee Battaglia.

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Soviet Strategy in the Balkans

By John C. Campbell

Like Central Europe, the Balkan area lies on the borderline between the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It has been affected, inevitably, by the changing relationship between the two superpowers and by the general transformation taking shape in Europe since the governments led by Brezhnev, Brandt, and Nixon, in 1969, initiated the reciprocal moves that produced the series of treaties, declarations, summit meetings, and multilateral negotiations cumulatively making up what is today called "détente" or "peaceful coexistence." Yet, in the Balkans, all is not so peaceful or serene or stable as one might have expected in view of this general trend.

Sweeping declarations of peaceful coexistence and the inviolability of frontiers can hardly stabilize an area where the two alliance systems are fraying at the edges, where old nationality feuds refuse to fade away, where internal tensions within several countries of the region can explode into international crisis, and where the situation is further complicated by the fact that two of the countries (Yugoslavia and Albania), both with active foreign policies, remain outside both alliance systems, as well as by the major influence of the Chinese factor on relations among the Communist states. In sum, the situation in the Balkans today is one that recalls the area's reputation in an unlamented past. And if the region, in combination with the neighboring Middle East, still merits the old label of the world's "tinderbox," the reason is in large part that Russia is vigorously pursuing its great-power destiny there and, as in past history, is running into the interests of other powers and the tangles of local nationalism.

It is an area in which the dynamism of Soviet policy is obviously increasing. At the same time, neither in declaration nor in action is that policy a model of clarity or consistency—especially as we watch it take shape in a series of separate compartments. Détente in central Europe; rapprochement with Yugoslavia and preparation for what comes after Tito; pressure on Rumania; and insistence on a role in the Cyprus affair—how do these individual elements of Soviet Balkan policy fit together? The approach of this article is to look first at the broader horizons as viewed from Moscow—global competition with rival powers, strategy in Europe and in the Middle East—and then to take up the more critical bilateral and regional problems. As will be seen, the picture that emerges is one that affords no grounds for relaxation or complacency on the part of any of the parties concerned, including the Soviet Union.

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Some General Observations

The Balkan area may be defined, roughly and somewhat arbitrarily, as encompassing Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey. These six countries share in one way or another the heritage of the Ottoman Empire. They have engaged in economic and cultural relations with one another on a regional basis from time to time. Their rulers exchange official visits and talk of Balkan solidarity. Politically, however, they have been split by ideology, by their own conflicting interests, and by the rivalries

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of the great powers. In the years since World War II, we have witnessed first the rapid advance of Soviet power into the area and then its gradual recession as it was checked in Greece and Turkey by combined local and Western resistance, then forced back from Yugoslavia in 1948 and Albania in 1961, and diluted in Romania following the withdrawal of Soviet forces from that country in 1958 and the assertion of a semi-independent foreign policy by its Communist leaders.

An assessment of Soviet policy in the Balkans over the last few years must start from the fact that while awe of Soviet military power remained undeniably strong, Soviet political influence in the area had reached an extraordinarily low point by the end of the 1960's. The Soviet Union had one loyal Balkan ally, Bulgaria, which had dutifully sent troops to take part in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia and Romania, whose leaders had paid ceremonial visits to Prague just before Dubeck fell, had been shocked by the Soviet move, had denounced it and loudly reiterated their own independence, which they proclaimed they would defend against any similar attack. Albania, closely tied to China since the break with Moscow, had condemned Soviet "social imperialism" (albeit without expressing sympathy for Czechoslovak revisionism), had formally withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact, and had even promised support to Yugoslavia and Romania in the event of Soviet attack.[1] The consolidation of Soviet power in Central Europe, where the USSR had sizable military forces stationed in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (after August 1968), contrasted with the situation in the Balkans, where there were no Soviet forces at all.

The sharp difference between the situations in Central Europe and the Balkans raised a question about Soviet priorities. Did the fact that the Kremlin allowed this difference to develop and chose not to intervene with force in the Balkans—as it had in Central Europe on more than one occasion—mean that it was indifferent to losses of prestige, influence, and strategic position in the area? Had it reconciled itself to the concept of many roads to socialism or of socialist states with freedom to follow anti-Soviet foreign policies? Did the fact that it had not used force mean that it would never do so?

It seems clear that the answers to these questions must be in the negative. There can be little doubt that a Soviet leadership concerned with the world balance of power and hence with preserving maximum unity among the Communist states and parties under its own guidance could not be content with the indefinite existence of Communist regimes in Europe which, in whole or in part, resisted that guidance. If this judgment is correct, then we must assume the existence of a long-term Soviet strategy to recoup past losses and to bring to power in the recalcitrant countries governmental and party leaders as loyal or subservient to Soviet direction in international and internal affairs as those who govern in East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, or Budapest. Such an assumption alone, however, does not fill in all the blanks of current and future Soviet policy in the area, for that policy is bound to be conditioned by time and circumstance, by opportunities and risks, and above all by broader considerations of Soviet policy toward other powers and other regions.

On the scale of global policy, the Soviet Union is engaged in its separate competitions with the United States and with China, which go forward under different slogans and with different strategies. Each has its effect on Soviet policy in the Balkans. Within the strategy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West, moreover, the Soviets have launched a campaign of détente in Europe and undertaken a process of negotiation which, in seeking to achieve consolidation of the Soviet position in Central Europe through Western acceptance, places some restraints on Soviet actions that might jeopardize that acceptance. They have also embarked on an active policy in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a region geographically and historically linked to the Balkans. Here, too, there are restraints, but also ambitions, commitments, and concern with the logistics of exerting military and political power in that area.

The Balkans and Europe

In its continuing campaign for a conference on European security, which dates from the 1950's but was initiated in its contemporary phase at the Bucharest meeting of the Political Council of the Warsaw Pact in 1966, the Soviet Union has altered its perspective and its tactics as external conditions have changed; however, Moscow's basic strategy remains the same. The primary emphasis has always been on Central Europe, and there the combination of Moscow's own "West policy" and Willy Brandt's "East

[1] Peter R. Prifti, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles), Autumn 1973, pp. 249-50.

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MOSCOW AND THE BALKANS

CONIC PROJECTION

0 100 200 300 miles
0 100 200 300 kilometers

SOURCE: Adapted by the Department of Geography, University of Texas at Austin, from *Hammond's World Atlas*, family reference ed., C. S. Hammond and Co., 1968.

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policy" has produced the desired results. The treaties which the Bonn government entered into with Moscow and Warsaw in 1970, and eventually with East Berlin and with Prague, were the equivalent of a peace settlement whereby the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and its Western partners accepted "the consequences of the Second World War"—*i.e.*, the partition of Germany as well as the primacy of Soviet power and the legitimacy of the Soviet-allied regimes in the East European states. The conclusion of these treaties rendered a European security conference much less necessary to the Soviet Union, although Moscow for various reasons continued to press for it.

The treaties, together with the "peaceful coexistence" line reaffirmed at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1971, continue to set the frame for Moscow's European strategy. The Soviet leadership expects this strategy to pay both political and economic dividends: a relaxation on the western front at a time of tension with China on the eastern front; and a growth in trade with Western Europe, especially with the FRG, including access to advanced technology and credits. These aims, it should be emphasized, are not incompatible with Moscow's continuing purpose of increasing Soviet influence in Western Europe by weakening NATO, encouraging the withdrawal of US forces and commitments, and preventing any effective West European unity. Although the term "Finlandization" has been overused, that country's subordination to the USSR in security matters combined with relative freedom in domestic affairs can be taken as representing a status toward which Moscow thinks its relations with West European countries should move, but from which its relations with the socialist East European countries should be held well short. There is, however, no set formula for all of Europe, including the Balkans. What cannot be achieved in Western Europe may be possible in Greece or Turkey. And where Yugoslavia fits into this scheme of things is a good question.

This is essentially a political and not a military strategy. Accordingly, the way in which the Russians are playing the current East-West negotiations in Geneva (on European security and cooperation—CSCE) and Vienna (on mutual balanced force reductions—MBFR) reflects their assessment of political factors and of what can be done, realistically, to exploit or to change them. They do not expect or intend the CSCE negotiations to create a new European regional system; rather they expect them to register gains and to hold open future choices while making sure that any increased contacts between Eastern and Western Europe do not undermine the political and social order in the East. Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev gives no sign of being troubled about the inconsistency between the doctrine which (in Western writing) bears his name and the principles of nonintervention and renunciation of force that Soviet representatives are sponsoring in Geneva. Yugoslavia and Romania have tried in every possible way to make clear that these principles apply to all countries in their relations with one another.[2] However, there is not likely to be much open discussion about this sensitive issue. All countries will no doubt subscribe to the principles in their pristine and general form—and the Soviet Union can be expected to make its own decisions on application of the Brezhnev doctrine if and when the need arises.

As for the MBFR negotiations at Vienna, Moscow appears to view them as susceptible of being used for limited and primarily political and propaganda purposes. These negotiations were undertaken on Western initiative, although apparently without any clear idea on the part of the Western powers as to what purpose they would serve. The Russians, however, have no intention of letting the negotiations weaken their military position in Eastern Europe, either in its function of maintaining a security posture and balance in relation to the West or in that of ensuring Soviet political control in the East. Nor do they expect, on the other hand, that they can substantially alter the balance in their favor through these negotiations. Their strategy is simply to continue to preach coexistence and reduction of arms, to make proposals at Vienna that will sound reasonable and forthcoming to most Europeans, and to let time and circumstances wear down the will of the United States to keep its forces in Europe and that of the Western Europeans to keep up their own contributions to defense.

The Balkan area is not central to this general Soviet strategy for Europe. It attracts little attention at Geneva and virtually none at Vienna. From Moscow's viewpoint, not only is there no need for any

[2] *E.g.*, see Nicolae Ecobescu and Sergiu Celac, "Reflections on the Organizational Framework of Security and Cooperation in Europe," *Revue roumaine d'études internationales* (Bucharest) No. 1 (11), 1971, pp. 19-35; George Macovescu, "Security and Cooperation in Europe," *Review of International Affairs* (Belgrade), No. 562, Sept. 5, 1937, pp. 25-28; and Radovan Vukadinovic, "Yugoslavia's Conception of European Security," *ibid.*, No. 565, Oct. 20, 1973, pp. 4-7.

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

Turks watch Soviet destroyer No. 295 sail through the Bosporus on June 4, 1967. It was one of a number of Soviet naval vessels which moved from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean at the time of the Arab-Israeli June War.

—Wide World.

negotiation and agreement with the West with respect to the Balkan states, but there would be a positive disadvantage to accepting any limitation on the Soviet Union's freedom of action in dealing with its own Balkan allies, with Yugoslavia and Albania, or with Greece and Turkey. The exclusion of Hungary as a full participant in the MBFR talks and even from the zone covered by the talks—which was done at Soviet insistence and to Hungary's embarrassment—was a sign that the USSR intended to keep its forces in that country intact, a standing threat to the neighboring Balkan states, and Soviet forces withdrawn from areas covered by an agreement with the West could be added to their numbers. Moscow also showed no sympathy whatever for Yugoslavia's insistence, clearly and frequently stated, that European security would be incomplete and unsound unless it were extended to the Mediterranean.[3] From the practical standpoint, the Russians saw this Yugoslav proposal for a broadening of the European security conference as threatening to divert the discussions from the main business at hand, for in their view the task they wanted the CSCE to perform would become vastly complicated if a host of Mediterranean countries were admitted and all the unsettled questions of the Middle East found their way into the agenda. But they also had far more important reasons for taking this position—reasons having to do with the role of the Balkans in the Kremlin's general strategy for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern region. This role was not peripheral but central both for obvious geographical reasons and because the eastern Mediterranean had become the scene of active local conflict and of potential military confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. Here the Soviet leaders had to think of supply routes, ports, bases, and other matters rather more tangible than the principles being debated at Geneva.

Strategy in the Middle East

For close to a decade the Soviet Union has been a Mediterranean naval power, and it has also become deeply involved in the affairs of the Middle East. It sees American military and naval strength in the area, with access to bases in Greece, Turkey, and elsewhere, as a threat not only to its Middle East interests but also to Soviet territory and to Soviet allies (including Bulgaria)[4]—a threat which it would like to nullify through a combination of political pressure and countervailing military power of its own. Its Mediterranean naval squadron is there to provide

[3] Most recently by Tito himself in his report to the Tenth Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, *The struggle for further development of socialist self-management in our country and the role of the LCY*, Belgrade, May 1974, p. 15.

[4] A.K. Kislov, "The USA in the Mediterranean: New Realities," *SSha: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia* (Moscow), April 1972, pp. 32-39, and E.M. Primakov, "Near East Conflict," in V.H. Zhurkin *et al.*, *Mezhdunarodnyi conflikt* (International Conflict), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1972, pp. 130-31.

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that power and to serve other purposes as well—*i.e.*, to support the USSR's Arab allies and provide a means of dealing with an Arab-Israeli crisis; to serve as a sign and symbol of Soviet power to the nations on both sides of the inland sea, including members of NATO; and, above all, to serve as part of a global deployment of naval power challenging the United States. The Soviet squadron is based on Black Sea ports but is self-supporting to the extent that friendly Mediterranean states grant facilities for replenishment and repair. Such facilities have been available in certain Arab countries, notably Egypt and Syria, but they are always at the mercy of changing political winds, as President Anwar Sadat of Egypt demonstrated when he drastically scaled down the Soviet military presence and privileges in his country in July 1972. Consequently, Soviet admirals would like very much to be able to use Yugoslav and Albanian ports and facilities on the eastern shore of the Adriatic.

The Soviet position in the Middle East also affects Moscow's Balkan policies in other ways. That position has depended heavily on the shipment of arms to the USSR's Middle Eastern friends and allies, both in times of peace and in times of war. The sea route goes through the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and the Aegean Sea, and the Soviet Union therefore must take account of the policies of Turkey and Greece. Aircraft must overfly Yugoslavia, Greece, or Turkey. Land routes are less important, but it is worth noting that Moscow in 1970 persuaded Turkey to permit the transport of Soviet arms to Syria by road across Turkish territory. The Middle East crisis of October 1973 underlined how important it is to the Soviet Union to have assurance, in advance, that it will be able to move supplies, or troops for that matter, into the area as it deems necessary. Fortunately for the Russians, Tito had long followed a pro-Arab policy and was cooperative in permitting them to establish an air bridge over his country, but they have learned by long experience that they can never take him or Yugoslavia for granted.

To be sure, Soviet policy in the Middle East is somewhat ambivalent, and local developments as well as larger considerations such as the evolution of US-Soviet relations may turn it in one direction or the other. If the past and the present are any guide, however, we can count on a continuing effort by the USSR to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab radicalism, the West's dependence on Middle East oil, the Cyprus dispute, and other permanent features of the Middle Eastern scene in order to establish a position in the region second to none. Whether this effort will proceed in sharp competition with the United States or within the framework of some generally agreed limitations is an open question. But the answer is probably irrelevant—at least for some time to come—to the conclusions which Moscow reaches with respect to the Balkans. In either event, it will want to have a stronger position there than it now enjoys.

With these overall considerations in mind, we may proceed to examine the recent course of Soviet policy toward Greece and Turkey, toward Yugoslavia and Romania, and on the general question of Balkan regionalism.

Moscow and Greece

On the surface, nothing seemed more unlikely than a cordial relationship between the Soviet Union and the group of right-wing Greek officers who controlled Greece from 1967 until the recent Cyprus crisis and whose stock in trade was combating the Communist menace. But the Soviet leaders showed their usual flexibility in applying the doctrine of peaceful coexistence between states of differing political and social systems. From the start they were gracious to the colonels. While their propaganda throughout the world condemned the brutality of the Athens regime, the Soviet government made a point of being correct and even cordial in its official relations with that regime. For its part, the junta, smarting under the West's scorn, broadened its ties with the Communist states, not only with its immediate neighbors but, pointedly, with Moscow as well.

In January 1973, the Soviet Ambassador in Athens hailed the growing ties between Greece and the USSR and attested to his government's interest in the development of independent Greek policies.[5] This statement was read in Greece as an invitation to leave NATO and sail the seas of independent nonalignment, presumably with the help of the Soviets, to say nothing of the Yugoslavs, the Arabs, and many others. While there was little likelihood of Greece's acceptance of the invitation, the Kremlin obviously deemed it useful to plant the idea in Greek minds.

During the October 1973 Middle East war, Greece permitted Soviet supply aircraft to fly over the Cyclades on the way to Syria and Egypt, while at the

[5] David Binder, citing US government officials, in *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1974.

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same time it forbade US planes to use Greek bases in operations for the military resupply of Israel.[6] The new leaders who replaced George Papadopoulos in in November 1973 adopted an even stronger nationalist tone in dealing with the United States. They held up previously agreed arrangements for "homeporting" in Greece ships of the US Sixth Fleet, and they questioned the value of NATO on the ground that it was not fulfilling its obligations to Greece. For a regime said to depend on the Pentagon, it seemed strangely hostile to the desires of its supposed protector.

While hoping to capitalize on the junta's frictions with the West, the Soviet leaders were also preparing for the eventuality of a sudden turn in Greek affairs, perhaps toward war with Turkey, perhaps toward revolution at home. It must have seemed quite apparent to Moscow that a Greek-Turkish conflict would surely weaken NATO and thus offer new opportunities to the Soviet Union to assert itself in the regional balance. Moreover, if the Athens regime were to fall, that event could open the door to political forces which would repudiate the entire past—including an American connection that had involved support of the repressive military dictatorship—and look to Moscow for support.

The series of dramatic developments set in motion when Greek officers overthrew President Makarios of Cyprus in July 1974 has broken old molds and thrown a tremendous burden both on Western diplomacy and on the statesmanship of those now governing in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. Events have moved so swiftly that the Soviet Union, an outsider, has had some difficulty in keeping up with them and adjusting its propaganda line. But three purposes are evident: to assert Moscow's right to be consulted and to take part in international decisions concerning the crisis; to keep Cyprus a neutral country outside NATO defense arrangements; and to increase leverage in all three countries. In Greece the restored democratic parties seem strong, and the Greek Communists, split into three factions, appear to have meager prospects. But the magnitude of Greece's domestic problems, plus the effects of weakness and humiliation in the Cyprus affair, may strain the democratic process to the limit, revive the historic right-left struggle, and play into Soviet hands.

Soviet and Turkish specialists examine plans in June 1972 at the Oil Refining Works in Aliaga, Turkey, a plant built with Soviet technical assistance.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Turkey: An Uncertain Courtship

In the mid-1960's, at about the time the Soviet Union began to build up a naval force in the Mediterranean, Moscow embarked on a campaign to improve relations with Turkey. In part, this campaign was associated with the general Soviet line of peaceful coexistence with the West, and the Turks responded favorably to it, as did their allies in Western Europe. There were exchanges of high-level visits between Moscow and Ankara, joint declarations, trade agreements, Soviet credits to Turkey, cultural exchanges and tourism.

But the change in Soviet policy had much broader implications than the mere cultivation of good relations. Moscow's shift of tack amounted, in effect, to the abandonment of a policy which had treated Turkey as totally committed to the United States in the cold war, and as an advance US base to be threatened on occasion with nuclear annihilation, in favor of a policy which acknowledged Turkey's right to choose its own course and offered some alternatives to one-sided dependence on the West. Hence the Soviet shift of position on the issue of Cyprus at a time when Turkish opinion was bitter over US policy in the Cyprus crisis of 1964. Hence also Moscow's deference to Turkish sovereignty and national rights at a time when many Turks were beginning to ask what they gained from a military relationship which seemed less and less attuned to Turkey's own

[6] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (Zurich), Jan. 7, 1973.

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defense needs and more and more burdened by wrangles over amounts of aid and the status and character of the US military presence in Turkey.

The reasons for Soviet interest in Turkey are readily discernible. The Turkish Republic is a Balkan country only in its small extension into Europe, but it forms part of the land barrier—broken only by the narrow straits under its own control—which separates the USSR from the Mediterranean and the Middle East. At the close of World War II, Stalin attempted to reduce Turkey to the status of a Soviet satellite, and had he succeeded, there can be little doubt that the entire barrier would have become a bridge instead. It is often said that Stalin's successors leap-frogged over the barrier and landed in the Middle East anyway, but Turkish independence and control of the straits, with the backing of NATO, are still of key strategic importance because they buttress the Balkan barrier of Greece and Yugoslavia. This is not to say that the Soviet Union could not brush aside Turkish, Greek, and Yugoslav defenders if it chose to do so in defiance of the NATO alignment of the first two and the well-advertised nonalignment of the third. But that would mean a major conflict with all its consequences.

Therefore, Stalin's successors would seem to have acted wisely in choosing to play up to the Turks rather than to persist in a policy of hostility. Events inside Turkey, however, have not been wholly favorable to Moscow. Internal agitation against NATO was led by the Marxist left wing, and it in turn provoked counteraction by the extreme right, with the result that the Turkish military chiefs took power in 1971. The conservative government which held office under the aegis of the military was tough on local leftists and suspicious of those to whom they looked for foreign support, mainly the Soviet Union. However, a return to party government after a new election in 1973 brought to power a coalition government under Bulent Ecevit, leader of the Republican People's Party, who announced a policy under which Turkey would no longer rely totally on NATO. For example, he indicated that Turkey would not wish to become involved in conflicts outside the scope of NATO in which other NATO members might be involved (read: Arab-Israeli dispute), and that NATO on the other hand should not be counted upon to help in conflicts of interest primarily to Turkey (read: Cyprus).[7] As the new Foreign Minister, Turan Gunes, put it, Turkey would retain flexibility and would determine its own security policy to complement the security provided by NATO. The use of joint US-Turkey defense installations on Turkish soil, he indicated, would have to be jointly determined.[8] In any case, so far as US operations in the Middle East outside the purview of NATO are concerned, Turkey seems to have become an effective neutral. That much is a definite gain for Soviet policy.

As long as the state of affairs on Cyprus and in Greek-Turkish relations remained *in statu quo,* the Kremlin could play up to one party or another without much concern for consistency and could blame NATO and American imperialism for everybody's troubles. But the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and Turkey's decision to resort to military action confronted Moscow with a hard choice as to how far to press ahead with its pro-Turkish line. With everything in flux and the local regimes all looking to the West, the Soviet leaders have been cautiously refraining from taking firm positions. For the longer future, however, there can be little doubt that for Moscow the item of highest priority in the region, the great strategic prize, is Turkey. In a dynamic situation which Western diplomacy may not be able to contain, Moscow will be looking for every change in Cyprus, in Greece, and especially in Turkey that might help to secure its road to the Middle East.

Moscow-Belgrade: Marking Time

While the Soviet Union explores new opportunities in the backyard of the Western alliance, it must also concern itself to an increasing degree with its relationships to the Communist states in the Balkan area, especially with those relationships which have been most sensitive. In the forefront of this concern is the Soviet relationship to a Communist Yugoslavia that remains doggedly independent of Moscow's control. To describe it oversimply but not inaccurately, that relationship since the Stalin-Tito break in 1948 has been like a pendulum, swinging between the opposites of full cooperation and total antagonism but never reaching the extreme limits of the arc. The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 started a new swing of the pendulum which has been marked

[7] Interview in *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 31, 1973. See also Seyfi Tashan, "Foreign Policy Issues in the 1973 Turkish General Election,," *Dispolitika* (Ankara), September 1973, pp. 55-58, for the RPP foreign policy platform on this point.

[8] Interview in *Milliyet* (Istanbul), broadcast by Istanbul Radio, Feb. 6, 1974; see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Washington, DC, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa,* Feb. 12, 1974, pp. L1-2.

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on the Yugoslav side by heightened disillusionment and denunciation, increased fear and preparations for military defense, greater stress on the themes of independence and nonalignment, and a turn toward more cordial relations with the West (highlighted by President Nixon's visit to Yugoslavia in 1970 and Tito's return visit to the US in 1971).

The Soviet leaders, having been responsible for this new tension in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, had no interest in prolonging it unless they saw a real chance of changing the Yugoslav regime or its policies. But at a time when peaceful coexistence had become the centerpiece of Soviet policy in Europe and the treaty with Bonn was hanging fire before the German legislature, the circumstances were hardly propitious for Moscow to embark on an adventurous course toward Yugoslavia. Brezhnev therefore opted for a conciliatory posture and undertook an "unofficial" visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971 which bore some resemblance to Khrushchev's more spectacular visit in 1955. While he did not go to apologize for the past, his evident purpose was to give the Yugoslavs certain assurances and to present a new image. Tito and his associates, for their part, were stiffly suspicious but desirous of a reconciliation. The real issue was the Brezhnev doctrine and its possible applicability to Yugoslavia. The doctrine, of course, went unmentioned in public except for the Soviet leader's denial at a press conference that such a thing existed—it was, he asserted an invention of the Western press. However, Soviet intentions on the underlying issue were put to the test in connection with two documents whose principal authors had been Tito and Khrushchev: the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 and the statement the same two leaders agreed upon in Moscow in 1956, both of which recognized without reservation the right of the Yugoslav Communist leadership to follow its own separate and independent road. Brezhnev and Tito explicitly reaffirmed these documents.

The events which followed the Brezhnev visit confirmed that it was indeed a turning point. The polemics faded from public comment on both sides. Bilateral economic negotiations produced a series of agreements for increased trade and cooperation, culminating in November 1972 with a Soviet pledge of credits totaling $450 million (with another $450 million to follow some years later). Yugoslavia expanded its cooperation with the Soviet bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) and improved its governmental and party relations with Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. This trend still continues. The Middle East war of October 1973, in which Moscow and Belgrade joined in support of the Arab side, reemphasized their solidarity on an issue which pitted both against the United States. Tito's meeting with Brezhnev at Kiev in November was a symbolic gesture showing that on this particular question Yugoslavia was not nonaligned.

The meeting in Kiev provided a revealing glimpse of the tactics of both parties. Brezhnev, capitalizing on Tito's strong pro-Arab convictions and commitment to the nonaligned countries, used those issues to stress the "coordinated policy" and "united actions" of "all the fraternal socialist countries" (including Yugoslavia) in the struggle for peace and security and against imperialism. Tito, speaking as if he were the ordained representative of the Arabs, expressed his high appreciation of the Soviet Union's extensive assistance to them but also stressed the right of all countries to take part, on the basis of equality, in the easing of tensions and the solution of international problems. He also referred to the common Yugoslav and Soviet goal of building socialism and communism, making sure to add, however, that it should be approached by differing roads depending on the special features of each country.[9]

Thus Tito, as always, was interested in the Arabs, in peace, and in his role on the world stage, but above all in the maintenance of a benign and noninterventionist Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia at a time of particular fragility in Yugoslavia's internal



Soviet First Secretary Nikita S. Khrushchev during his historic meeting with Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in May 1955.

—Keystone.

[9] Speeches of Brezhnev and Tito, *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 13, 1973.

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situation, which he wanted to handle without outside interference. If it was appeasement on the surface, it had a hard purpose underneath. He was willing to let the Soviet leaders talk about common socialist goals and socialist international policies as long as he could make the necessary reservations about independence and separate roads in his own statements and in joint Soviet-Yugoslav declarations. The Soviets, for their part, were not unmindful of the connection between the growing intimacy of the two countries in the international field and the development of internal affairs in Yugoslavia.

Those affairs during the past four years have been characterized by more than the usual turmoil as Yugoslavia has been simultaneously going through economic difficulties and a constitutional crisis and trying to prepare for the still unknown dangers of the post-Tito era. The central leadership—*i.e.*, Tito—saw in the "nationalist deviation" of the Communist leadership in Croatia in 1971 a challenge to both the authority of the party and the unity of the country, and he met it by removing the offending leaders and threatening to use the army if it became necessary to do so.[10] Within the following year, there were crises in the other republics, notably Serbia, and again Tito forced out the local party leaders, this time on a variety of grounds including liberalism, petty-bourgeois mentality, anarchy, technocracy, and economic exploitation. But even when the talk is of economic reform or of social ideology, the question of nationalism is never very far from the minds of Yugoslavs. The purge in Serbia was widely regarded as a logical and necessary sequel to the purge in Croatia.

Tito's current effort to stop the rot and to maintain effective authority throughout the country is based on rebuilding the central power of the Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) without going all the way back to Stalinism, and on giving a greater political role to the army, which now has representation in the higher party organs. These changes seem to have stabilized the situation, but it is still a question whether party discipline and force can contain the dynamism of the nationalities, and specifically whether the regime's policies can satisfy popular pressures in Croatia and Serbia.

The Yugoslavs have been well aware that the Kremlin has been keeping a sharp eye on the local scene. In 1971 there were reports, which official Yugoslav circles helped to spread, that Soviet agencies were in collusion with Croatian fascist émigré organizations in Germany allegedly engaged in trying to stir up trouble in Croatia. There were intimations, never proven, of Soviet encouragement of the Croatian leaders—Miko Tripalo, Savka Dabcevic-Kucar, Pero Pirker, and others—who were deposed in December 1971. When the affair was over, however, *Pravda* gave prominence to Tito's statement explaining the outcome of the crisis and the need to smash counterrevolutionary tendencies.[11] In the case of Serbia, the situation was different. There Moscow could not have been other than pleased by the fall from grace of Marko Nikezic and other leaders who had been engaged in the task of liberalizing and modernizing the Serbian party following the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic and his mainly Serbian security apparat in 1966.

Speculation about what the Soviet Union might do in the event of a succession crisis or civil strife in Yugoslavia—support the Croats to break up the country or support the Serbs to hold it together, help the Yugoslav Communists or undermine them, intervene militarily or not intervene—has undoubtedly been at a more intense level in Yugoslavia than in Moscow. It does not seem at all likely, however, that the Soviet leaders have contemplated any intervention in Yugoslav affairs as long as Tito is there—that is, unless some crisis more serious than those of 1971 and 1972 should arise. It is also unlikely that they have a ready-made plan for the moment when he passes from the scene. They seem willing to wait and see.

Over the years, the ways in which Belgrade and Moscow have tried to handle their ideological differences have gone through a number of phases and shifts. Titoism presented a serious ideological challenge to Soviet orthodoxy not only by reason of its fundamental principle of polycentrism but also because of the specific unorthodox features introduced into the separate Yugoslav path. The Soviet leaders always had the dilemma of whether to condemn this revisionism and fight it (as they did in the international Communist conferences of 1957 and 1960) or to stress the community of background and goals and minimize the conflicts (as Khrushchev did in pointedly accepting Yugoslavia as a socialist state in 1962). Brezhnev is obviously following the latter line, and here the recent evolution of Yugoslavia's official ideology is pertinent to Soviet calculations.

The Soviet leadership was profoundly distrustful of many aspects of Yugoslav socialism as it developed after 1948 and especially after the reforms of

[10] For an informed analysis of these events, see Dennison I. Rusinow, "Crisis in Croatia," American Universities Field Staff Reports, Southeast Europe Series, No. DIR 4-7, 1972.

[11] *Pravda*, Dec. 6, 1971.

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the mid-1960's—*e.g.*, the fading role of the party, the relaxation of censorship controls, the theory and practice of "market socialism" and of "socialist self-management," and the opening of Yugoslav society to Western ideas and customs, to say nothing of the LCY's claim to a truer interpretation of Marx. Accordingly, when Yugoslavia's economic reforms began to flounder at the end of the 1960's and nationality quarrels seemed to make a mockery of the socialist ideal, Soviet satisfaction was evident. And when Tito then chose to remedy these ills by reasserting the leading role of the party and reviving the old term "democratic centralism," Moscow's reaction was naturally favorable. Tito was quite specific in repudiating the thesis of the Sixth Party Congress of 1952 to the effect that the party was no longer to command but merely to act as an educating influence. He said that he never had been happy with that thesis and regretted the party's subsequent decline.[12] The debates on the new Yugoslav Constitution adopted in January 1974 and the resolutions approved by the Tenth Congress of the LCY in June 1974 leave no doubt that henceforth the party is to have the "leading role in society." [13]

This Yugoslav shift does not spell adoption of the Soviet model, but the retreat from experimentation with more democratic forms is evident. One should note that the men who now surround Tito at the top and presumably will be determining the party's leading role later are mostly his old companions of the war period, plus the ambitious and powerful Stane Dolanc. The promising new generation of leaders which appeared with the reforms of the 1960's has been hard hit by the purges and the political shift.

Since Tito's position within his own country is unassailable, the Soviet leaders are naturally interested in seeing him do the work of bringing the Yugoslav system closer to the Soviet and East European model, as they play steadily on the twin themes of socialist solidarity and European détente. We cannot be sure what hopes they entertain, but it would be logical to expect them to view a Yugoslav regime built on the principle of party dominance by Tito and by those whom he designates to carry on after him, a regime emphasizing its socialist character, as offering the best chance of a close Soviet-Yugoslav relationship in the period of uncertainty ahead. Thus Soviet interest seems to lie in supporting Tito in his present course—a course that must appear to Moscow as a diminishing threat to Soviet interests in Eastern Europe and in international politics generally. If there is a smooth Yugoslav succession, a new party directorate might draw even closer to Moscow; if not, the Soviet Union would be as well placed as any other power to exploit the situation.

At the same time that Yugoslavia has persistently clung to its internal ideological autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow, it has also insisted that its foreign policy has been one of absolute independence—indeed, one that has made nonalignment an article of faith. Nevertheless, nonalignment has been shaded one way or another depending on the internal as well as the international atmosphere. In the past two years, the campaign against domestic enemies—the liberals, the technocrats, and the purveyors of the decadent culture of the West—has been accompanied by more prickly relations with Western countries, particularly with Italy in a renewed dispute over Trieste. A number of Yugoslav leaders with Western educational or diplomatic experience have been shunted aside. Tito himself, in a reversion to ingrained feelings which he has repeatedly voiced in times of domestic stress even when official relations with Western governments were good, has strongly attacked alleged anti-socialist forces engaged in hostile activity against his country. He and his spokesmen have waged a publicity campaign against claimed Western distortions of what has been taking place in Yugoslavia, especially the concern of Western intellectuals about the constriction of civil liberties. All this has brought grist to the Soviet mill.

Yet the total record of Yugoslav policy since 1948 probably cautions the Soviet leaders against drawing radical conclusions from this latest swing of the pendulum. They must recognize that if they do so and try to press their current advantage too hard, they may well cause a swing in the other direction.

Moscow-Bucharest: Controlled Conflict

As a full-fledged member of the Soviet East European bloc, Romania with its own aspirations toward autonomy has become as much a source of concern to Moscow as nonaligned Yugoslavia. Ever since Bucharest in the early 1960's defied Khrushchev's plans for the economic integration of Eastern Europe under Comecon, the Romanian leadership—first

[12] *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Oct. 8, 1972.

[13] *Draft report on the activities of the League of Communists and Presidency of the LCY between the ninth and tenth congresses*, Belgrade, March 1974, pp. 120 ff.; Tito, *The struggle for further development of socialist self-management in our country and the role of the LCY*, pp. 62-73.

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under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and since under Nicolae Ceausescu—has striven to maintain and enlarge the degree of independence then won. In this effort, it has had to perform a difficult balancing act both externally and internally—opposing Moscow on some issues, but not to the point of provoking Soviet military action; and making concessions designed to win popular support at home, but not to the point of relaxing the strict controls of a totalitarian system.

For its part, the Soviet leadership has been amazingly tolerant of a Romanian regime which, in the realm of foreign policy, has made its own decisions on establishing relations with West Germany, on not breaking with Israel when the rest of the bloc did, on openly supporting Dubcek and denouncing his overthrow, and on staying neutral between Moscow and Peking (with perhaps a greater show of cordiality toward the Chinese side). On the party level also, the Romanians have been a thorn in the side of the CPSU in its laborious efforts to line up support and organize conferences under the banner of proletarian unity. At the 1969 world conference of Communist parties, the Romanians were represented by a delegation which read into the public record its disagreements with the conference resolutions.[14] They are not (like the Bulgarians) rushing to join the present campaign for a successor conference and are likely to insist on certain conditions, such as no collective denunciation of China and no recognition of a leading role for the CPSU.[15]

We can only speculate on the reasons why the Kremlin has tolerated the Romanian deviation. It is evident that the degree of provocation has so far not reached the point of invoking Soviet military action and that Ceausescu must have a fairly good idea of where that point is. He may have come close to the brink in 1968, just after the Soviet move into Czechoslovakia, and again in the summer of 1971 when he was so cordially received in China that it sorely offended Moscow. Following the latter episode, a meeting of Soviet and East European party leaders was held in the Crimea without him—a procedure that was ominously reminiscent of the similar meetings held in 1968 without the Czechs—but nothing happened. The Soviet leaders are well aware of the price they had to pay for their curative action in Czechoslovakia in terms of its injurious effects on Soviet relations all over the world, and it seems reasonable to assume that they would prefer not to repeat the experience in Romania.

Peking crowds honor Nicolae Ceausescu during the Romanian President's June 1971 visit to the People's Republic of China. With Ceausescu and his wife in the limousine is Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

—EUPRA.

Actually, Moscow has been reasonably successful in containing the Romanian deviation. While other East European regimes may privately relish Ceausescu's bear-baiting, they have not joined in it. Nor has Soviet diplomacy been seriously hampered by the speechmaking of Romanian delegates at international conferences or by Bucharest's initiatives to draw the nations of East and West Europe together across bloc lines. In Middle East affairs, although Romania has staked out an independent position—maintaining normal relations with Israel unlike its Warsaw Pact partners and Tito—it has lacked the power and prestige to act as a mediator, and none of the countries involved, including the Soviet Union, seems to need Romania as a channel of communication.[16] Ceausescu has visited dozens of countries on every continent, sounding more like a Third World spokesman than a Soviet ally and signing declarations embodying the principles so important to Romania: sovereign independence, inviolable borders, nonintervention in internal affairs, equality of all

[14] *Conférence internationale des partis communistes et ouvriers, Moscow 1969* (International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow 1969), Prague, Editions Paix et Socialisme, 1969, pp. 246-69.

[15] N. Ceausescu, interview in *Die Presse* (Vienna), Dec. 29, 1973; Tanjug dispatch, Dec. 23, 1973.

[16] Joseph Alpern "Israeli-Romanian Relations from the Six-day War to the Yom Kippur War," *Politique Etrangère* (Paris), No. 6, 1973, pp. 725-52.

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nations, mutual cooperation. But the main purpose of these visits and declarations has seemingly been to assert Romania's individuality and to foster wider economic relations, and they do not appear to have affected the basics of Soviet-Romanian relations.[17]

To be sure, Ceausescu's visits to the United States and especially to China might have had more far-reaching repercussions if he could have mobilized effective American or Chinese support for his independent position. His first visit to the United States, in 1970, actually netted very little; the second, in December 1973, did produce a joint declaration of principles and a "statement on economic cooperation." [18] The intervening period, however, had seen the flowering of Soviet-American détente, the effect of which was to diminish the importance of Romania's special position. Significantly, the Nixon administration was making no effort to persuade Congress to extend most-favored-nation treatment to Romanian imports, preferring to leave that question dependent upon resolution of the basic issue vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

Ceausescu's trip to China in 1971 was superficially more successful. Peking generously promised credits totaling some $250 million, and a Chinese military delegation which later visited Bucharest pledged "firm support" of Romanian efforts to maintain national independence.[19] But as Chou En-lai pointed out at the time in an interview with a Yugoslav editor, "distant water does not quench fire." [20] Certainly, the results of these diplomatic maneuvers could not have led the Romanians to entertain any illusion that the United States or China would (or could) physically protect their independence. They also were discovering that joining the world system of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund and efforts to develop trade with the West neither cured their hard-currency deficits nor gave them real bargaining power against Soviet economic pressure.

The past two years, moreover, have seen a definite contraction of some of Romania's earlier positions. Nothing is any longer heard of Bucharest's former demands for changes in the Warsaw Pact structure so as to reduce the dominant Soviet role in that alliance. Furthermore, though Romania still resists the holding of regular Warsaw Pact maneuvers on its territory, it did participate in February 1973—for the first time since 1962—in a joint staff exercise with Soviet and Bulgarian officers on Romanian soil under the direction of Marshal I. I. Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact forces. In the economic field, the Romanians have likewise relaxed some of the stiff positions they had previously taken regarding integration with their Comecon partners (though without giving up the right to veto joint projects), and they have concluded large-scale economic agreements with Moscow, including provisions for Romanian investment in raw materials development in the USSR. On the political side, the now regular summer meetings of Communist leaders in the Crimea, from which Ceausescu was pointedly excluded in 1971, were graced by his presence in 1972 and again in 1973.

As in the case of Yugoslavia, the Kremlin is also very much concerned with the internal state of affairs in Ceausescu's domain. The Romanian leader runs one of the most tightly controlled states in the Communist world. Unlike Yugoslavia, Romania has had no economic reform, no liberalization—and no comparable nationalities problem. Its Communist Party has never had any broad base of popular support, although the regime's policy of independence and its recent stress on national traditions have been well received by the people. Consequently, Romanian politics have been the business of a few people at the top, and the success or failure of Soviet efforts to influence and—as far as possible—control Romanian affairs has depended on how effectively the Soviet leadership was able to deal with the key individuals in the small ruling group.

The dominating figure in that group, Nicolae Ceausescu, not only has steadily tightened his grip on the apparatus of power, but also has made himself the object of an all-embracing cult of personality. Taking over in 1965, he gradually got rid of the old war horses and brought to the fore capable younger leaders who were his own men. Some of these men have since been shunted into less important jobs, and none is being allowed to accumulate enough power to rival in any way the authority and prestige of the supreme leader, who has recently added the Presidency of the Republic to his other titles.

This one-man system has its strengths, as does any strong dictatorship, but we may be sure that the Soviet leaders are testing its possible vulnerabilities and studying alternatives. It is not unlikely that, as

[17] J.F. Brown, "Rumania's Uphill Struggle for an Independent Role," *The World Today* (London), March 1973, pp. 126-33.

[18] Texts in *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, DC), Jan. 7, 1974, pp. 1-11.

[19] Agerpres report from Bucharest, Aug. 26, 1971.

[20] *Vjesnik*, Aug. 28, 1971.

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in Yugoslavia, they deem it prudent for the moment to ride along with a situation which now appears to be evolving in a direction congenial to Moscow. Internationally, Ceausescu seems to have reached the limits of his independence and to be drawing back a bit. Internally, he has not significantly broadened his regime's base of support. Furthermore, by reason of the very fact that his is a one-man regime, it could conceivably be won over at the top through a change of mind or a felicitous bargain, or—in an extreme case—it might be decapitated.

A Zone of Peace—For Whose Benefit?

Having surveyed Soviet relationships with the major Balkan countries individually, let us turn now to an examination of Soviet attitudes and calculations with respect to the broader issue of regional cooperation for peace and security, for a Balkan "zone of peace." The litany of cooperation for peace in the Balkans is heard in every formal speech and appears in every communiqué marking exchanges of official visits between the Balkan states. Significantly, it also finds a place in Soviet pronouncements whenever a Brezhnev or a Podgorny descends upon Belgrade or Bucharest or Sofia. The theme is the same, but as will be seen, the motives differ.

Here, it is important to distinguish two basic ideas. One is the notion of Russia's historic mission to "protect" the Balkan peoples or, to put it more crassly, to organize the area in the Russian interest; the second is the concept of Balkan unity and collaboration for its own sake, or—to use a phrase which made its appearance in the 19th century—"the Balkans for the Balkan peoples." The latter idea has had hard sledding over the last hundred years, as the Balkan peoples have had to contend with their own conflicts as well as with the ambitions of outside powers. Nevertheless, it has a tradition in certain episodes of common struggle against the Ottoman Empire and in the Balkan Entente of the 1930's, and it still exists today. In Romania, indeed, the Communist regime has encouraged a remarkably favorable view of Romanian diplomacy in the interwar period and especially of the Balkan Entente.[21]

For the Soviet leaders, the problem of how to bring *their* kind of peace to the Balkans has never been an easy one, even in Stalin's day. In the 1940's, Stalin failed not only in Greece and Turkey but also in dealing with relationships among the then supposedly loyal Communist regimes of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The question of South Slav federation was brought to Stalin as arbiter in early 1948, but his heavy-handed effort to settle it merely contributed to the Soviet-Yugoslav break because the Yugoslavs, in the context of their developing dispute with Moscow, saw it as a plan to put their country under Soviet control.[22] After 1948, Stalin did his utmost to stir up all the old Balkan nationality feuds as a supplement to Soviet pressure designed to bring down the Tito regime, yet his efforts only contributed to the creation in 1954 of a new Balkan alliance of Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, indirectly associating Yugoslavia with NATO.

When Khrushchev and his colleagues made the choice for a limited reconciliation with Yugoslavia in 1955, they laid the basis for new initiatives of their own with respect to the Balkan area. In 1957, the same year in which Poland, acting in its own as well as Moscow's interests, put forward the Rapacki plan for an atom-free zone in central Europe, the Romanian government broached the Stoica plan for a similar zone embracing the six Balkan countries. The latter probably was a Romanian proposal in name only, and it was later repeated and elaborated by Khrushchev himself.[23]

One aim of the Stoica plan was to weaken NATO's position in the Balkan-Mediterranean area through the elimination of US nuclear weapons from Greece and Turkey, just as the aim of the Rapacki plan was to reduce NATO's power in Germany. A second aim was to bury the already near-moribund Balkan alliance of 1954 and to associate Yugoslavia with the Soviet Union's allies in a scheme which would be consonant with Belgrade's declared policy of nonalignment but was certain to be rejected by the West. The NATO countries, especially the United States, Greece, and Turkey, did in fact oppose the scheme, and the idea of a Balkan zone of peace

[21] See, for example, two recent historical works: Gheorghe Matei *et al., Studii privind Politica Externa a Romaniei, 1919-1939* (Studies on Romanian Foreign Policy, 1919-1939), Bucharest, Editura Miliara, 1969; Eliza Campus, *Intelegerea Balancia* (Balkan Entente), Bucharest, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1972.

[22] Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito,* New York, Simon & Shuster, 1953, pp. 311-24, and *Izgubljena Bitka Josifa Visarionovica Staljina,* (The Battle that J.V. Stalin Lost), Sarajevo, Svjetlost, 1969, pp. 131-132; Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin,* New York, Harcourt Brace & World, 1962, pp 143-47, 171-86.

[23] Texts of the Romanian proposals in *Scinteia,* Sept. 17, 1957, and June 7, 1959, and of the later Soviet proposals in Gillian King, Ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1959,* London, Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 141-44, 593.

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lived on only as a Soviet propaganda theme and not as a serious subject of negotiation.

Then, the 1960's witnessed a series of developments which put an entirely new face on the matter. First, the Soviet-Chinese rift introduced a new, alternative pole of attraction to the Balkan Communist states. Albania, following its tradition of seeking a distant protector, turned to Peking; Romania tried to stay on good terms with both sides; Yugoslavia, though under heavy Chinese propaganda attack for revisionism, nevertheless kept the door open to Sino-Yugoslav reconciliation. Second, Yugoslavia and Romania drew closer together for mutual comfort and support in an association which was short on military power but long on dedication to common ideas, including that of Balkan unity. Third, there was a general opening up of contacts among all the Balkan states, including Greece and Turkey: more trade; joint projects; dams, bridges, and power stations on the Danube; cultural meetings; sports conclaves. Even Albania came out of isolation, renewed normal relations with Yugoslavia, and moved toward restoration of relations with Greece after a break of 30 years.

Thus, a zone of peaceful cooperation seemed to be taking shape in the Balkans almost spontaneously. But in the existing state of affairs, one had to ask who was managing it, and *cui bono?* The Soviet Union, as we have noted, has had only one firm Balkan ally, Bulgaria. The regime in Sofia, especially in the long period since Todor Zhivkov assumed the leadership in 1954, has faithfully followed the Moscow line in international affairs and in the world Communist movement, making Bulgarian-Soviet relations the perfect example of the "international relations of a new type" which, according to Soviet theorists, are being developed under socialism.[24] Not that the Bulgarians are any less nationalistic than other peoples, or that at one time or another Bulgarian public opinion or individual leaders (including Georgi Dimitrov himself) have not resented Soviet dominance. But Bulgarian nationalism has been directed more against Balkan neighbors than against the USSR—a situation not without historical precedent, for ever since gaining independence in the 19th century, Bulgaria has felt the need to have an outside protector against its enemies nearby.



The Iron Gates Hydroelectric Power Station on the Danube, a joint project of Romania and Yugoslavia, opened on May 17, 1972.

—Eastfoto.

Because of its alienation from its neighbors, Bulgaria has also been, historically, the key to Balkan unity or disunity. The Balkan alliance and the common war against the Turks in 1912 gave way to the war between Bulgaria and its allies in 1913. The Balkan conferences of the early 1930's included Bulgaria, but the Balkan Pact of 1934 did not—and that was a fatal weakness. Communist Bulgaria in the 1960's was in the same unstable position, a participant in many moves and trends of inter-Balkan cooperation but still in many respects the odd man out. Even the timid Zhivkov regime has had reasons of its own to assert itself in the Balkan region and to normalize relations and expand trade with its neighbors, including Greece and Turkey. At the same time, it has served as a weathervane of Soviet intentions, since whatever it did, it was not going to go against Soviet policy.

It was significant therefore that, following Romania's lead, Zhivkov in April 1971 included in the prepared text of a public speech a call for a meeting of Balkan leaders to make a common declaration on security, but then omitted it from his actual address[25]—presumably on getting the word from Moscow. And when Ceausescu again took the initiative the next year in proposing a conference to discuss the transformation of the Balkans into a zone without nuclear weapons and without military bases and to elaborate agreements on eco-

[24] For a Bulgarian description, see L. Georgiev, "Basic Principles of the Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of Bulgaria," *Etudes balkaniques* (Sofia), No. 4, 1973, pp. 5-14.

[25] This discrepancy was pointed out by F. Stephen Larrabee in an excellent article, "Changing Russian Perspectives in the Balkans," *Survey* (London), Summer 1972, pp. 28-29.

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nomic, cultural and also *political* collaboration,[26] there was no response whatever from Bulgaria.

These facts are indicative of the Soviet-Bulgarian relationship and its impact on Balkan politics. Geographically situated at the center of the region, Bulgaria occupies a srategic position which the Soviet leaders can exploit politically and, if they so choose, militarily. They have used their influence in Sofia as an arm of their policies toward other Balkan states. Thus, when they have wished to put pressure on Yugoslavia, they have encouraged Bulgarian claims on Yugoslav Macedonia. When they have wanted to warn Romania, they have held military talks and maneuvers with the Bulgarians. But the more the Soviet Union has based its Balkan policy on Bulgaria's pro-Soviet militance and animosity toward other Balkan states, the more it has risked isolating itself with its lone Balkan ally and compromising its chances of gaining influence with other states in the region.

Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1971 represented not only a turn toward détente with that counry but also an attempt to open up wider possibilities for Soviet influence in the Balkans. From Belgrade he went to Budapest and Sofia, and thereafter criticism of Yugoslavia from those two countries eased off. The Soviet leaders thus seem to have decided to play upon the theme of Balkan cooperation as part of a tactic of wearing down the anti-Soviet edges of Yugoslav and Romanian policies rather than attacking the policies and leaders directly. Perhaps, in capturing the movement toward regional cooperation, they would not capture very much, given its weakness, but they might at least smother its anti-Soviet potential. They have no need to define the terms and relationships of the Balkan zone of peace at the moment; "peaceful coexistence" is enough. They have shown no disposition to negotiate on neutralization, regional arms control, or anything beyond the already familiar idea of an atom-free zone. Certainly they are not likely to accept any limitation on the Soviet Union's political or military role in a region where there may be new opportunities to enlarge both.

Global détente with the United States appears to mean a great deal to the Soviet leaders, and this situation will probably continue for some years to come. However, the degree to which they will be able to reap the benefits of the economic cooperation détente promises while serious conflicts of interest and policy continue in certain regions of the world is uncertain. They may be expected to continue competing for power in the Balkans and the Middle East, and since US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has publicly warned in this connection that détente is indivisible, they may face hard choices. On the other hand, the United States will not find it easy to check Soviet influence here, there, and everywhere without risk of reviving the cold war at a time when there is an obvious American stake in détente and its evolution toward a more stable international order. In the Balkan area, probably neither superpower would gamble on an attempt to take advantage of a major change in orientation on the part of Yugoslavia or another local state at the almost certain price of provoking a world crisis, but less spectacular events or subtle shifts in alignment, with potential for greater change in the future, might well take place without rending the fabric of peaceful coexistence at the superpower level. In such cases, the superpower with the more imposing presence in the vicinity would seem to have the better chance of taking advantage of the situation.

To be sure, whether it tries to capitalize on desires for Balkan unity or to exploit rivalry and disunity in that region, the Soviet Union seems destined to run into plenty of trouble with nationalism, as it has elsewhere. But outside factors are likely to be crucial to the outcome. Much will depend on whether the United States, failing the achievement of real détente, maintains balancing power in the Mediterranean and Middle East; on whether China continues to be a check on the Soviet Union both directly and through its influence in the Balkans (even if the Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest-Peking axis remains but a chimera); on whether relations between Western and Eastern Europe can flourish. Unless the forces making for local independence and cooperation have some help from a favorable world environment, there is the possibility that the kind of peace that might eventually evolve in a Balkan "zone of peace" could be one dependent upon the unchallenged will and power of the Soviet Union—in short, a *pax sovietica.*

[26] Repcrt to the National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party, July 19-21, 1972, *Revue roumaine d'études internationales,* No. 2-3 (16-17), 1972, p. 77.

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Moscow and Cairo: Currents of Influence

By Alvin Z. Rubinstein

Egypt has been one of the two central targets (with India) of Soviet efforts to cultivate influence in the Third World. Since 1955, the Soviet Union has persistently supported Egypt for a changing combination of strategic, diplomatic, ideological, and Soviet domestic political reasons. By the late 1950's, the USSR had already become Egypt's mainstay among the great powers, and Egypt's dependence on Soviet help was only accentuated by Cairo's crushing defeat in the Six-Day War of June 1967 against Israel. Even Anwar Sadat's precipitate and humiliating expulsion of the bulk of Soviet military advisers from Egypt in July 1972 did not cause Moscow to terminate the relationship. Soviet military aid programs continued, and from early 1973 on, Egypt—apparently with the financial backing of Saudi Arabia—was able to purchase all the weaponry it needed from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in October 1973 the USSR went along with Sadat's decision to go to war again against Israel and resupplied Egypt and Syria with massive quantities of arms at considerable jeopardy to other major Soviet policy pursuits. Finally, even though Cairo has since improved its relations with the United States dramatically, there are still no indications that Moscow is prepared to cut off the flow of arms supplies to Egypt despite its irritation over Cairo's shift.

In light of this history, it is reasonable to presume that a consensus exists in the Kremlin concerning the desirability of the Soviet Union's Egyptian connection.[1] But, one may ask, has the game been worth the candle? We have no way of knowing how the Soviet leaders feel about this matter—they are not saying. What we can investigate, however, is the extent to which Soviet inputs into Egypt have, in fact, brought tangible returns. What have the last seven years of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship—the period of greatest Soviet investment—brought the Kremlin in terms of influence?

Methodological Considerations

Before attacking these questions, it is first necessary to examine certain conceptual and methodological problems that are involved in identifying and analyzing the political influence which one state, through its foreign policies and inputs, is able to acquire over another.[2] Hitherto, the study of Soviet policies in the Third World has suffered from a tendency among observers to equate Soviet inputs

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[1] One suspects that continued Soviet support of Egypt may be a function more of Soviet bureaucratic politics than of national strategic calculations. For an imaginative but inconclusive attempt to link factional strife within the Soviet leadership with differential coverage of Middle Eastern issues in various Soviet newspapers, see Ilana Dimant-Kass, "*Pravda* and *Trud:* Divergent Soviet Attitudes Toward the Middle East," *Soviet Union* (Pittsburgh), Vol. 1, Part 1, 1974, pp. 1-31. See also Victor Zorza, "The Kremlin Power Struggle," *Radio Liberty Dispatch* (New York), Feb. 1, 1974.

[2] The political dimensions of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship and methodological problems involved in their examination will be treated in detail by the author in a monograph currently in preparation.

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with influence—that is, to assume that the mere fact that certain inputs are being made signifies that Moscow is automatically achieving its policy goal of actual influence. By tracing diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural activities and interactions, one can readily identify Soviet policies toward a particular country, but it does not automatically follow from such data that the USSR has been able to exercise influence over the behavior of the target country. And this is, after all, the essential question.

The trouble is that there has thus far been no accepted method of determining how much actual influence the Soviet Union has exercised in Egypt or any other nation of the Third World—on what issues and in what specific situations. Has there been any correlation, for example, between Soviet inputs of military and economic assistance and Soviet influence on Egyptian behavior? Is the Soviet-Egyptian influence relationship necessarily a zero-sum situation—one in which gains for one party (the USSR) entail heavy costs for the other (Egypt)? In the Soviet-Egyptian aid relationship, is the donee bound to accede to the policy preferences of the donor? It has not been uncommon to assume an affirmative answer to such questions. However, as this paper will argue on the basis of a closer examination of the evidence, negative responses may be closer to the truth. Such a perception is of great importance to an accurate assessment not only of relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt but also of other dyadic relationships between the USSR and individual countries of the Third World. Moreover, it may indicate some of the limits which the superpowers encounter in pursuing their rivalry in areas such as the Middle East and South Asia. Certainly, it indicates that the building of influence in the current international system is a highly uncertain, transient, and variable process, one which differs markedly from its antecedents in the pre-nuclear era.

In seeking manifestations of influence, it is most profitable to investigate specific "issue areas" [3] which have arisen in the normal course of Soviet-Egyptian diplomacy, situations which could reveal shifts in Egyptian domestic or foreign policies congenial to the interests of the USSR. Furthermore, influence must be viewed within a larger strategic



Egyptian and Soviet builders pause in 1968 to mark the eighth anniversary of the commencement of work on the Aswan High Dam, constructed on the Nile with assistance from the USSR.

—TASS via Sovfoto.

context and not merely in terms of tangible, short-term advantages discernible within the Soviet-Egyptian relationship itself. Thus, the success or failure of Soviet influence-building may be judged by the extent to which Egypt opts for policies which rely essentially on inputs from the USSR and which redound to the latter's long-term regional or global advantage.

Having sketchily set forth these methodological considerations, we can proceed to evaluate Soviet influence in the period when one would logically expect it to be the greatest—the period from June 1967 to July 1972, when direct Soviet involvement in Egypt was at its peak. After the disaster of the June 1967 war, Egypt became heavily dependent on Soviet aid to shore up its domestic and international positions. Soviet arms and advisers flowed in, and particularly in late 1969 and early 1970, the USSR committed military personnel to operational roles in Egypt on a scale hitherto unprecedented outside the Communist bloc.[4] Economically also, Moscow proved more munificent than Egypt's oil-rich Arab friends. On the Egyptian side, local Communists

[3] For a discussion of the concept of "issue areas," see James M. Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, Ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 60-92 (a formal definition is provided on p. 81).

[4] For some indication of the scale of the Soviet rearmanent of Egypt, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1970*, London, author, 1971, pp. 46-47; Yaacov Ro'i and Ilana Dimant-Kass, "The Soviet Military Involvement in Egypt, January 1970-July 1972," Research Paper No. 6 of the Soviet and East European Research Centre, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, February 1974, pp. 8-14; and *The New York Times*, May 14, 1970.

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were again permitted to be active in Egypt's media and economic life, presumably as a gesture of goodwill to the Soviet benefactor. Yet, even in this period of maximum and mounting commitment and entanglement, Soviet influence was, as we shall see, by no means unconstrained.

Although other issue areas might be investigated, we shall limit our discussion of Soviet influence in the 1967-72 time-frame to Cairo's decisions relating to two significant events: (1) the initiation of a "war of attrition" against Israel in the spring of 1969, and (2) the signing of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of May 27, 1971. When, where, and how was Soviet influence manifested in these decisions?

Picking Up the Pieces

In order to set the stage for the discussion of Egypt's gravitation toward a renewal of hostilities in early 1969, it is useful to describe in brief the Egyptian and Soviet actions in the immediate aftermath of the six-day war of June 1967. The USSR immediately came to Cairo's aid with massive arms shipments and attempted, at an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly, to force Israel to withdraw from its newly-won positions (as it had in 1956). This support set Egypt on the road to recovery and enabled President Gamal Abdel Nasser to reject an immediate settlement with Israel. In the following months, however, Moscow apparently did work with the United States toward a compromise settlement, only to find Nasser reluctant to scale down his demands. During the autumn of 1967, both the UAR and the USSR were active in the United Nations, the one seeking positive UN action against Israel, the other pushing its own resolution but ultimately accepting a British version, adopted as Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.[5] By getting Egypt to go along with this resolution, which fell somewhat short of calling for total and immediate Israeli withdrawal, Moscow appeared to have gained Nasser's acceptance of the idea of a political settlement of Middle Eastern issues.

Meanwhile, however, expanded Soviet shipments of arms permitted Egypt by the fall of 1968 to restore its arsenal of tanks, artillery and aircraft to levels equalling or even exceeding those existing prior to the June 1967 hostilities (only in numbers of trained pilots did Egyptian military might lag behind the earlier levels).[6] Thus rearmed, Egypt was able to step up its military assertiveness, beginning in late summer 1968 with sniper fire across the Suez Canal and the laying of mines on the Israeli-held eastern bank of the waterway, and subsequently escalating to periodic artillery and air duels in the canal area during September and October.

This escalation of military pressure was clearly designed to reinforce Egyptian diplomatic maneuvers and public pronouncements aimed at creating a crisis atmosphere which would force the United Nations and particularly the great powers to demand an Israeli withdrawal. For example, a massive artillery barrage on September 8, 1968—the largest Egyptian barrage since the June war—came just one day before a scheduled meeting of the UN Security Council.

In the ensuing days, Nasser (recently returned from a period of medical treatment in the USSR) met with his cabinet to discuss the military situation "on the fighting front," and at the opening session of the Arab Socialist Union's Congress he reaffirmed his commitment to liberate Egypt's lost territories.[7] The Cairo press and radio spoke repeatedly of the tense and explosive situation in the Middle East and called for "positive action" by the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly to ensure the success of the Jarring mission.[8] On September 27, Hasanein Heikal, confidant of President Nasser and editor of the semiofficial Cairo newspaper *Al-Ahram,* ominously wrote:

The Middle East crisis is about to make a decisive and perhaps final appearance in this UN interna-

[5] For a text of the resolution, see *The New York Times,* Nov. 23, 1967, p. 5.

[6] See *ibid.,* Oct. 12, 1967; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1967,* London, author, 1968, p. 37; and *Near East Report: A Special Survey* (Washington, DC), January 1968, p. A-9. An editorial by Hasanein Heikal in *Al-Ahram* of March 1, 1968, stated: "Today we see that we have a big and strong army—an army prepared and armed but in need of greater preparedness and more weapons. *It is, by any estimate, stronger and more effective than the army we had before the Sinai battles.*" See British Broadcasting Corporation, *Report* (London), ME/2711, March 4, 1968, p. A3.

[7] See *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), Sept. 12 and 15, 1968.

[8] *Ibid.,* Sept. 25, 1968. Gunnar Jarring, Sweden's Ambassador to the USSR and formerly his country's Permanent Representative at the UN, was appointed on November 23, 1967, by the UN Secretary-General as Special Representative to the Middle East charged with exploring the possibilities of a settlement in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 242.

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Evidence of Soviet support for Egypt after the June War of 1967: at the top, three Soviet Tupolev bombers pass over Cairo in January 1968 before landing at the UAR capital on an official visit; at the bottom, command vessel No. 890, one of eight ships in a Soviet squadron paying official calls at Egyptian ports, sails into Port Said on October 27, 1967.

—Paris Match via Pictorial Parade; UPI.

tional arena. After this, the race between a political settlement and a military solution—and the political settlement so far has lagged behind in the race—will have ended with the final elimination of the political solution from the race.

The tension created by Egyptian actions along the canal and Cairo's threatening statements failed to produce any sustained response from the great powers, who were generally preoccupied with other matters. The United States was in the midst of a presidential election campaign, and the Soviet Union was dealing with the consequences of its August 21 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the September 26 enunciation of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." The Soviet Union did back up Egypt by warning Israel against any provocative actions aimed at Egypt, Jordan, or Syria and by pressing the UN General Assembly for implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. The latter move, however, proved unavailing, and Egyptian diplomacy was stymied. By late October the threat of serious fighting had passed, and on November 8 Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad returned early from the UN General Assembly with the assessment that the Jarring mission was deadlocked and no further purpose was served by his remaining at the UN.

Mounting Pressures

The lull proved short-lived as Nasser found himself under increasing domestic and Arab-world pressures. Serious student rioting broke out in Mansurah and Alexandria on November 21. For the second time in nine months, riots and disorders spread in the major cities. While the slow pace of internal reforms was clearly a factor, the students were also impatient with Nasser's failure to make any progress toward the "liberation" of Egyptian and other Arab lands occupied by Israel.[9] Nasser's leadership in the Arab world was likewise under implicit challenge from the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, whose headline-catching border raids against Israel from Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan and terrorist

[9] In a speech before an emergency session of the National Congress of the Arab Socialist Union, Nasser acknowledged the sources of discontent. He likened Egypt's situation to that of England after Dunkirk, with the difference that, ". . . we are neither in a state of war nor of peace—hence the sad atmosphere." Nevertheless, Nasser affirmed his continuing efforts to achieve "an honorable political settlement." See BBC, *Report*, ME/2942, Dec. 4, 1968, . p. 46.

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exploits against Israelis abroad appeared to be the only real resistance to Israel. Consequently, in early December—on the eve of visits to the area by Jarring and by William Scranton, a personal envoy of US President-elect Richard M. Nixon—Egypt resumed firing along the canal.

Moscow, evidently anxious to avert a new outbreak of war, moved quickly, sending Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Egypt on December 21 with what Cairo Radio the next day termed "an important message from the Soviet leaders." The message presumably was the "peace plan" presented to Jarring in Moscow on December 22 and formally submitted to Britain, France, and the United States on December 30. According to incomplete reports, this plan called, *inter alia*, for acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 by Israel and "those neighboring Arab states willing to participate in implementation" of a plan of action; proposed a timetable and procedure for the phased withdrawal "under UN supervision" of Israeli forces from all territories occupied in 1967; and promised "secure and recognized boundaries," "freedom of navigation in the region's international waterways," and "a just solution of the refugee problem." [10]

The tone of the joint Soviet-Egyptian communiqué issued on December 24, 1968, at the end of Gromyko's visit, suggested that Cairo had bent somewhat to Moscow's wishes and was prepared to give Soviet diplomacy an opportunity to produce results.[11] While none of the specific proposals contained in the Soviet peace plan were mentioned, the communiqué did stress the need for a peaceful settlement based on implementation of Resolution 242 and Egypt's readiness to accept such a settlement in principle. A further indication of the mood of accommodation was the communiqué's failure to mention the problem of Palestinian refugees (implying that this thorny issue would not be permitted to block any move toward a settlement of the June 1967 "aggression") or to attack "imperialism," the latter omission evidently being designed to avoid losing Washington's cooperation in the quest for peace.

Behind the apparent meeting of minds conveyed in the December communiqué concerning the best way to resolve the Middle East crisis, there were still serious differences between the positions of the USSR and Egypt. In the Soviet case, this may be inferred from the cursory, cautious treatment given the Gromyko visit in the Moscow press, which suggested a certain wariness about the extent of Egypt's commitment to the principle of a political settlement. Soviet statements continued to stress the need for a peaceful settlement in the area,[12] and Moscow's Ambassador to the UN called for an early meeting of the "Four Powers" (Britain, France, the US, and the USSR) to forestall a further deterioration of the situation. On the other hand, the Egyptian news media stressed the mounting tensions in the Middle East (including sniping incidents along the canal and intense fighting along the Jordanian and Syrian borders with Israel) and tended to reject even the minimal concessions implicit in the Soviet peace plan. Cairo's uncompromising and truculent mood was reflected in Heikal's weekly column of January 3, 1969, in which he wrote:

A peaceful solution to the Middle East problem is not feasible . . . even a political solution cannot be achieved or made possible except through some kind of military action. This action alone is capable of changing the present condition of the land, and this action alone can give expression to the terms which eminent diplomats and veteran lawyers are laboring to formulate.[13]

Heikal's column one week later, though ostensibly summarizing the Soviet peace plan, failed even to mention such key provisions as the phased Israeli withdrawal, Arab guarantees of Israeli sovereignty and territorial security, and the reopening of the Suez Canal once Israel had withdrawn a certain distance in the Sinai.[14]

It soon became clear that Nasser himself was growing increasingly pessimistic about the chances for a political settlement and hence more belligerent toward Israel. Addressing the new National Assembly on January 20, 1969, the Egyptian President spoke of the strengthening of his country's armed forces over the preceding 18 months thanks to the "true and sincere cooperation" of the USSR. On the Middle East crisis, he bluntly stated:

[10] The text of what was purported to be the Soviet peace plan was published in the Beirut newspaper *Al-Anwar* on Jan. 10, 1969; in *Al-Ahram* on Jan. 19 (together with the US reply of two days earlier); and in *Pravda* (in outline form only), on Jan. 25.

[11] The communiqué was published in *Pravda*, Dec. 25, 1968; trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Ann Arbor, Mich.), Vol. 20, No. 52, Jan. 15, 1969, p. 30.

[12] See, for example, *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1969.

[13] *Al-Ahram*, Jan. 3, 1969.

[14] *Ibid.*, Jan. 10, 1969.

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We must realize that the enemy will not retreat unless we force him to by fighting. As a matter of fact, there is no hope of a political solution unless the enemy realizes that we can force him to withdraw by fighting. In other words, no progress can be made by military or political action unless the military front is the starting point for such progress.[15]

Nasser also spoke of the Palestinian resistance movement and insisted that no decisions affecting its members would be made without their approval. (The Palesinian issue can be viewed as a political barometer of Egypt's attitude toward dealing with Israel: when deemphasized, it suggests a readiness to negotiate; when emphasized, it signifies intransigence and a virtual demand for a return to pre-partition conditions in Palestine.) As if to highlight the growing tensions, Egyptian Minister of War Muhammad Fawzi briefed the Assembly on the military situation in a secret session two days after Nasser's appearance.[16]

Faced with such signs of Egyptian intransigence, the Soviet Union apparently made another high-level, if low-key, attempt to deter Nasser from resuming hostilities. CPSU Politburo member Aleksandr N. Shelepin, in his capacity as Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, journeyed to Cairo in late January at the head of the Soviet delegation to the Fourth Congress of the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. Publicly addressing the Congress, he reaffirmed full Soviet support for "legitimate Arab rights" and declared that an "Israeli withdrawal behind the lines of June 5, 1967, is a necessary condition for any solution." [17] During his visit, however, Shelepin also held a three-hour meeting with Nasser that was described by *Al-Ahram* as "very, very important." The Cairo newspaper claimed that the meeting had indicated "complete agreement that Israel's continued occupation [of its positions in Sinai] will probably create an explosion in the Middle East at any moment." [18] But Moscow's silence on the subject seemed to suggest that there was more to the talk than Cairo was ready to admit. The *Pravda* accounts of Shelepin's trip failed to mention his talk with Nasser or any messages that Brezhnev or Nasser might have conveyed through this important envoy.

The differences between the views of Moscow and Cairo on how best to deal with the crisis were further highlighted in an interview with Nasser published in *Newsweek* magazine on February 4, 1969. Nasser now claimed that he had been pessimistic about the Soviet peace plan from the moment that Gromyko had presented it. The Egyptian president also added that, while Israeli acceptance of Resolution 242 might be adequate to liquidate the effects of the 1967 aggression, it "is not adequate for the Palestine problem, *which is the main problem* . . . ." (emphasis added).

Egypt Moves Toward War

Throughout February, Egypt stepped up clashes along the canal and on February 24 declared a state of emergency in all governorates. On March 8, sniper fire, machine-gun exchanges, and mine-laying expeditions gave way to massive Soviet-style artillery barrages—the most severe fighting since the 1967 war. On March 27, Nassar linked the new hostilities to Four Power talks scheduled to begin at the UN on April 3 and suggested that the intensity and scope of the fighting would depend on their outcome. He also gave a glowing and unusually detailed description of Moscow's generosity in supplying arms and advisers to help train Egyptian troops,[19] presumably in an attempt to ensure that Moscow would not try to curtail the fighting by restricting the flow of weapons.

Although the Soviet Union apparently did not try to exert such leverage, it was clearly anxious to prevent the situation in the Middle East from getting out of hand (particularly in view of the growing tension with China along the Ussuri River frontier since the clashes in March 1969). Moscow thus faced the delicate task of continuing to support its Arab partners while discouraging them from undertaking extreme initiatives. An April 3 commentary in *Izvestia* illustrated these simultaneous concerns.

[15] *Ibid.*, Jan. 21, 1969.
[16] *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1969.
[17] *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1969.
[18] *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1969.

[19] Nasser stated: "The Soviet Union is supplying us with the arms we need without exerting pressure on our current financial resources, which are bearing the heavy burden of the war. It is enough to tell you that we have not yet paid a single penny. The first consignment of arms we received from the Soviet Union was free. After that, all other arms consignments were paid for with long-term loans . . . ."

He continued, "We also asked the Russians to assist us in training, in grasping arms, and in modernizing the various commands—from the supreme to the subordinate commands . . . . We have benefited a great deal in the recent months from the Soviet experts and advisers who are with our units." See BBC, *Report*, ME/3037, March 29, 1969, pp. A5-6.

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While blaming Israel for triggering the new fighting, the commentary stated that "the extremists [*i.e.*, the Arabs opposing peaceful settlement of the crisis] have become particularly active now when there have been signs of progress in the search for paths to a political settlement of the Near East crisis, when consultations are being held beween representatives of the USSR, the United States, France, and Britain on this question." Moreover, in a note to UN Secretary General U Thant on May 8, the USSR called for strict adherence to the UN cease-fire [20]—an implied admonition to Egypt as much as to Israel.

In spite of these apparent Soviet efforts to curb Egyptian bellicosity, the fighting continued to intensify, as evidenced by a heavy air battle over the canal on May 22. Western diplomats reported that in private talks with their Soviet counterparts the latter expressed "little sympathy with the Arab position." [21] *Izvestia* of May 25, while crediting Nasser with a "positive attitude" toward the Four Power talks, cautioned the Arabs against any "adventurist" course of action. On the other hand, Moscow failed to broadcast internationally a commentary by *Pravda's* Near East specialist, Igor Beliaev, endorsing the principle of direct talks, presumably for fear of offending the Arabs,[22] and on June 4, *Al-Ahram* was able to quote, with evident satisfaction, an *Izvestia* denial of a US report that the Soviet position on Israeli withdrawal was becoming more flexible.

The last Soviet effort to avert serious hostilities along the canal occurred on June 10, when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko journeyed to Cairo for intensive talks with the Egyptian leaders. However, the resulting joint communiqué of June 13 appeared to represent a clear-cut victory for Cairo's position. It held that "to find a peaceful settlement in the Middle East requires the implementation of all parts and provisions of the 22 November 1967 resolution and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab areas occupied by Israel as a result of the 5 June 1967 aggression. . . ." This wording was indicative of a hard-line rejection of various proposals for a phased Israeli withdrawal which were currently circulating. Moreover, in contrast to the December 24, 1968, communiqué, it clearly linked any peaceful settlement to solution of the Palestinian problem, further underlining Cairo's intransigent stand.[23] In all probability, Moscow's support of Cairo's uncompromising position was needed to reassure Egypt, which had been concerned about press reports of a joint Soviet-US proposal. As a matter of fact, we may assume that Gromyko had indeed come to consult about a comprehensive 13-point proposal that had been submitted by the US to the USSR on May 26.[24] The June 13 communiqué left no doubt that Cairo had turned down the proposal.

The Gromyko visit to Cairo thus seemed to mark the failure of a considerable Soviet diplomatic effort to steer Egypt away from a renewal of the Middle Eastern war. Soviet inputs of military and economic assistance had unquestionably been indispensable to Egypt's recovery from the June 1967 conflict, but they had failed to give Moscow sufficient influence to avert Egypt's return to belligerency in 1969.

Once the "war of attrition" was launched, Moscow apparently saw no alternative to supporting the Egyptian forces. Judging from the lavish expenditure of artillery shells over the next 13 months, Moscow made little effort to restrict supplies of munitions—presumably for fear that such blatant pressure would undermine its position in Egypt. And when Egypt was faced with the threat of "deep penetration" Israeli air raids in late 1969-early 1970, Moscow acceded to a very significant escalation of its military support—*i.e.*, the commitment of missile crews, pilots, and air defense teams to protect Egypt's heartland.[25] While this meant greater Egyptian dependence and an expanded Soviet military presence in the UAR, it also increased Soviet exposure and adversely affected the Kremlin's pursuit of a policy of détente with the West.

By mid-1970, however, Egyptian military reverses enabled Moscow to regain a measure of leverage in its efforts to contain the threat of a major conflict in the Middle East. Egypt, under Soviet pressure, acceded to a three-month cease-fire plan proposed by the United States, and on August 8, 1970, the "war of attrition" along the Suez Canal came to an

[20] *The New York Times*, May 9, 1969.

[21] *Ibid.*, May 23, 1969.

[22] *Ibid.* The Beliaev broadcast was translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: USSR and Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC), May 12, 1969, pp. A38-40.

[23] For the text of the communiqué, see *Pravda*, June 14, 1969; trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 21, No. 24, July 9, 1969. The UAR and USSR agreed "to defend the legitimate rights and independence of the Arab peoples . . ."

[24] *The New York Times*, June 21, 1969. *Al-Ahram* on June 15 had dismissed rumors of agreement between the US and the Soviet Union as "psychological warfare." *The Egyptian Gazette* (Cairo) of June 15 suggested that the June 13 communiqué was designed to tell "exactly where the Soviet Union stood."

[25] See, for example, Yaacov Ro'i and Ilana Dimant-Kass, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-15.

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end. The USSR thus barely managed to defuse a dangerous situation which threatened not only to enmesh it more and more deeply in the actual fighting but also to negate efforts to arrive at an accommodation with West Germany and the US.

Upping the Ante

Up to this point, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship had been on an *ad hoc* though continuing basis, but on May 27, 1971, it took on a more formalized charactor with the signing of a Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.[26] The treaty attracted widespread attention and was generally interpreted in the West as signifying both an increase and the institutionalization of Soviet influence in Egypt. The very fact that the Soviet Union was willing to commit itself explicitly to the defense of Egypt (something it had not done for any non-Communist country of the Third World) suggested that Moscow must have believed that it would receive an important *quid pro quo* in terms of influence over Egyptian policy.[27] Articles 7 and 8 of the treaty seemed to confirm this impression. Article 7 called for consultations "regularly at various levels with regard to all important issues which concern the interests of both countries." Article 8 spoke of

. . . cooperation in the military sphere on the basis of suitable agreements between them [the two parties]. *This cooperation will particularly include aid in training the personnel of the UAR Armed Forces and in their assimilation of arms and equipment supplied to the UAR for strengthening its capability to remove the traces of the aggression and for strengthening its capability to confront aggression in general.*

These provisions gave reason to anticipate a further expansion of the Soviet military presence in Egypt, and, in addition, the 15-year term of the treaty suggested a more permanent type of relationship in which the Soviet Union would be able to pursue its courtship of Egypt systematically and with long-term purposes in mind.

That the treaty indicated a major new Soviet commitment in its relationship with Egypt is beyond question. That it signaled a major increase in Soviet influence is more problematic, as a close investigation of the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement tends to confirm.

In the first place, the treaty appears quite clearly to have resulted from a Soviet and not an Egyptian initiative. The coming of the large Soviet delegation dispatched to Egypt for the negotiation and signing was announced on Cairo Radio a mere two days before its arrival on May 25. Moreover, the provisions of the treaty, when announced, bore a remarkable resemblance to those of treaties between the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations, suggesting that the Soviet delegation had arrived with a prepared text in hand. Also, the delegation itself was an impressive one with significantly comprehensive representation of party, government, and military interests, including President Nikolai Podgorny as head of the delegation, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Deputy Defense Minister General Ivan Pavlovsky, and CPSU Secretary Boris Ponomarev, the party's specialist on relations with foreign Communist and "progressive" parties.[28] Finally, the treaty, which was ratified by Egypt on June 14 and by the USSR on June 18, was hailed with considerably more fanfare in Moscow than in Cairo.

What prompted Moscow's decision to up the ante so dramatically in its relationship with Egypt? One can see now that it was very likely a combination of factors on the Egyptian domestic scene and in the evolving foreign policy posture of the new Egyptian President, Anwar Sadat (who had succeeded Nasser after the latter's death on September 28, 1970), that must have convinced the Soviet Union of the necessity of making an increased commitment. As early as February 1971, Sadat had reportedly been making his own independent diplomatic soundings about the possibilities of a political

[26] For provisions of the treaty, see *Pravda*, May 28, 1971; trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 23, No. 21, June 22, 1971, p. 204.

[27] In this regard, one must bear in mind that the Soviet Union by and large views treaties as serious obligations entered into for mutual benefit. Such an attitude has not necessarily characterized Middle Eastern regimes in the past. As a Yugoslav official suggested to the author recently, the Soviet Union's failure to recognize this discrepancy may constitute an important drawback in its approach to the region. "We cautioned the Soviets," he recalled, "that Sadat was agreeing to the treaty too quickly for it to have any lasting value."

[28] The last three individuals were the principal Soviet representatives in three working groups—one dealing with political affairs, one with military matters, and one with party-to-party relations—formed at Soviet suggestion on May 26 for working out the terms of the treaty. See Cairo domestic broadcast in Arabic, May 26, 1971, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC), May 26, 1971, p. G11.

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Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny, left, and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat sign a fifteen-year USSR-UAR Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Cairo on May 27, 1971.

—Wide World.

settlement in the Middle East, and to counter the danger that this might weaken the Soviet-Egyptian tie, Moscow had stepped up deliveries of aircraft and defense missiles in March and April.[29] On the Egyptian domestic front, Vice-President Ali Sabri had begun challenging Sadat's growing power at a series of meetings of the Arab Socialist Union's Central Committee on April 25-27, complaining that Sadat had made too many concessions to Libya and Syria during talks in Tripoli aimed at forming a Federation of Arab Republics. On May 3, the day before US Secretary of State William Rogers was due to arrive in Cairo to discuss a plan for phased Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai and reopening of the Suez Canal, Sadat dismissed Sabri from the vice-presidency and ten days later carried out a sweeping purge of Nasser-era leaders including Sabri and War Minister Fawzi—both generally regarded as advocates of closer ties with the USSR.

Uncertain about the full implications of these developments, Moscow maintained virtual silence. However, it must have seemed clear to the Soviet leaders that the USSR's special posiion in Egypt was threatened. If the Rogers plan were to materialize, Washington would have delivered to Egypt by diplomacy what Moscow's considerable military commitments had not enabled Cairo to attain. Moreover, if Moscow were no longer to be able to speak for Cairo in discussions with the United States on the future of the Middle East, what function—other than that of quartermaster—would be left for the USSR to play in Middle Eastern affairs? The upshot was that, within two weeks of Sadat's preemptive coup, Moscow dispatched its delegation to Cairo with the proposal for a 15-year treaty. If Sadat signed, the Soviet Union was prepared to leave its fallen Egyptian sympathizers to their fate.

Sadat's alacrity in signing the treaty was equally understandable. Eager to consolidate his political position at home, he saw the treaty as a Soviet pledge not to interfere in Egyptian domestic affairs and hence as a reinforcement of the legitimacy of his rule, while the reaffirmation of Soviet promises of weapons and military advisers would strengthen his credentials with the Egyptian military, upon whose loyalty he depended. In addition, the formalization and expansion of Soviet commitments of support could only strengthen Sadat's hand in bargaining with the United States.

On the other hand, the Soviet leaders who were the initiators of the treaty found themselves obliged to expand their commitments merely in order to preserve their existing position. The treaty did not positively strengthen that position in any significant area of Egyptian affairs; on the contrary, the Russians were forced to sit back while Sadat suppressed "progressive" elements and took such "bourgeois" steps as increasing the permissible size of private landholdings. It is possible that conclusion of the treaty helped to squelch the Rogers peace plan, but the more important motivation behind Sadat's subsequent shift from exploration of the possibility of an interim settlement to a policy of decisive confrontation with Israel was the need to consolidate his domestic power by pursuing a more aggressive foreign policy.

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

Thus, the conclusion of the treaty of May 1971 seems to have been largely a defensive maneuver on Moscow's part to prevent an erosion of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship—and one which actually benefited the Sadat regime more than it benefited the USSR. Despite this maneuver, however, serious strains quickly surfaced again between the two governments. These strains stemmed in part from a basic incompatibility between Soviet and Egyptian objectives and in part from the dynamics of Egyptian domestic politics.

[29] On Sadat's initiative, see *The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1971. The influx of new Soviet weaponry was reported in various sources, including *The Egyptian Gazette*, March 23, 1971.

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While moving to reequip the Egyptian armed forces, Moscow refused to provide the offensive weapons—in particular, missiles—which Sadat sought in order to be able to recapture the Israeli-occupied territories. By withholding such weapons, Moscow was, in effect, delaying any decisive Egyptian move along the Suez Canal. The Soviet Union was willing to support Egypt's position that "a just and lasting peace in the Middle East can be established only if all the provisions of the November 22, 1967, resolution of the Security Council are fulfilled," but the Kremlin shied away from endorsing a full-scale resumption of hostilities.[30]

On the other hand, President Sadat faced mounting domestic discontent over his policy of "no war, no peace" and the growing Soviet presence in Egypt. In December 1971, there were new student demonstrations calling for domestic liberalization and a more decisive policy toward Israel. In early February 1972 and again in late April, Sadat went to Moscow in a quest for offensive missiles or decisive Soviet pressure on behalf of a Middle East settlement satisfying Egyptian demands. (At the time of the April Sadat visit, the Soviet leadership was preparing for the Nixon-Brezhnev summit conference of May 22-29, 1972.) The most he came away with, however, was an implied acceptance by Moscow of the right of the Arab states to resort to force in order to regain the Arab territories captured by Israel.[31]



In April 1972, Anwar Sadat, President of the Egyptian Republic, pays his second visit in two months to the USSR. He is welcomed at the airport by Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin.

—Keystone.

Frustrated in his request for Soviet offensive weapons, pressured by Egyptian military officers offended by the overbearing attitude of Soviet staff officers, and desirous of enhancing the prestige of Egypt (and himself) on the eve of the 20th anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, Sadat finally took drastic action to demonstrate that Egypt was no Soviet puppet. On July 18, 1972, he ordered the expulsion of Soviet military advisers and personnel from the country and the return of Soviet-manned bases in Egypt to Egyptian control.

Sadat's defiant action deprived the Soviet Union of the extraterritorial enclaves on Egyptian soil that had been granted by Nasser, involving exclusive Soviet use of six air bases and of a section of the port of Alexandria. The bulk of the 15,000-man Soviet military adviser contingent also were expelled, although several thousand military technicians needed to man the Egyptian air defense and communications systems, as well as Soviet economic advisers, were allowed to remain. Faced by this severe setback, Moscow nevertheless appeared unwilling to abandon its investment in Egypt and chose to ride out the storm.

The "Yom Kippur" War

The Egyptian expulsion move made one thing quite clear: Sadat was not willing to let his dependence on Soviet arms prevent him from pursuing a definitive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on terms acceptable to Egypt. Fifteen months later, on October 6, 1973—the Jewish religious day, Yom Kippur—Egyptian forces broke the stalemate with a massive attack across the Suez Canal that established footholds on the east bank of the canal.

[30] See the author's "The Soviet Union in the Middle East," *Current History* (Philadelphia), October 1972, p. 168. It might be noted that in December 1971 Moscow withdrew its missile crews and planes from the defense of the Aswan Dam—a clear signal to Sadat to abstain from triggering a new war at a time when the USSR was preoccupied with the Indo-Pakistani conflict.

[31] The Soviet-Egyptian communiqué of April 29, 1972, stated that the Arab states "have every justification for using other means . . . to regain the Arab territories captured by Israel." See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), May 1, 1972, pp. B1-3.

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(Syrian forces simultaneously struck in the Golan Heights, briefly penetrating almost to the line of June 5, 1967, before being pushed back.)

Based on the available evidence, admittedly fragmentary, it would appear that the decision to start the war was made in Cairo, not in Moscow as some have argued.[32] Admittedly, Moscow must have had several days' advance knowledge of the contemplated Egyptian action from Soviet intelligence sources on the scene. Indeed, this was evident from Moscow's action to evacuate the families and dependents of Soviet advisers in Egypt and Syria between October 3 and 5. It seems unlikely, however, that Moscow would have undertaken the evacuation at such a crucial juncture if it had been in collusion with Egypt and Egypt's allies and had approved of or pressed for the launching of hostilities. It is even conceivable that Moscow was trying to "signal" or forewarn Washington of what was about to happen, although this remains in the realm of unconfirmed speculation.

Once the fighting began, however, Moscow was faced once again with the need to preserve its credibility as an ally and to avoid charges of pusillanimity. Within 48 hours it began to resupply Egypt and Syria with weapons and ammunition by an airlift which assumed massive proportions on October 10. Soviet naval units in the area also began to maneuver in a provocative fashion. During the initial Egyptian successes, Moscow appeared willing to give Cairo its head, but when the fighting turned against Egypt and Syria, the situation grew much more complex.

Amidst growing Soviet-US tension, Soviet Premier Kosygin journeyed to Cairo on October 17 for secret talks with President Sadat. From subsequent events, it would appear that Kosygin urged Egypt to settle for limited tactical gains in return for a promise of full support for a political settlement agreeable to Cairo. On October 20, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger flew to Moscow at the urgent request of the Soviet government, and on October 22 the Soviet and American governments called for an immediate session of the UN Security Council at which they cosponsored a resolution calling for an end to the hostilities. In spite of this joint move, the two powers came close to a collision in the next several days as reports of troop concentrations at Soviet airports caused the US government to order a worldwide nuclear alert.[33] By early November, however, after some last-minute jockeying by the combatants for more favorable field positions, a UN-sponsored cease-fire and troop disengagement plan went into effect on the Egyptian-Israeli front, and the crisis was once again returned to diplomatic channels.



Soviet surface-to-air missiles captured from Egypt by Israeli forces during the "Yom Kippur" war of October 1973.

—AFP from Pictorial Parade.

The lessons of the "Yom Kippur" war must have been sobering ones for the Kremlin. As a consequence of Egypt's renewal of hostilities, an action which Moscow presumably did not advocate but was powerless to prevent, the Soviet Union found itself in grave danger of sacrificing the potential economic and political gains it had sought through a painstaking policy of détente. Moscow's immediate stake in the Arab world came close to superseding its long-term relationship with the United States.

The Soviet-Egyptian Tie Today

Where does this leave the Soviet-Egyptian relationship today? Egypt continues to be heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. All its weapons are Soviet-supplied, and although Sadat has expressed interest in obtaining weapons from the US and other Western states, such reequipment, if undertaken, would take considerable time. Thus, notwithstanding the new diplomatic options that have become avail-

[32] For an interpretation to the effect that Brezhnev orchestrated the entire scenario, see Uri Ra'anan, "The USSR and the Middle East: Some Reflections on the Soviet Decision-Making Process," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Fall 1973, pp. 946-77.

[33] See *The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1973.

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able to Egypt through improved relations with the United States, Cairo cannot dispense with its Soviet protector, its ultimate shield against military defeat.

For its part, the USSR also remains tied to Egypt. It must maintain an ongoing relationship with Cairo, as well as Damascus, in order to reassure doubting Arabs of Moscow's reliability and to retain a major Soviet presence in the Arab world—more because of considerations inherent in its global rivalry with the United States than because of any expectation of spreading communism in the Middle East.

One should recognize that there is at the base of this relationship a fundamental asymmetry in aims. The Soviet Union has sought to maintain a presence in the strategic Middle East by cultivating Egypt, enabling that major Arab state to resist a settlement with Israel on terms viewed in Cairo as disadvanageous or intolerable. In effect, the Soviet purpose has been to perpetuate the unsettling regional conflict without letting it get out of hand. Cairo, on the other hand, has sought from Moscow the military, economic, and diplomatic support which would enable Egypt to resolve the chronic Middle Eastern crisis to its advantage—whether militarily or diplomatically.

From this asymmetry of goals has flowed an asymmetry of accomplishments. Clearly, Soviet influence over Egyptian foreign policy has been limited —even during the period of greatest Egyptian vulnerability and dependence. Massive inputs of Soviet military and economic aid did not translate into any significant influence over their disposition. As far as the author can determine, the Egyptians decided when and for how long to mount military actions along the Suez Canal. Cairo accepted Soviet advice on how to use its new military hardware, but it did not look to Moscow to develop a foreign policy for Egypt's new strategic situation. On the domestic front, moreover, neither Nasser nor Sadat really reoriented Egyptian economic practices and priorities to make them conform to Soviet suggestions.

In effect, Soviet policy in Egypt has been forced to adjust to developments in Egyptian domestic politics more often than Egyptian policy has yielded to Soviet preferences. There is no evidence that Moscow has been able to mobilize or strengthen the position of Egyptian officials or groups disposed to follow policies preferred by the Soviet Union. Moscow's leverage on issues of importance to the Egyptian leadership has been, at best, marginal once Cairo resolved upon a course of action. Gratitude for Soviet support has not carried with it a willingness to tolerate Soviet interference in Egyptian decision-making on key issues.

There is, in a word, no indication that Moscow has ever attained with Egypt the sort of relationship that it has with the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. As one observer has put it, "the Soviet Union wants its client states to be strong enough to stand on their own, but weak enough to take orders." Through much of the period examined, Egypt was not strong enough to stand on its own, but strong enough to refuse to take orders.

Thanks to Soviet shipments of increasingly sophisticated military equipment (even if not as sophisticated as Cairo might have wished), Egypt has repeatedly been able to put military pressure on Israel, sometimes in ways not congenial to larger Soviet designs. While the USSR could marginally regulate the flow of arms in order to exercise some leverage on Egyptian decisions vitally affecting Soviet global interests, Moscow really had little choice but to keep the material moving to Cairo lest its client state either terminate the Soviet presence in Egypt completely or suffer a major defeat. There is considerable truth to Nasser's oft-repeated observation that in such relationships the donor is circumscribed by its commitment to a small nation. Once committed to giving, Moscow could not reduce the supply of weapons significantly without undercutting its entire, expensively-acquired position in Egypt. And this treadmill situation will doubtless continue as long as a Soviet presence in Egypt is important to Moscow's overall strategic interest in the region, or until the political context within which the relationship is pursued changes for reasons beyond Moscow's control.

We find, then, that it is easy both to overestimate the extent to which Soviet inputs into Third World countries bring influence and to underestimate the profound constraints on Soviet influence inherent in the institutions, practices, and political climate of those countries. It has been shown in the case of Egypt that the "dependent" member of such a relationship may be quite capable of undertaking independent foreign policy initiatives, at times to the detriment of the broader interests of the donor. The possibility that the party to be influenced may turn out to be the one that in the end holds the whip-hand is an example of the surprising findings awaiting the development and application of increasingly refined criteria and methods for studying influence relationships in the Third World.

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Ceausescu's Romania

By Trond Gilberg

The contemporary political scene in Romania is characterized by rapid change, the emergence of an increasingly complex socio-economic system which sets important parameters for political activity, and above all by the growing personal power of Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and President of the Republic. Indeed, some Western analysts maintain that the increasing sway of the General Secretary is the catalyst for the myriad of other political interactions and developments in Romania,[1] and there is widespread agreement that the current political scene cannot be understood without a close examination of Ceausescu and his personal political style.[2] This article will explore the character of Romanian politics in recent years and the factors that have shaped these politics, with special attention to the role of Ceausescu. It will also attempt to gauge the crucial determinants of political life in the Balkan country for the foreseeable future.

Ceausescu's Accumulation of Power

Among the important factors that have established the framework of Romanian politics over the last several years, perhaps the most obvious has been Ceausescu's drive to consolidate his personal power. Certainly, the authority concentrated in his hands has steadily expanded since he assumed leadership of the RCP in 1965.[3] Having spent most of his political career in the Communist Youth Organization (*Uniunea Tineretului Comunist*—UTC [4]) and in the RCP *apparat* and having been a close associate of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the previous head of the party, he was an acceptable successor to Gheorghiu-Dej in the eyes of most of the RCP leadership upon the latter's death in March 1965; however, his position was by no means solid and unchallenged. In fact, he even confronted strong opponents at the highest levels who had greater seniority in the party than he had. (Born into a peasant family in 1918, Ceausescu had moved up the party ladder quite rapidly after joining the UTC in 1933. For example, he had entered the RCP Central Committee as early as 1945 and had become a member of the Secretariat in 1954.)

Today, the situation has altered dramatically. His entrenchment in the party apparatus and the number of formal posts that he occupies afford a vivid illustration. Not only is he a member of the RCP Permanent Presidium (formerly called the Politburo), but he also heads the Party Secretariat and has full membership on the RCP Executive Committee. In 1967, he acquired the position of President

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[1] See, for example, Stephen Fischer-Galati, *Twentieth Century Rumania,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.

[2] For a typical statement, see Gabriel Fischer, "Rumania," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Eds. *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971,* Minneapolis, Minn., The University of Minnesota Press, 1972, pp. 158-80.

[3] The biographical information in the following discussion is taken from an excellent summary, Radio Free Europe Research, "The Rumanian Party Leadership," Rumania/4, March 30, 1973 (introduction by Robert R. King; chart and individual chronologies by Unity Evans).

[4] While the name has varied somewhat since the organization's founding, *Uniunea Tineretului Comunist* has been the official designation since 1949.

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of the Socialist Republic of Romania (head of the State Council). His other posts include Deputy to the Romanian parliament, *Marea Adunarea Nationala* (Grand National Assembly, commonly known as the GNA in the West); head of the *Frontul Unitar Socialist* (Socialist Unity Front—FUS), the "umbrella" mass organizaion that incorporates all major socio-economic and political organizations in the country; and, since 1973, Chairman of the newly established Supreme Council for Socioeconomic Development.

It is fair to say that Ceausescu personally holds the most important political positions in *both* the party and state hierarchies, while his control over joint bodies such as the Supreme Council for Socio-economic Development ensures his influence on matters pertaining to socioeconomic planning, forecasting, and actual production in the economy. No other individual in Eastern Europe possesses as much formal power as he does.

Ceausescu has achieved this status through a a variety of steps over the years. The Ninth RCP Congress in July 1965—four months after Gheorgiu-Dej's death—elected a Central Committee with a strong majority of pro-Ceausescu members.[5] Throughout 1966 and 1967, Ceausescu further strengthened his power by various actions, especially the economic decentralization measures of the latter year. These sought to transfer some aspects of economic planning and decision-making from the central ministries to so-called "economic centrals," which were essentially large trusts in various fields of industry. The economic centrals were designed to improve output within related fields of activity by ensuring coordination between regional and economic units, party branches, and trade union structures, but the immediate *political* effect was to reduce the influence of the central economic hierarchy while expanding that of the new RCP leader.[6]

Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu during his visit to the United States in October 1970.

—Dennis Brack for Black Star.

By early 1968, Ceausescu was ready for his next move. A major administrative reorganization of the country did away with existing territorial units and reestablished the prewar "judets" (counties). To staff the new party branches in the judets, a major reshuffling of party cadres was necessary, and in the process of carrying out this reshuffling, Ceausescu staffed the regional RCP *apparats* with trusted followers—primarily from the ranks of the general *apparatchiks*, a group which had always been largely loyal to the new leader.[7]

This consolidation of Ceausescu's influence in the central and regional RCP *apparats* during 1965-68 was followed by a major ideological campaign in the party and other elite structures in 1971 and subsequently by a series of personnel changes at all levels, both of which are still under way. The ideological campaign, dubbed "the little cultural revolution" by some Western analysts,[8] was aimed at all levels of the party organization and was primarily intended to infuse cadres everywhere with more ideological orthodoxy and greater *esprit de corps*, which by all accounts had begun to wane in

[5] For a list of the members of the Central Committee chosen at this congress, see *Congresul al IX-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman* (Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party), Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1966, pp. 735-40.

[6] The major elements of the economic reform were published in late October and early November 1967 in *Scinteia* (Bucharest) and other major newspapers.

[7] See the author's "Regional Political Leadership in Romania: The Case of the Judet Party," in *East European Quarterly* (Boulder, Col.), September 1974 (forthcoming). In the present context, "general *apparatchiks*" includes all individuals whose primary functional experience has been party work "in the field"—*i.e.*, supervisory personnel without special technical or educational skills but with years of trusted service in the party.

[8] See, for example, the present author's "Ceausescu's Little Cultural Revolution in Romania," *Osteuropa* (Berlin), October 1972, pp. 717-28.

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the second half of the 1960's. In conducting this campaign, Ceausescu has removed a number of individuals at all levels whose performances have been deemed unsatisfactory; at the same time, he has also directed the purge against anyone whose loyalty to him could be considered questionable. Thus, in early 1972, Vasile Patilinet, Party Secretary in charge of security and military affairs, was released from his duties and transferred to a relatively insignificant ministry.[9] Previously, another Secretary, Virgil Trofin, had been removed and dispatched to an unimportant ministry, but in Trofin's case the transfer was not a clear-cut demotion since he had remained on the RCP Permanent Presidium.[10] A short time after Patilinet lost his Secretariat post, a third Secretary, Paul Niculescu-Mizil—who, as Secretary with jurisdiction essentially over interparty relations, had enjoyed a substantial amount of influence—found himself reassigned to governmental service.[11] Other personnel changes of lesser consequence in early 1972 included the replacement of the head of the Bucharest party organization, Dimitru Popa, ostensibly for serious mistakes and misconduct; and the ouster of two judet first secretaries, Karol Kiraly of Covasna Judet and Ilie Fasui of Caras-Severin Judet—the former "at his own request," the latter because of "serious shortcomings in party work." [12]

The Party Secretariat underwent additional changes during the second half of 1972 and throughout 1973. For instance, there were frequent shifts in personnel dealing with security and military matters and with propaganda. In two years, four persons were designated to oversee these areas—Miu Dobrescu and Aurel Duca to handle propaganda and Vasile Patilinet and Ion Dinca to handle security and the military—only to experience early removal and demotion. (At present, it appears that Cornel Burtica, recently named to the Secretariat although his prior jobs had been largely in the state administration, is in charge of both these functional realms.) [13] In June 1973, Josif Banc, the Secretary presumably responsible for agriculture, suffered demotion to the post of First Secretary of Mures Judet.[14] By late 1973, then, a considerable revamping of the Secretariat had taken place, and it seems quite certain that this reshuffling of personnel has measurably enhanced Ceausescu's personal power in this important body since he clearly controlled both removals and replacements.

The personnel changes in the Secretariat, it should be noted, were not confined to the top echelons but extended down through the general Central Committee *apparat* as well—especially in the Section on Military and Security Affairs. A recent appointment to this section, Ion Coman, may be one of the new "Ceausescu men" who can be expected to come to the fore.[15]

While the Secretariat has been substantially altered, it is true that the RCP Executive Committee and the Permanent Presidium have remained essentially the same during the last two or three years. The removal of several individuals from the Secretariat, in short, has not resulted in their dismissal from the Executive Committee or the Presidium. For example, Niculescu-Mizil and Trofin retain membership on the latter, while Patilinet, Banc and Dinca are still on the former body.[16] This anomaly may indicate that Ceausescu is unwilling or unable to change these two bodies substantially—or it may be proof that the personnel changes effected constitute a genuine "rotation of cadres", as is officially maintained.[17] Even in the latter case, however, Ceausescu's position is obviously stronger than before as a result of the rotation.

The reshuffling at the top of the party hierarchy has had its counterpart at the lower levels of the pyramid. Since the "little cultural revolution" was ostensibly launched to combat "careerism, sloganeering, formalism, and lack of ideological-educational activity" among party cadres as well as other elites, it was inevitable that a purge would follow throughout the RCP. There is no available information on the number of individuals involved, but there have clearly been many reassignments of personnel and an injection of loyal *apparatchiks* at all levels. This fundamental reshuffling is still going on and has now overlapped with a major transfer of state ad-

[9] Patilinet's removal from the Secretariat was announced in *Scinteia*, Feb. 17, 1972.

[10] See "The Rumanian Party Leadership," p. 19.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[12] *Scinteia*, April 19, 1972.

[13] As indicated in fn. 9, Patilinet's replacement was reported in *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1972. For information about Dinca, see *ibid.*, June 20, 1973; about Dobrescu and Duca, Radio Free Europe, "Unresolved Questions Concerning Personnel Changes in the Rumanian Party Leadership," Rumania/8, June 29, 1973; about Butica, "The Rumanian Party Leadership."

[14] *Scinteia*, June 20, 1973.

[15] Coman's appointment was confirmed by the RCP Central Committee Plenum in June 1973. See Radio Bucharest, May 29, 1973.

[16] "The Rumanian Party Leadership," pp. 13-21.

[17] See, for example, Ceausescu's speech to the RCP National Conference, July 1972, *Scinteia*, July 20, 1972.

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ministrative personnel to production jobs (to be discussed in detail in another context).

The growing degree of Ceausescu's sway in the party is also reflected in some of the major mass organizations affiliated with the RCP, notably the UTC and the trade unions. His ideological campaign was directed partly against the UTC, which had experienced considerable difficulties in getting through to Romanian youth, and whose programs were plainly unequal to the task of instilling ideological fervor in the younger generation. Continuing problems in this field have resulted in a rapid turnover of the UTC's top leaders over the last few years, with three individuals—Ion Iliescu, Martian Dan, and Traian Stefanescu—having served as General Secretary. The current occupant of the post, Traian Stefanescu, is reputed to be a close follower of Ceausescu.[18]

Relatively rapid turnover of the top leadership of the trade unions has likewise been a hallmark of the Ceausescu era. Florian Danalache, head of the *Uniunea Generala a Sindicatelor din Romania* (General Confederation of Trade Unions in Romania—UGSR) in the 1960's, was replaced in 1971 by Virgil Trofin, who in turn lost this position to Mihai Dalea in 1973. Both Trofin and Dalea must be considered close associates of Ceausescu, so the latter change appears to have mirrored primarily the RCP General Secretary's unhappiness with ideological work in the unions. At the same time, Trofin's ouster from this powerful structure served to prevent any "empire building" on his part, a fact obviously beneficial to Ceausescu.

Ceausescu's major shakeup of the political elite in Romania has involved members of the state governmental structure and the general state administration as well as those of party and party-connected bodies. At the apex of this hierarchy, there have been frequent changes of ministers, and the Foreign Service has recently experienced a big turnover of personnel. While some of these transfers probably stem from the principle of regular rotation—a principle which the General Secretary has emphasized during the last few years[19]—most of them must be seen as part of an attempt by Ceausescu to increase the party's hold on the state administration by "functional unification" of RCP cadres and government personnel. During 1972-73, for instance, several important party leaders—notably Virgil Trofin, Manea Manescu, Maxim Berghianu, Emil Draganescu, Florian Danalache, Miron Constantinescu, and Paul Niculescu-Mizil—assumed high governmental positions, essentially Vice-Premierships. (All these individuals are members of the Executive Committee, the Secretariat, or the Permanent Presidium of the RCP.) In some cases, the shift of personnel entailed transfer of party *apparatchiks* to governmental positions (Trofin and Niculescu-Mizil); in the rest, persons previously appointed to government jobs were reassigned in such a manner as to strengthen party control. As of the spring of 1973, fully 26 of the 54 major governmental posts (Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, heads of ministries, and heads of various significant joint councils) were in the hands of individuals belonging to one or more of the top three RCP bodies, and the remaining 28 were filled by persons on the RCP Central Committee, either as full or alternate members.[20]

This tightening of party control of the governmental structure has been carried further during the last year. Beginning in the early summer of 1973, Ceausescu launched a drive to reduce the heavy administrative component of Romanian ministries and economic agencies. Literally thousands of individuals whose tasks were previously administrative have been transferred to productive jobs in enterprises, on farms, in transportation and commerce, and in numerous other activities.[21] The economic purpose of these transfers was more efficient employment of trained personnel in the production process and reduction of so-called "overhead costs" and general waste resulting from excessive bureaucratization, but the reorganization had major political significance, too. It removed many of the governmental experts from immediate administrative work and placed them "in the field," where they would be subject to party direction as well as to supervision by such party-dominated bodies as trade unions, workers' control councils, and local "people's councils." In this respect, it inevitably enhanced the power

[18] Stefanescu was one of the chief overseers of Ceausescu's ideological campaign among students and academic personnel. See his speech as head of the Union of Students' Associations of Romania in honor of the Eighth Conference of the Union, *Romania's Youth* (Bucharest), No. 1, 1971, pp. 34-44.

[19] *E.g., Scinteia,* July 20, 1972. See also Robert R. King, "Reorganization in Rumania," *Osteuropa,* January 1974, pp. 37-46.

[20] These data were compiled from "The Rumanian Party Leadership."

[21] See, for example, the reorganizations announced in *Viata Economica* (Bucharest), May 11, 1973; *Era Socialista* (Bucharest), No. 9, 1973; and numerous issues of *Scinteia* during the summer and fall of 1973.

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not only of the party at large but also of the General Secretary personally, for one of the main obstacles to Ceausescu's assertion of his own will had been the entrenched state and economic bureaucracy, which was demanding a greater say in political decision-making as a *quid pro quo* for the important services it rendered in the modernization process.[22] The stripping away of much of the experts' power base has reduced the ability of such individuals and groups to have an effect on decision-making in contemporary Romania.

Ceausescu's Personality and Style

A second critical factor that has had an impact on recent political life in Romania has been Ceausescu's personality and style as a leader. He at present constitutes the main motor force of Romanian politics. Indeed, a good deal of the interaction within the political system consists of elite personnel responding to his initiatives, criticisms, and exhortations. This monopoly on policy initiative in most of the important areas has produced a one-man show in Bucharest which is unprecedented anywhere in Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin.

To understand the precise effects of this factor, one must look closely at Ceausescu the man and at his value system.

This value system appears to be a highly original mix of orthodox Marxism-Leninism, Romanian nationalism, and a form of populism springing in part from distrust of bureaucratic procedures and expertise. The General Secretary is, of course, the major Romanian exponent of ideological orthodoxy, of the belief in the expansion of party influence, of mobilization of the masses, and of mass indoctrination through political socialization (all to be treated in detail later). However, his stress on such orthodox Marxist-Leninist themes as the supremacy of the party and democratic centralism is tempered by a strong attachment to the concept of "the national road." According to this notion, each country must apply the *general* elements of the Marxist-Leninist classics creatively within the national context—*i.e.*, within the parameters of existing socioeconomic and cultural conditions in each country. Ceausescu has repeatedly rejected rigid and unquestioning application of some supranational "model" of Marxism-Leninism, and he has castigated those who have demanded such rigor as "scholastics" and "formalists." He considers "formalism" a major sin in elite political behavior, exceeded only by "bourgeois-capitalist deviationism" in his catalogue of undesirable traits.[23] There is a Romanian way, a Yugoslav way, a Soviet way, and so on, and it has been clear that Ceausescu intends to make the Romanian path conform to *his* own vision of it.

Ceausescu's constant insistence on a Romanian road to socialism and communism reflects the strong nationalism in his thinking. On virtually every major occasion, he has made plain his conviction that the RCP is a national leadership vehicle which will propel Romania to its rightful place among nations and restore to the country a prominent place in the world, a place which was lost for centuries as the result of foreign occupation and subjugation.[24] The Romanian press and radio have often compared him, as the leader of this national revival, with national heroes such as Michael the Brave and Stephen the Great, and there is little doubt that he accepts the responsibility inherent in such a comparison with alacrity and enthusiasm. Party publications, speeches, and even resolutions of political and economic decision-making bodies have strongly emphasized the national heritage.[25] In literature and the arts, historical themes abound, and archaeological and anthropological works which stress the Roman heritage of the present inhabitants of the country have been produced constantly. Historical works have also attempted to show the traditional Romanian heritage of such disputed border areas as Transylvania and Moldavia.[26]

The nationalistic aspect of Ceausescu's outlook has been highly popular among the Romanian masses in this multi-ethnic country, who have always tended to view Romania as an outpost of Latin culture in a sea of Slavic underdevelopment. The General Secretary, to be sure, has carefully avoided direct association with the more outspoken nationalists and chauvinists in the country. For instance, he

[22] See the author's "Ceausescu's Little Cultural Revolution . . ." especially pp. 726-28.

[23] See, for instance, his speech to the 1972 RCP National Conference, *loc. cit.*

[24] See his speech to the Tenth RCP Congress in August 1969, in *Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman*, Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1969, especially pp. 57-64.

[25] See, for example, the theses and resolutions of the 1972 RCP National Conference published in *Scinteia*, July 22, 1972.

[26] See, for instance, G. Prodan, *Supplex Libellus Valachorum* (Petition by the People of Walachia), Bucharest, Publishing House of the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971, particularly the commentary, pp. 347-467.

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Nicolae Ceausescu discusses with local officials the most suitable location of new installations.

—Eastfoto.

has underscored the need for all groups, "Romanians, Hungarians, Germans and other nationalities," to live together in harmony and to build jointly a higher civilization neither Romanian nor minority-oriented in character but incorporating the best elements of all national traditions.[27] Despite his overt commitment to a political system above ethnic particularisms, however, it seems clear that Ceausescu's vision of Romania's future society is above all a *Romanian* vision, and that many features of his conception of the desirable societal system at this stage are heavily infused with traditional Romanian nationalism. Therefore, with socioeconomic modernization and a rise in political self-consciousness occurring among all ethnic groups, the General Secretary's nationalism could eventually clash with increasing particularism, especially among the Hungarians, and put his ideal of a new socialist culture transcending old rivalries to an acid test.

The third major element in Ceausescu's political approach has been a highly personal style of decision-making, which to some extent springs from skepticism about bureaucratic procedures and a preference for personal contact with the masses. He is wont to make frequent forays out of Bucharest to visit regional cities, industrial centers, and agricultural districts. On these occasions, he gives a major speech on some subject ranging from economic problems and political mobilization to foreign policy at mass meetings, and he confers with regional leaders, planners, and trade union officials at a series of smaller meetings. But the emphasis is heavily on contact with the rank and file and a relatively open exchange of information, suggestions, and complaints.[28] Such contact with elements of the mass population encourages input from the lower levels in a limited form. It is a carefully orchestrated kind of mass participation which funnels information directly to the party leader, often bypassing bureaucratic channels and structures. The kinds of inputs sought have to do largely with implementation of already established decisions or complaints about

[27] *E.g.*, his speech to the 1972 RCP National Conference, *loc. cit.*

[28] This style has been dramatically exhibited on numerous occasions, and the party press has dutifully reported it in detail. See, for instance, *Scinteia*, Sept. 15, 1972.

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mistakes committed; no basic criticism of the political system *per se* is permitted.

Even this limited kind of contact has proved highly important because it has afforded Ceausescu personal access to the mass public and has provided a safety valve for the release of popular frustrations with aspects of the existing regime. For Ceausescu himself, the results have been exceedingly beneficial, for this populistic, semi-plebiscitarian approach has given him a highly useful image of concern for the average citizen and has at the same time afforded him additional leverage over the bureaucratic *apparats*. Indeed, it has been a major reason for the rise in his power.

While Ceausescu has been encouraging limited involvement of the masses in Romanian politics, he has simultaneously been rotating cadres, reducing the power of the party *apparat*, and using "proletarian organs" and the RCP to restrict the options of socioeconomic and cultural elites. This course, it should be stressed, holds potential dangers, for it may prove impossible to deny the various administrative *apparats* influence for long. The continuing modernization process in Romania is bound to cause more social differentiation than has thus far occurred, and the sophisticated, modern economy now emerging will demand ever larger numbers of technical and managerial experts. Consequently, in supervising the modernization process, the political elite will likely become heavily dependent upon the experts for uninterrupted progress toward the socioeconomic and political goals that the political elite establishes, and it seems unrealistic to suppose that the ubiquitous and indispensable specialists would put themselves unquestioningly at the disposal of a group of nonexpert, party *apparatchik* generalists. In short, the specialists will probably demand a meaningful role in the political system in terms of both information input and participation in actual decision-making—particularly since they enjoyed at least indirect access to the political process between 1965 and 1970-71, before the "little cultural revolution" and the present reorganization of bureaucratic structures, including dismantling of much administrative "overhead," altered the situation.

With respect to this issue, Ceausescu seems to find himself caught in a major dilemma. On the one hand, the general population undoubtedly welcomes its expanded role as an input factor, but its craving for higher material consumption and better services is also considerable after years of relative deprivation. Indeed, the demand for a higher living standard is probably greater than the desire for a symbolic right of limited political participation. Ceausescu undoubtedly realizes this and seeks to "lay the material basis of socialism" through rapid economic development and improved living conditions. To deliver on such a program, on the other hand, he must have the cooperation of the socioeconomic elites who constitute the lifeblood of modern society.

The Effects of Modernization

A third major factor which has had a part in shaping contemporary Romanian politics has been the country's rapid (especially in recent years) socioeconomic and political modernization. Since 1950, total industrial production has expanded 10 times. Production in heavy industry ("Group A") has increased 13 times, while the light and consumer goods industries ("Group B") have registered a much more modest amount of growth (the index of production in Group B stood at 674 in 1969 with 1950 output as the base of 100). The number of wage earners rose almost two-and-a-half times during this period, and the volume of investments went up a phenomenal 12 times. Even agriculture experienced some development (the index of production had reached 225 in 1969 with 1950 output as the base of 100).[29]

Along with socioeconomic development has come increasing social stratification. The relatively uniform mass of the peasantry has been considerably depleted by migration to the cities, where occupational specialization has produced social differentiation. As the Romanian economy has grown more sophisticated, new employment categories have emerged. The 1966 census lists 353 occupations in the economy and provides a detailed breakdown of the "economically active" citizens in these categories, which range from supervisory personnel at all levels to farmhands in "general" functions on the land.[30] Educational development has led to the graduation of thousands of specialists every year. The 1970 statistical yearbook lists 12 kinds of specialization in

[29] See, for example, Republica Socialista Romania, Directia Centrala de Statistica. *Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1970* (Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Republic of Romania 1970), Bucharest, 1970.

[30] Republica Socialista Romania, Directia Centrala de Statistica, *Rescensamintul Populatiei si Locuintelor din 15 Martie 1966* (Census of the Population and Residents of March 15, 1966), Vol. 1, Bucharest, 1969, especially pp. 283-370.

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professional schools below the university level and 29 fields of higher education, all with substantial numbers of students enrolled and graduates.[31]

The rapid development just described was initiated and has been supervised by a highly committed party elite whose modernization goals have also included massive political indoctrination and control. The latter have been carried out primarily through the party structure itself, which today consists of approximately 65,000 primary organizations with about 2.3 million members.[32] Through a complex set of overlapping memberships, the RCP exercises hegemony over the governmental structure, the main mass organizations, and the Socialist Unity Front.

The modernization process has created a far more complex society, economy, and polity than existed when the Communists attained power about a quarter of a century ago, and that growing complexity has posed new problems for the rulers of the country. By and large, the leadership has appeared to be in agreement on the general principles to be followed in approaching these problems. For example, the top RCP leadership has remained a modernizing elite with strong preferences for rapid socioeconomic modernization. Thus, there seems to have been little conflict in the upper echelons of the party about the need for accelerated industrialization, with concomitant urbanization, improved education, and (at least for the time being) relative stratification of society. Similarly, there has been broad commitment to a steady rise in the standard of living—in terms of better living conditions, higher wages, and more satisfactory social services.[33] However, to the leadership, industrialization has essentially meant continued emphasis on heavy, extractive, and machine-building industries rather than on consumer-goods industries.[34] According to the 1971-75 economic plan, the ratio of investments to consumption during this period will be among the highest in Europe, auguring only modest growth in per capita consumption.[35] Agriculture will continue to receive a relatively small share of investments, and agricultural production is scheduled to rise only moderately in the plan period.[36]

Ideologically and operationally, the Romanian political elite has also uniformly supported the "Soviet model" of socioeconomic modernization, which is characterized by centralization of decision-making and planning, strict party control, and limited market orientation. Whatever decentralizing measures have been introduced have been carried out under central guidance and supervision. In this connection, it is worth noting that the commitment to centralism appears to have been as strong among the professional engineers and academics in the RCP Presidium, Executive Committee, and Secretariat (*e.g.,* Stefan Andrei, Constantin Babalau, and Gheorghe Ciora, who have engineering degrees; Ion Gheorghe Maurer [now deceased] and Emil Bodnaras, who have law degrees; Gheorghe Macovescu, who has a degree in philosophy; and Miron Constantinescu, who has a degree in economics) as it has among the *apparatchik* generalists (*e.g.,* Nicolae Ceausescu, Petre Blajovici, Florian Danalache, Constantin Dragan, Gheorghe Pana, Gheorghe Patan, Dumitru Popescu, Virgil Trofin, and Ilie Verdet).[37]

The predilection for firm party control has found reflection in the increasing power of the party *apparat* vis-à-vis other bureaucratic elements—exemplified by the reorganization of administrative agencies already mentioned—and in the push for the expansion of party influence in society at large. There has been elite consensus that the party's role as the leading force in society must be exercised decisively in all situations and among all societal groups and strata.

The practical manifestations of such an outlook have been strong tendencies toward the use of mass mobilization techniques in the socioeconomic, cultural, and political life of the country, with frequent campaigns to increase ideological education and awareness not only among the masses but also among leadership cadres at all levels, to complete the harvest, to reduce wastage in industry, to improve utilization of manpower and machines, to eliminate corruption, or to eradicate "old-fashioned eco-

[31] *Anuarul Statistic 1970,* pp. 592-624.

[32] This figure was given by Ceausescu in his speech to the 1972 National Conference of the RCP, *loc. cit.*

[33] This theme ran through most of the speeches at the Tenth RCP Congress in August 1969. See *Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman.*

[34] Ceausescu's views on this issue have repeatedly been emphasized in speeches and meetings. See, for instance, Nicolae Ceausescu, *Romania: Achievements and Prospects,* Bucharest, Meridiane Publishing House, 1969; and Ceausescu's speech to the 1972 National Conference of the RCP, *loc. cit.*

[35] See, for instance, the article on the 1971-75 Five-Year Plan in *Scinteia,* Oct. 29, 1971.

[36] These priorities were clearly set forth in "National Conference of the Romanian Communist Party, July 19-21, 1972. Report presented by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party," Supplement to *Romania Today* (Bucharest), No. 8/213, 1972, pp. 4-10. (Hereafter cited as "July 1972 Report.")

[37] "The Rumanian Party Leadership," pp. 6-8.

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Engineer Ioan Tudor, left, instructs students about time and motion in the mechanical engineering industry during a lecture at a Bucharest institute.

—Maria Posteinicu for Agerpress via Eastfoto.

nomic practices" among the population.[38] Two major campaigns are currently in progress under the slogans of "fulfillment of the five-year plan in four and a half years!" and "improved ideological training of the population."[39]

The pattern of such campaigns has become fairly standardized. First, the party leader voices strong opinions about a problem perceived to be in need of a rapid and thorough solution. Next comes quick and vociferous endorsement of the idea by other central leaders, followed by party meetings in regional and local RCP branches in which unanimous support for the new campaign is expressed. At times, this second step is superseded by popular meetings in which factory workers, farmhands, or the local population generally endorse Ceausescu's ideas and express their support in lengthy telegrams. In the latter sequence, party leaders at the central, regional, and local levels meet to consider popularly voiced demands for action subsequent to the telegram campaign.[40] The third stage is the beginning of implementation. Local and regional party bodies, branches of the Socialist Unity Front and of the trade unions, or general public meetings produce resolutions and suggestions concerning ways to carry out the specifics of the campaign. Individual workers and peasants are encouraged to send suggestions to the central leadership bodies for consideration. At this stage, it is also customary to call a conference of party activists and experts in the relevant fields.[41] The final stage of the campaign is the implementation of specific decisions that often appear first as decrees of the RCP Central Committee and later receive the ratification of the legislative body, the Grand National Assembly. Implementation is supervised by the 65,000 local party branches and the numerous governmental structures at all levels.[42]

The campaign approach, of course, requires a citizenry which is willing to be mobilized at any time, and a continuous socialization campaign aimed at producing such a citizenry has been an important feature of Romanian political life. Once again, the top party elite has seemed united in its dedication to undertakings of mass socialization and indoctrination —and in this regard has differed greatly from some other party elites in Eastern Europe, notably the Hungarian leadership, which has operated under Janos Kadar's famous formula, "whosoever is not against us is with us." [43] In Romania, the top party elite is still engaged in massive efforts to convert the populace to the local brand of Marxism-Leninism, not merely to achieve tolerance of the ruling oligarchy.

Political mobilization and socialization, then, have had socioeconomic as well as political overtones. Since the party has attempted to maintain strict control of the economy and the administrative apparatus, questions of economic efficiency have become political concerns. This consideration has put socioeconomic behavior and political/moral concerns into a common "socialization package," with the following themes most frequently voiced: the need for punctuality, for the skill levels required in a modern sophisticated economy, for reliability, trustworthiness, and thrift, and for a general commitment to society and one's fellow man; and, in negative terms, the need to eschew selfishness, greed, "bourgeois individual-

[38] See, for example, *Scinteia*, July 24, 1972 (campaign for innovation and economy in industry); *ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1972 (campaign for better utilization of machinery); and *ibid.*, Nov. 18 and Dec. 23, 1972 (campaign for early fulfillment of the 1971-75 plan).

[39] See, *e.g.*, *ibid.*

[40] This procedure was employed at the outset of the "cultural revolution" campaign in the summer 1971 and of the campaign initiated in early 1972, for early fulfillment of the five-year plan.

[41] The National Conference of the RCP, July 1972, served this kind of purpose. For a discussion, see Ceausescu's speech to the conference in *Scinteia, loc. cit.*

[42] This was the designated function of local party branches in the "cultural revolution" campaign. Ceausescu revealed later, however, that there had been problems in implementation (see *ibid.*, Nov. 21 and 22, 1972, where his speeches to the RCP Central Committee plenum were published).

[43] This formula was restated by Kadar at the 1971 congress of the Hungarian Workers' Party. See *Osteuropa*, November 1971.

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ism," and corruption. Furthermore, the regime has constantly promoted the image of the New Socialist Man, who not only incorporates all the positive character traits listed above but also willingly accepts the party as the supreme motive force of society with the right to mobilize individuals for socioeconomic or political action at any time.[44]

Despite the apparent agreement of the top party leaders on the principles of RCP supremacy and of the need for mass mobilization and continued indoctrination efforts, there have been differences in this group concerning actual *implementation,* as well as considerable conflicts in the party just below the uppermost levels. The current reorganization of bureaucratic agencies and reshuffling of personnel have resulted in a considerable gap between Ceausescu and some of his colleagues at the top of the party. While removal of Trofin, Banc, and Dinca from central positions probably reflected personality disputes more than institutionally-based factionalism,[45] more serious splits have developed between Ceausescu and parts of the security apparatus and propaganda sections. The important personnel changes in this field clearly indicate that the General Secretary regards the implementation of the ideological campaign as faulty.[46]

The most important differences at the elite level, however, have centered on the issue of the proper mix of ideological purity, party control, and economic efficiency. There has been a classical confrontation between *apparatchik* generalists concerned with continued political supremacy for the RCP, on the one hand, and economic managers, central planners, and technical personnel charged with economic output, on the other. The operational code of the RCP leadership and the posture of monolithic unity around the General Secretary preclude systematic discussion of disagreements among the members of the Presidium, Executive Committee, and Secretariat on this question; therefore, evaluations must be tentative and based on inference rather than solid evidence. Nevertheless, it appears that prior to his death in July 1974, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Premier and thus head of the state apparatus, had been somewhat critical of the ideological campaign and the massive reorganization and rotation of cadres currently under way. He had displayed notable reticence concerning the need for increased orthodoxy in the ideological field and had repeatedly emphasized economic efficiency.[47] This approach stood in sharp contrast to the unqualified and at times anticipatory support of Ceausescu's policies voiced by most other individuals at the top level.

While disputes over economic activity and political orthodoxy have only been hinted at in the public pronouncements and actions of top leaders, there has been protracted and open debate among subordinate units of the party and state *apparats* over implementation of various programs. Specialized journals such as *Probleme Economice, Finante si Credit,* and *Viata Economica* have discussed economic efficiency and productivity within the context of the current ideological campaign, at times registering doubts about the propriety of increased party control.[48] The misgivings of some central planners about diminution of their role have even been recorded in the main RCP organ *Scinteia* and in the party's theoretical journal *Lupta de Clasa.*[49] Essentially, economic elite spokesmen have pleaded for autonomy "within the directives established by the party," and they have on numerous occasions voiced opposition to the economic reform instituted in 1967-68 but still only partially implemented.[50] Basically, this reform would enhance the degree of autonomy at the plant level, at the expense of central economic agencies. The occasionally esoteric debate has clearly focused on a familiar political theme: To what extent will decentralization in the economy, combined with expanded party control, seriously undermine the interests of the economic elites? This conflict-ridden issue is a source of major concern in contemporary Romania.

Values of the Masses

A fourth factor which has set the framework of political life in contemporary Romania has been the persistence of mass values inimical to the achievement of the Communist regime's broad objectives. The primary goal of the political leadership with respect to the masses of the population has lain in mobilization. In part, mobilization has been intended to serve an economic purpose: *i.e.,* to attain maximum economic output within the parameters estab-

[44] See the author's "Political Socialization in Romania," in Ivan Volgyes, Ed. *Political Socialization in Eastern Europe,* New York, Praeger, forthcoming.

[45] The removal of Banc and Dinca was officially categorized as "rotation of cadres." See *Scinteia,* June 24, 1973.

[46] *Ibid.,* July 20, 1972, and Jan. 28, 1973, announced the most important personnel changes in the party and security apparatuses and in the Ministry of the Interior. Ceausescu's unhappiness with the security apparatus dates back to 1972 when he removed Patilinet as Party Secretary in charge of military and security affairs (reported in *ibid.,* Feb. 17, 1972).

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lished by the political elite; in part, it has been aimed at a political end: *i.e.,* to ensure party supremacy in society and to enhance party hegemony over other elites. In either case, however, the mass public has been regarded as essentially an object of manipulation and control—despite recent bows to popular participation in the political process. But certain values of the populace have acted as impediments to this kind of mobilization and caused problems for the regime in its mobilization efforts. Two types of problems loom particularly important in the present context. They are:

1. *Popular apathy.* Unfortunately, no sampling evidence can be produced to demonstrate this problem since social science research is still in its infancy in Romania and since restrictions on Western scholars in the country preclude systematic interviews at any level. The researcher must therefore depend on official sources for this purpose. Even such limited evidence, however, makes it clear that political and social mobilization is not meeting with unqualified support and enthusiasm from the population. There have been frequent complaints in the party press about apathy, corruption, retention of a "bourgeois-landowner" mentality, and the development of new forms of social parasitism among the masses of the population.[51] Indeed, Ceausescu launched his "little cultural revolution" partly in reaction to what he deemed unsatisfactory developments with regard to mass attitudes in both the political/ideological and the economic realms. For the general masses, it should be noted too, the results of the elite purges and reorganization and of the increased ideological orthodoxy at the top since 1971 have been more severe social control, expanded party activity, and more stringent attempts at political socialization at all levels and in virtually all areas of activity. The current campaign against wastage of resources and for better use of machines, manpower, and raw materials also requires tighter supervision at the production level, with markedly less room for individual or group autonomy there.[52]

The RCP modernizers, thus, have been undergoing an agonizing confrontation with socioeconomic reality at the mass level. Although tremendous changes have taken place in the political and socioeconomic fields in Romania during the last 25 years, the change in commonly-held values has been much less drastic. Like Communist elites elsewhere in Eastern Europe, many elites in Romania have realized that value reorientation is going to be a slow process, but Ceausescu himself has elected to struggle against this kind of resignation for fear that much of the party apparatus could become oriented to the status quo instead of sticking to value reorientation. That choice has produced his current ideological offensive, clearly a major feature of the Romanian scene today.

2. *The continued existence of ethnic particularism.* Romania is a multinational country, with substantial numbers of ethnic Hungarians and Germans (as well as other, smaller ethnic groups) living inside its state borders. The 1966 census showed the following breakdown of the population: Romanians, 16,740,310 (87.6 percent of the total); Hungarians, 1,619,592 (8.5 percent); Germans, 382,595 (2.0 percent); Gypsies, 64,197 (0.3 percent); Jews, 42,888 (0.2 percent); Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Hutans, 54,705 (0.3 percent); Russians, 39,483 (0.2 percent); Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, 44,236 (0.2 percent); Slovaks 22,221 (0.1 percent); and Tatars, 22,151 (0.1 percent), with smaller numbers of Turks, Bulgars, Czechs, Greeks, Poles, and Armenians. Of equal significance with this ethnic diversity is the fact that the two largest minorities, the Hungarians and Germans, are heavily concentrated in Transylvania and the Banat.[53]

Communist ideology and much Western scholarly literature on political and socioeconomic development have predicted increasing assimilation of ethnic minorities into any modern political culture, and Ceausescu has made his assumptions explicit by emphasizing that modern, socialist Romania will have a culture which is neither Romanian nor minor-

[47] See the author's "Ceausescu's Little Cultural Revolution . . .," especially p. 724.

[48] See, for instance, G. Antonescu in *Finante si Credit* (Bucharest), January 1972, and S. Ansene in *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest), January 1972.

[49] See, for example, B. Almasan in *Scinteia,* Nov. 24, 1967, and Maxim Berghianu in *Lupta de Clasa* (Bucharest), July 1971.

[50] One form of such opposition was the repeated redrafting of parts of the 1967 reform package. This procedure was criticized by a high economic official, G. Gaston-Marin, in *ibid.,* January 1972.

[51] See, for instance, *Scinteia,* Nov. 4, 1971, for Ceausescu's thundering remarks at the November 1971 RCP Central Committee plenum.

[52] *Ibid.* This imperative is also clearly indicated in numerous articles by prominent party and government leaders on implementation of the 1971-75 plan. See, for example, Ilie Verdet in *Era Socialista,* No. 11, June 1973; and also *Romania Libera* (Bucharest), June 6, 1973.

[53] The nationality breakdown may be found in *Republica Socialista Romania,* Directia Centrala de Statistica, *Recensamintul Populatiei si Locuintelor din 15 Martie 1966,* Vol. 1, p. 153.

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A Hungarian amateur group performs at Tirgu Mures in the Mures-Magyar Autonomous Region of Romania.

—Eastfoto.

ity-based, but socialist.[54] Today, socioeconomic modernization has drastically changed the life style of virtually all citizens of Romania, whatever their ethnic background, and produced a common backdrop of urbanization, industrialization, and expanded educational opportunities for a common culture, but despite the regime's express commitment to establishing a common culture for all at a higher level, ethnic particularism has not disappeared. Rather, it appears to be on the rise, especially among Hungarians.

There are several aspects to the explanation of this phenomenon. First, much of the political and socioeconomic mobilization carried out in Romania is supervised by ethnic Romanians, a situation which smacks of "Romanianization" to the ethnic minorities. Here Ceausescu has faced an excruciating dilemma. An important reason for his popularity among the *Romanians* appears to have been the mass belief that political development does, in fact, mean assimilation to the dominant Romanian culture. Hence, he has had to walk a tightrope. On the one hand, he has had to avoid overt attempts at Romanianization and to uphold national autonomy in fields such as folklore, literary traditions, and the use of the native language, while seeing to it that "socialist values" rule political and economic activity. On the other hand, he has had to maintain his commitment to *Romanian* nationalism, one of his regime's chief sources of legitimacy.

The consequence of this exceedingly complicated state of affairs has been vacillation in nationality policy over the years. That is, there have been alternating periods of relative ethnic autonomy and of heavy stress on assimilation. At the present time, Ceausescu is engaged in an effort to operationalize the old adage "national in form, socialist in content," by allowing some ethnic autonomy in cultural and literary fields with strict controls against political separatism. This fairly balanced approach has prevailed since 1968, when the regime's concern about possible unrest among the minorities forced it to make certain concessions to them, particularly to the Hungarians. (Throughout much of the 1960's under the regimes of both Gheorghiu-Dej and Ceausescu, a much more assimilationist approach had been in effect.) [55]

There is little evidence, however, that this flexibility in policy has brought about assimilation to a higher form of national culture among the minority masses. A major reason for such lagging assimilation may be that socioeconomic modernization does not as a matter of course lead to greater assimilation. Increased urbanization, better jobs, and higher standards of literacy in many cases bring about a mounting awareness of ethnic backgrounds, historical traditions, and cultural bases and folkways, rather than a future-oriented attachment to a theoretical, higher entity of socialist culture.[56] In Romania, this has been the case especially among ethnic groups with a long and proud historical tradition essentially alien to the Romanian experience—notably, the Hungarians and Germans, who were historically the political and socioeconomic masters of

[54] Ceausescu in "July 1972 Report," pp. 36-40.

[55] For an analysis of this development, see the author's "Ethnic Minorities in Romania Under Socialism," *East European Quarterly*, January 1974, pp. 435-58.

[56] For discussions of this phenomenon, see Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Non-Russian Nationalities," in Allen Kassof, Ed. *Prospects for Soviet Society*, New York, Praeger, 1968, pp. 143-241; and the author's "Ethnic Minorities in Socialist Romania: Assimilation or Ethnic Separatism?," a paper presented to the September 1973 meeting of the American Political Science Association in New Orleans, La.

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large areas of the country. Thus, the modernization process among these groups has rendered it doubly difficult for the Romanian political elite to achieve meaningful cultural assimilation.

External Influences

No analysis of factors affecting recent Romanian politics would be complete without some mention of external influences, primarily those stemming from the USSR. Much has been said about the decline of Moscow's power in Eastern Europe in the post-Stalin period, and there is relatively broad agreement that the present leadership in the Kremlin cannot determine domestic politics in the Warsaw Pact countries in detail, as was Stalin's wont. At the same time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine have demonstrated quite clearly that Moscow still can and will set general parameters beyond which no political leadership within the Soviet sphere of influence can safely venture. These parameters have been operational with respect to Romania no less than with respect to other countries. The most important are:

1. *Continued dominance of the Communist Party and unswerving attachment to a political and socio-economic program broadly defined as "socialism."* Under this requirement, the appearance of a meaningful political alternative to the local Communist Party is precluded; furthermore, the Communist Party itself may not introduce major ideological and political deviations. Similarly, the economic organization of the state must reflect a commitment to state ownership of the means of production, only limited and controlled private agriculture, a centrally-controlled money market, and minimal individual enterprise in small industry and in services.

These requirements have constituted no particular problem for the RCP. Not only is it the only party in the country, but Ceausescu's policy has ruled out the rise of any informal political alternative. It is worth pointing out here that the recent campaigns designed to reestablish ideological orthodoxy while furthering party control must be seen in Moscow as reassuring developments. There have indeed been analysts who have hinted that the ideological campaign in Romania is a local "sacrifice" to Moscow in return for continued relative autonomy in foreign policy.[57] Whether such a *quid pro quo* has actually been established cannot be determined with any certainty, but it is clear that Moscow accepts Bucharest's assurances that a Romanian Dubcek will not be allowed to appear on the domestic scene. Such assurances would tend to make Romanian foreign policy maneuvers more tolerable to the Soviet leaders.

2. *Firm commitment to the Soviet Union in foreign policy, or at least a "progressive" foreign policy which supports Moscow in general terms and is suitably "anti-imperialist" in tone.* In this realm, the Ceausescu regime is in considerable difficulty. The General Secretary has repeatedly stated that Romania wishes to have relations with *all* countries without regard to social system, although relations with other socialist countries remain a major concern.[58] Romania's "deviation" in foreign policy—manifested by the recognition of West Germany in 1967, close economic ties with many capitalist countries, recent agreements with the United States, and continued relations with Israel at a time when all other countries in Eastern Europe broke diplomatic relations with the "Zionist state"—has caused considerable strain in Moscow-Bucharest relations and

Ceausescu, left, leads a delegation of Romanian state and party officials to 1970 Warsaw Pact talks in Moscow. To right is CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, who greeted the Romanian leader at the Moscow airport.

—V. Musaeliarr for Tass via Sovfoto.

[57] See, for instance, the Radio Free Europe Research report by Robert R. King, "A Lull in Rumania's Relations with China?," Feb. 15, 1972.

[58] *E.g.*, "July 1972 Report," pp. 40-54.

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has resulted in increased Soviet pressure for more conformity.

This pressure, which grew in intensity after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, has had two domestic effects in Romania. It has slowed the trend toward greater economic cooperation with the West. This slowdown has in turn forced domestic production to pick up the slack in terms of both investment and the availability of consumer goods and has thus brought about a somewhat harsher economic climate.[59] The pressure also probably had something to do with the inauguration of the ideological campaign described above, which has had considerable impact on economic and social life.

3. *Firm commitment by the local party leadership to the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.* This is another troublesome area for Ceausescu, an area which has caused him repeated problems internally. The Romanian party leader has officially taken a middle position in the conflict, deploring the destructive fraternal infighting between Moscow and Peking. He has steadfastly refused to participate in conferences designed to read the Chinese out of the world Communist movement, or, when he has participated, he has acted as a conciliatory influence, emphasizing the need to keep the "camp" united in the face of continued "imperialist onslaughts."[60] The Romanian commitment to a communism with national roots and Bucharest's frequent insistence on relations among socialist states based on "noninterference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual advantage" [61] have caused much consternation in the Kremlin; and in Romania this conflict has given rise to factionalism, about which relatively little is known. The purges of General Ion Serb and Party Secretary Vasile Patilinet, presumably for pro-Soviet factional activity, have constituted only the visible tip of an iceberg.[62]

Ceausescu has long maintained cordial relations with the Chinese, and there are indications that he greatly admires some of the policies of the CCP. The advent of the "little cultural revolution," hard upon the heels of Ceausescu's visit to China in 1971, brought forth much speculation in the West concerning the General Secretary's preference for Maoist approaches.[63] A cause-effect relationship is hard to establish in any analysis of personal motivations, and some of the early speculation on this point has died down. Ceausescu's official position is that he is a *Romanian* Communist and as such is devoted to a Romanian road within the general parameters of Marxism-Leninism. This position presumably leaves open the option of borrowing from both the Soviet and Chinese experiences. The immediate domestic effect of Ceausescu's ideological commitments, of course, has been the campaign for orthodoxy, which has met with some approval in both Moscow and Peking.

The Future

Having examined the factors that have determined the character of political life in Romania during recent years, let us now turn to a brief assessment of those which are likely to be critical in this regard in the future. Obviously, foreign influences will probably loom large, for the Soviet parameters will doubtless remain operative. Ceausescu will thus have to maneuver between domestic factions and the shadows of the Brezhnev Doctrine. To date, his ideological orthodoxy, the current campaign for increased party power in society, and the strategic isolation of Romania in a geographical sense have persuaded Moscow to tolerate his independent stance in foreign policy. But should Ceausescu be confronted with a serious rebellion among his own bureaucratic elites or adopt domestic policies which appear to Moscow to constitute major deviations from orthodoxy, he could find himself confronted with Soviet interference of one sort or another.

As for internal factors, these seem to be the most important:

1. *Ceausescu's personal power and his style of decision-making.* As described above, the personal power of Ceausescu has lately been enhanced by administrative reorganizations and the removal of important individuals from their major power bases. The General Secretary has increasingly dominated both the party and the state administration, and his personal involvement in the newly-established joint

[59] The 1974-75 plan, approved by the RCP Executive Committee on June 13, 1973, provided for more reliance on domestic production of certain goods. See *Scinteia*, June 14, 1973.

[60] *E.g., Congresul al X-lea al Partidului Comunist Roman*, pp. 74-89.

[61] A favorite concept which Ceausescu has repeatedly stressed, e.g., in "Report" pp. 40-57.

[62] The recent changes in the RCP Secretariat may indeed be a continuation of the 1972 purge.

[63] See, for example, King, "A Lull in Rumania's Relations with China?," especially pp. 6-8.

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party-state bodies such as the Supreme Council on Socioeconomic Development has further strengthened his control over the course of events. Moreover, Romania's successes in foreign policy during the last decade have by and large stemmed from his highly personal approach to foreign affairs. As long as the country registers reasonable economic progress and retains its relative autonomy in foreign policy, the General Secretary would appear to be rather firmly in the saddle—at least for the next four or five years.

2. *Increasing socioeconomic diversification and its implications for political life.* As the modernization process continues, Romania will inevitably experience more social diversification and stratification. Functional specialization will grow, and the service sector of the economy will become more important. At some stage of this development, a centralized party attuned to the idea of strict control of *all* aspects of socioeconomic and political life may encounter thorny difficulties in exercising its customary supervision of society. In short, the Romanian Communist Party will be caught in a major dilemma. On the one hand, it will have to press forward with its drive for modernization since much of its legitimacy rests on the idea of steady progress and development; on the other hand, the very process of modernization will tend to make political control harder. Present-day approaches such as ideological campaigns, personalized power politics, and frequent administrative reorganizations will probably not solve the escalating problems of control during the coming decade. One possible solution might be the gradual withdrawal of the party from direct day-to-day involvement in economic affairs, as has been the case in Hungary; another could be for the Romanian political leadership to attempt to coopt more economic specialists into the RCP for better control in this field. Such innovations, however, would clash with the current trend toward ever-increasing personal power for Nicolae Ceausescu.

3. *Probable long-term expansion of the power of the "technocrats."* The increasing sophistication of the economy and the stratification of Romanian society will likely result in more influence for the managerial and technical experts who have been emerging in large numbers from the universities and research institutions of the country. At the moment, the party *apparat* is still primarily in the hands of professional *political* cadres whose education is rudimentary or limited to short courses at party institutes. These two groups now coexist in a reasonably peaceful manner. The experts need political support in order to advance their careers, and the political cadres need the technocrats to improve social and economic conditions and to propel Romania forward to the overriding goal of "modernity." During the next decade or so, however, the services of the technical and managerial experts will become even more crucial, and it seems improbable that they will perform these services without demanding greater *political* power. The party could meet this challenge by coopting some of them, by training its own people as specialists, or by intensifying ideological campaigns and social control (the device currently in use). In the long run, the most likely scenario appears to be one that will involve recognition by the party of the need for concessions to the societal elites it has helped create. At that time, of course, the personal authority of the party leader would have to be curtailed, and such a curtailment would certainly not sit well with the present General Secretary.

The broad prospects in Romania, then, are for continued emphasis on rapid socioeconomic modernization, with continued impressive achievements. At the same time, political problems will probably become increasingly severe because of the complexity of the issues facing the Romanian political leadership, and how the leadership will respond to the challenge is bound to be a subject of ongoing interest to the rest of the world.

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The Albanian Cultural Revolution

By Nicholas C. Pano

November 1974 will mark both the 30th anniversary of Albania's liberation from Axis occupation and the Communist seizure of power. Although it is the smallest and least developed of the East European party states, the People's Republic of Albania (PRA) has, since the end of World War II, enjoyed a prominence far out of proportion to its size and power. To a considerable degree, Albania's notoriety stemmed originally from the role the country played in the events that led to the Soviet-Yugoslav break in 1948 and the Sino-Soviet rift in the early 1960's. Since the mid-1960's, however, it has been the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution that has most attracted the interest of foreign observers.

Viewed in the context of Albania's postwar history, the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution does not appear to be either "a great aberration" or a mere carbon copy of the Chinese Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It represents, rather, a distinct stage of what Albanian Communist theoreticians have termed their nation's "uninterrupted revolution," which began during the wartime "struggle for national liberation" and is intended to continue until Albania has successfully completed its construction of socialism and made the transition to communism.[1] Albania's present rulers hold that the Ideological and Cultural Revolution constitutes the most recent and decisive phase of their campaign to build socialism in accordance with the tenets of Marxism-Leninism. Concerning this point, Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the ruling *Partia e Punës së Shqipërisë* (Albanian Party of Labor—henceforth referred to as APL), declared in November 1966:

So long as the complete victory of the revolution in the realms of ideology and culture has not been ensured, the victories of the socialist revolution in the economic and political fields can neither be secured nor guaranteed.[2]

The roots of Albania's Ideological and Cultural Revolution are to be found in the history of the PRA, and especially in the experiences of the republic's formative years. That history may be divided into two periods. During the first period (1944-60), the Communist seized power, consolidated their hold on the country, inaugurated their program of socialization, and strove to preserve Albania's independence and territorial integrity. This was an era of strife within the ranks of the ruling party and of conflicts between the PRA on the one hand and Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the major Western powers on the other. It was above all the period during which Enver Hoxha firmly established himself as the leading personality in the Albanian ruling elite. By the end of the period, the now tightly-knit Albanian leadership had established the institutional bases of socialism, provoked the diplomatic and ideological break with the USSR, and cemented the ideological and economic alliance with China. The second period began in 1961 and extends to the present day. It is this period which has witnessed the emergence and

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[1] See Ndreçi Plasari, "Some Features of the Revolution in Albania," in *Konferenca Kombëtare e Studimeve Shoqërore* (National Conference on Social Studies), Vol. II, Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1970, pp. 3-30.

[2] *Zëri i Popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 2, 1966.

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development of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution to become the dominant feature in the internal life of the nation.[3] Let us now proceed to examine the highlights of these two major historical periods.

The Formative Years

Shortly after the Communists assumed power in Albania in November 1944, policy and personal differences developed within the leadership. The dominant faction, headed by Hoxha, wanted to consolidate the Communist military victory by eliminating all political opposition, nationalizing industry, instituting an agrarian reform program, and strengthening relations with the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. On the other hand, a "moderate" faction, whose leading spokesman was Politburo member Sefulla Maleshova, advocated lenient treatment for political opponents, postponement of socialization until the economy had further developed within a capitalist framework, creation of a broad-based coalition in which all "genuine anti-fascists" would be represented, and the maintenance of diplomatic and cultural ties with the United States and Great Britain on an equal footing with the USSR and Yugoslavia. At the same time, a personal rivalry arose between the charismatic, independent-minded party leader, Enver Hoxha, and his colorless but shrewd pro-Yugoslav deputy, Koçi Xoxe.[4]

Despite their differences, Hoxha and Xoxe collaborated during 1946 to destroy the "moderates." Meanwhile, Hoxha had formulated his program for Albania, which called for the establishment of effective party control over all aspects of Albanian life, the preservation of Albania's independence and territorial integrity, and the construction of socialism in accordance with the Leninist-Stalinist Soviet model. Hoxha's refusal to deviate from this program has at various times since the late 1940's brought him into conflict with elements of his own party, as well as with Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the majority of parties in the world Communist movement.

By 1947, Hoxha was becoming increasingly uneasy over the growing Yugoslav influence within the Albanian party. He was especially irritated by Yugoslav efforts to replace him with Xoxe, to incorporate Albania into Yugoslavia, and to thwart the development of Albanian industry. The 1948 Soviet-Yugoslav break, however, helped Hoxha remain in power, saved Albania's independence, and allowed the PRA to embark on its projected program of industrial development. Still, Tirana's fear of and hostility toward Yugoslavia continued to grow during the late 1940's and early 1950's as Tito persisted in his efforts to influence Albanian politics, turned to the West for economic aid, and began his economic and social experimentation within the socialist framework. In the eyes of the Albanians, Tito's regime was guilty of "splitting" the socialist camp, accepting "handouts" from the imperialists, and falling victim to the heresy of "revisionism." Yugoslavia was regarded not only as an avaricious neighbor who had already displayed "evil" intentions regarding Albania, but also as a horrible example of what could happen to a "former socialist" state once it had strayed from the Marxist-Leninist path.[5]

From Ally to Outcast

In retrospect, the years 1948-56 appear to have been most crucial in shaping both the destiny of the PRA and the outlook of its leaders. The economic aid Albania received from the Soviet Union and the people's democracies made it possible for her to launch an ambitious industrialization program in conjunction with the First Five-Year Plan (1951-55). There were apparently no significant differences with Moscow until after the death of Stalin in March 1953, when the Soviet leaders began counselling the Albanians to slacken the pace of their industrialization drive, a step which Tirana was unwilling to take. By 1955, the signs of strain were starting to grow as Khrushchev began promoting destalinization and moved toward a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The APL leadership viewed the former development as a threat to its socialization program and the latter

[3] For an overview of Albanian history between 1944 and 1967, see the author's *The People's Republic of Albania*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, pp. 55-183. The official Albanian interpretation may be found in *Historia e Partisë së Punës së Shqipërisë* (History of the Albanian Party of Labor), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1968, pp. 192-509.

[4] On the Hoxha-Xoxe rivalry, see Enver Hoxha, *Vepra* (Works), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1968- , Vol. 5, pp. 170-82, 516-54.

[5] For the Albanian view see, *inter alia*, *Lufta e Partisë së Punës së Shqipërisë Kundër Nderhyrjes Armiqësore të Udhëheqjes Revizioniste të L.K.J. në Punët e Brendëshme të Vendit Tonë* (The Struggle of the Albania Party of Labor Against the Hostile Intervention of the Revisionist Leadership of the Y[ugoslav] L[eague of] C[ommunists] in the Internal Affairs of Our Country), Tirana, Mihal Duri, 1958, pp. 3-5, 15-56.

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as a potential menace to Albania's independence as well as to its own survival.[6]

During the same 1948-56 period, Albania's relations with the United States and Great Britain also deteriorated seriously. These trends reflected a reversal of Albania's attitude of the immediate postwar period, when Tirana had sought to obtain diplomatic recognition by the two Western powers. By late 1946, Hoxha had become annoyed at the refusal of London and Washington to establish relations with his regime and their opposition to Albania's admission to the United Nations, as well as at what he perceived to be the two powers' support for Greek territorial claims in southern Albania (Northern Epirus).[7] What little hope still remained for an Albanian understanding with the United States and Great Britain was finally shattered by evidences of Anglo-American involvement in clandestine operations to overthrow the Tirana regime between 1949 and 1953. These ventures failed partly because of poor planning and partly because of their betrayal to the Russians and Albanians by H.A.R. (Kim) Philby, then an undercover agent for Moscow in the British Foreign Office.[8] Their discovery led to an intensification of repression within the PRA and also had the effect of driving the Albanians more deeply into the Soviet camp and heightening their fear, mistrust, and hatred of the US and its NATO allies.

Besides his external enemies, Hoxha also had to contend with opposition within both the APL and the government. This domestic strife was reflected in the numerous personnel changes in the leading party and state organs between 1948 and 1956.[9]

[6] *Historia e Partisë . . .* pp. 309-13; Sotir Madhi, "The Struggle of the APL Against Rightist Opportunism," *Studime Historike* (Tirana), No. 3, 1967, pp. 49-53.

[7] On these issues, see especially *Foreign Relations of the United States 1945,* Vol. IV, Washington, DC, United States Government Printing Office, 1968, pp. 1-80; *Foreign Relations of the United States 1946,* Vol. VI, same publisher, 1969, pp. 1-45; and Hoxha, *op. cit.,* Vol. 3, pp. 1-5, 174-79, 215-16, 518-20.

[8] Bruce Page, David Leitch, and Philip Knightly, *The Philby Conspiracy,* Garden City, New York, Doubleday, 1968, pp. 197-203; C. L. Sulzberger, *A Long Row of Candles—Memoirs and Diaries, 1934-1954,* New York, Macmillan, 1969, pp. 476, 498, 505, 867. For the Albanian version of these episodes, see Mark Dodani, *Fronti i Heshtun* (The Silent Front), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1968, pp. 26-171; Fadil Paçrami, *Deshtimi i Komploteve* (The Destruction of Conspiracies), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1970, pp. 303-67. For Philby's version, see Kim Philby, *My Silent War,* New York, Grove Press, 1968, pp. 167-70; also *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Aug. 18, 1971.

[9] For details of these personnel shuffles, see Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1956, pp. 490-93. By 1955 Hoxha was the only member of the original APL Central Committee still serving on that body. Of the 31 members and candidate members elected to the APL Central Committee in 1948, 14 had been removed by 1956.

The opposition, headed by Politburo members Bedri Spahiu and Tuk Jakova, had urged, among other things, a slowdown in the industrialization program, a delay in the collectivization of agriculture, the initiation of a program of destalinization, "democratization" of the APL, and a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. By June 1955, however, Hoxha had succeeded in purging his major rivals, including Jakova and Spahiu.[10]

The remnants of the opposition to Hoxha, mostly middle-rank bureaucrats and military officers, made a final effort to topple the APL leader at the April 1956 conference of the Tirana city party organization. Encouraged by Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist policy pronouncements at the Soviet 20th Party Congress in February 1956 and, allegedly, by promises of support from the Yugoslav legation in Tirana, the dissidents called for adoption of the opposition's program, as outlined above, and postponement of the Third APL Congress until their demands had been met. When it appeared that his critics might gain control of the conference, Hoxha appeared before the assemblage and managed to prevail by combining appeals to patriotism and personal friendship with threats of reprisal.[11]

Hoxha's triumph on this occasion marked the defeat of the last serious challenge to his rule from within the APL. He had succeeded in overcoming his rivals between 1948 and 1956 thanks to a number of factors—principally, the opposition's lack of effective leadership and organization, its failure to win over either the armed forces or the security organs and to develop substantial grassroots support, and its appearance of being pro-Yugoslav. Up to the time of the Third APL Congress (May 25-June 3, 1956), moreover, Hoxha had had the further advantage of enjoying the confidence of the Soviet leadership.

The Third Congress witnessed not only the definitive consolidation of Hoxha's control over the party, but also his first public defiance of Moscow in refusing to rehabilitate Xoxe, Jakova, and other "victims" of the Albanian "Titoist purges." The Central Committee and Politburo elected by the Con-

[10] Hoxha, *op. cit.,* Vol. 12, pp. 335-92. See also *Dokumenta Kryesore të Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë* (Principal Documents of the Albanian Party of Labor), Vol. 2, 2nd ed., Tirana, Librit Politik, 1972, pp. 534-41 (hereafter cited as DK).

[11] The text of the speech delivered by Hoxha at this conference has been published for the first time in Vol. 13 of his works, released in 1973, pp. 202-37. Also useful are his commentaries on the meeting, which appear on pp. 242-68 of this volume.

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

Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party of Labor, addresses a workers' meeting.

Eastfoto.

gress consisted exclusively of Hoxha loyalists, and the constant turnover that had hitherto characterized the membership of these bodies now ceased.[12] Hoxha's domestic position was also strengthened indirectly by the outbreaks of unrest in Poland and rebellion in Hungary during the autumn of 1956 and the ensuing disarray in the Communist camp.

Given these changed circumstances, it is not surprising that Hoxha proceeded to defy repeated Soviet efforts to get him to realign his policies with those of the CPSU. The Albanian leader defined his party's position on the issues in dispute in his February 1957 report to the APL Central Committee,[13] and his subsequent pronouncements up to 1960[14] were largely amplifications of this original formulation. The positions he took may be summarized as follows:

First, Hoxha adamantly opposed full-scale destalinization on the grounds that it would weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat, undermine the vanguard role of the party, hinder class war, and generally obstruct the orderly progress of the socialist revolution. He contended that massive destalinization could cause Albania to fall into the same cycle of revisionism, counterrevolution, and eventual Soviet intervention that had already occurred in Poland and Hungary.

Second, the APL leader asserted his unwillingness to modify his program for the development of industry and the collectivization and modernization of agriculture. He argued that acceptance of Moscow's advice to slow the pace of industrialization would not only undermine Albania's efforts to construct the "material-technical basis of socialism" but would also reduce Albania to a permanent economic dependency of the USSR. This, Hoxha later declared, "would have been tantamount to national suicide."[15]

Third, Hoxha made it clear that Albania was adamantly opposed to a reconciliation with Yugoslavia, on the ground that the "revisionist" Tito regime had forfeited its place in the Communist camp. Underlying this uncompromising stand vis-à-vis Yugoslavia was the apparent suspicion of the APL leadership that Tito had demanded a free hand in Albania as part of his price for normalizing relations with Moscow.

Fourth, Hoxha took the position that the Soviet leadership was no longer waging the struggle against imperialism as vigorously as it should. By placing undue emphasis on such tactics as peaceful coexistence and the parliamentary road to socialism at a time when the preponderance of power in the international arena had shifted in favor of the socialist camp, Moscow, in the view of the Albanian leadership, was actually helping the cause of imperialism.

Although these basic policy differences became clear-cut in the period between 1957 and 1960, the final rupture in Soviet-Albanian party and state relations did not occur until December 1961. By that time, Moscow had made an abortive attempt to overthrow the Albanian leadership and had ended economic and technical assistance to the PRA.[16]

[12] Of those elected to full Politburo membership at the Third Party Congress, only one (Liri Belishova in 1960) had been expelled from that body as of June 1974. Of the 43 persons named full members of the Central Committee, only six had been expelled, two had been demoted to candidate membership, and two had died over the same period.

[13] Hoxha, *op. cit.*, Vol. 14, pp. 214-93.

[14] Perhaps the most important of these was Hoxha's speech at the November 1960 Moscow conference of Communist parties. For the text of this address, see *DK*, Vol. 3, 1970, pp. 414-62.

[15] *Zëri i Popullit*, Nov. 2, 1966. For a detailed account of Soviet-Albanian economic differences, see Robert Owen Freedman, *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc* New York, Praeger, 1970, pp. 58-102.

[16] The most authoritative account of the Soviet-Albanian break is William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1963.

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Albania's successful defiance of the USSR was in large measure attributable to the Sino-Soviet rift and the emergence of a Peking-Tirana "axis" within the world Communist movement.[17] Already during the late 1950's, the Chinese and Albanian regimes had been attracted to each other by their common opposition to the post-1956 CPSU line. Although there were numerous and obvious differences between the two, there were also several noteworthy similarities. In both China and Albania, the Communists had seized power by their own efforts, the ruling party was headed by a charismatic revolutionary leader, and the regime had embraced a fundamentalist version of Marxism-Leninism in its quest to overcome social and economic backwardness through the building of socialism. During the 1960's, as Albania and China began to collaborate closely in many areas, their approaches to the remolding of society were to develop certain similar features. Perhaps the most important of these was the resort to "cultural revolution," which became a dominant aspect of the lives of both nations by the mid-1960's. But while the Albanian and Chinese versions of this movement were clearly alike in many respects, there were nevertheless discernible differences between them stemming from the specific environments in which they developed.[18]

Setting the Stage

The Fourth APL Congress (February 13-20, 1961) marked the point at which the Albanian leaders began to lay the foundations of their Ideological and Cultural Revolution. In their reports to the Congress,[19] Hoxha and Premier Mehmet Shehu maintained that since world communism now found itself confronted with the twin dangers of imperialism and "modern revisionism," it was necessary for all "true Marxist-Leninist" parties to wage a "two-front war" against both these enemies. They also proclaimed that with 99 percent of the nation's industry nationalized, 86 percent of its farm land collectivized, and industrial output coming to account for some 44 percent of the national income by the end of 1960, Albania had finished building the "economic base" of socialism and would now enter the stage of "complete socialist construction." In addition to the continued development of industry and agriculture, the Albanian leaders announced, a major feature of this stage would be the inauguration of a massive ideological campaign of "Communist education." Explaining the purposes of this campaign, Hoxha declared:

The complete construction of a socialist society cannot be realized without creating at the same time a new person with new ideas and thoughts, with lofty virtues and morals. The bourgeois and petty-bourgeois remnants in the consciousness of the people pose a serious obstacle to the complete victory of socialism in our country. The contradiction between the new socialist base and the capitalist remnants in the consciousness of the people is one of the most important contradictions in the life of our nation. A great effort must be made to overcome this.[20]

In less ideological terms, there appear to have been two primary motivations behind the launching of the "Communist education" campaign, which was in effect the preliminary phase of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960's. First of all, now that the political and economic foundations of the new order had been laid, Hoxha was anxious to complete the process of nation-building by tackling the difficult job of eliminating those attitudes, traditions, and organizations that hindered the regime's efforts to achieve national unity and modernization. The chief targets of this effort were the nation's three (Islamic, Eastern Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) religious organizations as well as the traditions of social conservatism and sectionalism. The second primary motivation was the desire to preserve "doctrinal purity," not merely to ensure that Albania would not stray from the Marxist-Lenin-

[17] For a discussion of Sino-Albanian relations during 1956-60, see Daniel Tretiak, "The Founding of the Sino-Albanian Entente," *China Quarterly* (London), No. 10, 1962, pp. 123-43.

[18] A comparative analysis of the Albanian and Chinese cultural revolutions is not attempted in this article. However, some of the more obvious differences between the two movements will be noted in passing.

[19] The texts of Hoxha's and Shehu's reports to the Congress appear in *Kongresi IV i Partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë* (The Fourth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1961, pp. 13-167 and 171-266, respectively. For an analysis of the historical significance of this Congress, see Veniamin Toçi and Kiço Kapetani, "The Congress Which Marked the Transition to the Period of the Complete Construction of the Socialist Society," *Rruga e Partisë* (Tirana), No. 3, March 1971, pp. 45-54.

[20] *Kongresi IV* . . ., p. 148. It may be noted here that the Chinese Communist Party decided to launch a "socialist education" campaign at its Tenth Central Committee Plenum in September 1962.

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ist path but to advance the regime's ambition to make Albania a showcase of "Marxism-Leninism."

The Albanian leaders moved slowly but steadily to implement the program of "Communist education" between 1961 and 1963. By June 1961 the People's Assembly had approved a plan for reform of the educational system to rid it of Soviet influences, a major feature of the plan being its provision for closer integration of academic study and productive work.[21] The next step was taken at the September 1961 APL Central Committee Plenum, when the party leadership acted to mobilize two of the nation's major mass organizations, the Union of Albanian Labor Youth (UALY) and the Albanian Women's Union, behind the "Communist education" campaign.[22]

For the most part, however, the Albanian leaders were preoccupied in this period with waging their ideological and propaganda campaign against the Soviet Union and staving off an economic collapse following Moscow's termination of aid to the PRA. Up to the beginning of 1963, Albania served as a surrogate for China in the ideological warfare against Soviet "revisionism," and it was only then that Peking initiated open polemics with Moscow, thereby permitting a scaling-down of Tirana's role in the conflict. During 1963-64, Albania's economic worries also were somewhat alleviated by assurances from Peking that China, now recovering from the aftereffects of the "Great Leap Forward," would be able, if belatedly, to fulfill its economic commitments to Tirana.[23]

With the consolidation of the Sino-Albanian economic-ideological alliance, the APL leaders were at last able to devote greater attention to the ideological problems on the home front. During the first half of 1963, there was a noticeable increase in the number of articles in the Albanian press dealing with social and ideological "shortcomings" in various aspects of the nation's life. It was reported, for example, that one-third of the students enrolled in the State University of Tirana had failed to take their first-semester examinations, and that "anti-socialist," "idealistic," and "humanistic" attitudes were still prevalent among Albanian youth. Of even greater concern to the regime in view of the nation's

A May Day 1974 poster in Tirana proclaims "Glory to Marxism-Leninism."

—EUPRA.

continuing economic difficulties were reports complaining of "poor labor discipline" both on farms and in the factories.[24] From the evidence available, it was apparent that the "Communist education" campaign had made little real headway by mid-1963.

What distressed the APL leadership most was the prevalence of widespread apathy and alienation in the countryside, where two-thirds of the population lived and where the influence of the party in the daily lives of the people was still limited. In an attempt to rally the peasants behind the regime, to integrate them into the mainstream of the new Albanian society, and to uproot the "bourgeois" and "patriarchal" attitudes and practices that still persisted in the rural areas, the APL in June 1963 launched a drive specifically aimed at raising the educational and cultural level of the peasants and improving their material lot.[25]

The "unsatisfactory state of affairs" existing in "several areas" of Albanian life was again noted at a December 1963 meeting of the APL Politburo. That body was especially disturbed by the fact that only 25 percent of the party membership came from rural areas, and it called for an increase in rural representation in the party ranks as a necessary step toward strengthening the party's influence in the countryside. The Politburo also decreed that the per-

[21] For a discussion of the educational reform program, see Hamid Beqja, *Riorganizimi i Shkollës në R.P.Sh.* (The School Reorganization in the PRA), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1964.

[22] *Zëri i Popullit*, Sept. 29, 1963.

[23] *Vjetari Statistikor i R.P.Sh., 1965* (Statistical Yearbook of the PRA, 1965), Tirana, Mihal Duri, 1965, pp. 314-15.

[24] See, *e.g.*, *Zëri i Popullit*, Jan. 26 and May 9, 1963; and *Drita* (Tirana), May 7, 1963.

[25] *Zëri i Popullit*, June 9, 1963.

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centage of office workers in the party be reduced in order to prevent the party's possible *embourgeoisement,* and that steps be taken to raise the ideological level of party members.[26]

In a further move toward revitalizing the flagging "Communist education" campaign, the APL Central Committee devoted its July 1964 plenary session to a consideration of the ideological implications of the continuing "imperfections" in the Albanian economy and society. The principal report was given by Politburo and Secretariat member Ramiz Alia, the second-ranking party ideologist next to Hoxha.[27] Declaring that the task of building socialism under conditions of "imperialist-revisionist encirclement" would require heroic effort and ironclad discipline on the part of the Albanian people, Alia stated that, with the economic base of socialism already laid, the most important domestic task confronting the nation was to "cleanse the nation's superstructure" of remaining "bourgeois traces and influences" and to prevent the infiltration of revisionist ideas from abroad, and that Albania's success or failure in accomplishing these objectives would determine the ultimate fate of socialism in the country. The battle for socialism, Alia maintained, was ultimately a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people, and the shortcomings reported in various areas of Albanian life indicated that the APL was still not doing as good a job as it should in the ideological sphere. He therefore called it the main responsibility of the party to intensify its "Communist education" work in all segments of Albanian society, but especially among the nation's youth, who would soon take over the leadership from the generation which had seized power and currently governed Albania. A perusal of Alia's and Hoxha's speeches at the Plenum indicates that the general outline of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution was sketched out at this time.[28]

Following the July 1964 Plenum, the Albanian communications media continued to complain about "the same small percentage" of youth who were being influenced by foreign radio and television broadcasts, films, and literature. There was also increasing official concern over manifestations of dissatisfaction among the nation's writers and artists at having to base their works on such officially "approved" themes as the Albanian War of National Liberation, as well as over the mounting influence of these writers and artists on the minds of the nation's youth.[29] These "unhealthy" trends impelled the APL Central Committee, at its October 1965 session, to focus its attention on the "role of art and literature in the Communist education of the masses." Both Hoxha and Alia, in addressing the meeting, severely criticized the Albanian Union of Writers and Artists for failing to curb "un-Marxist tendencies" in the arts and literature and called for tighter party supervision over these areas.[30]

The groundwork for what was to be another facet of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution was laid in December 1965 when the APL Politburo approved a series of directives ordering a reduction in the size of the bureaucracy, decentralization of some government operations, and the elimination of what was termed "the bureaucratic style and method" in party and state administration.[31]

Thus, the years 1961-65 saw the gradual emergence of what were to become the major components of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution. The movement had been generally defined and justified, and its goals established. Its immediate aims were to "cleanse the Albanian superstructure" of those elements that threatened the success of the socialist revolution and to prevent the PRA from slipping into "revisionist" heresy, while its ultimate goals were to create the new socialist person and to effect the transition to communism according to the principles of Marxism-Leninism as interpreted by the APL. This preliminary stage was primarily a period of educating the masses and mobilizing the party preparatory to the launching of the next, revolutionary phase.

The Revolutionary Zenith

An examination of the course of the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution in its main phase—during 1966-69—reveals that the movement was well planned and carefully orchestrated.[32] In contrast to China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the "revolutionization" movement in Albania lacked sponaneity and never showed any signs of getting out of the control of the APL leadership. Its

[26] For the text of the Politburo's decisions, see *DK,* Vol. 4, 1970, pp. 386-449.

[27] For Alia's report, see *Zëri i Popullit,* July 11, 1964.

[28] Hoxha delivered the closing address at the Plenum. His remarks, published in *ibid.,* July 19, 1964, paralleled those of Alia, but he devoted greater attention to Albania's international situation and matters of party governance. The views of Hoxha and Alia on the major issues confronting world communism closely paralleled those expressed in an editorial of *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), on July 14, 1964, entitled "On Khrushchev's Phony Communism and Its Historic Lessons for the World." This editorial was reprinted in *Zëri i Popullit,* July 24, 1964.

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essential features were the mass mobilization of the people and reliance upon ideology as the major weapon for remolding society and spurring the masses to achieve the regime's revolutionary goals.

In outlining the aims and tactics of this new phase of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution at the February 1966 Plenum of the APL Central Committee, Hoxha emphasized that while the "Communist education" program would continue, the party would also initiate a series of actions designed to "revolutionize" all areas of Albanian life.[33] The first of these actions, as already foreshadowed in the December 1965 Politburo directives, was directed against "bureaucratism" in party and state administration. The party spelled out the rationale for the campaign to the people in early March in an "open letter," which stated:

The bureaucratism that arose in the USSR was of great help to the Khrushchevian revisionists in their seizure of power. The creation of a privileged stratum of party and state bureaucrats, economic managers, artists, scientists, and cultural figures, who were receiving top salaries and enjoying a higher standard of living than the working classes, served as a secure social base from which revisionist outlooks blossomed . . . . All trends of this type must be eliminated so that Albania will not repeat the experiences of the Soviet Union.[34]

Between February and November 1966, the anti-bureaucratism campaign resulted in the reduction of the number of government ministries from 19 to 13, the abolition of military ranks (with the reintroduction of political commissars into the armed forces), the pruning of the bureaucracy, the transfer of bureaucrats from Tirana to outlying areas, and the decentralization of routine party and state operations.

At the Fifth APL Congress (November 1-8, 1966), Hoxha announced that, as a result of the still incomplete campaign, some 15,000 former bureaucrats had already switched to productive work and several thousand other bureaucrats had taken positions in the provinces. He also indicated that the "revolutionary initiatives" undertaken during 1966 constituted only the first phase of the "revolutionization" process.[35]

The next targets of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution were designated by Hoxha in a lengthy programmatic address on February 6, 1967. Castigating lower- and middle-ranking party and state officials for their "revolutionary shortcomings" and promising a continuation of the anti-bureaucratism campaign, he said that the main thrust of the revolution would thereafter be directed toward eradicating such "bourgeois" attitudes and legacies as organized religion, the denial of full equality to women, the peasants' capitalist mentality, sectional feelings, and the spirit of individualism.[36]

Hoxha's speech signaled the inauguration of a party-directed drive to mobilize mass support for the campaign. In an attempt to fan revolutionary fervor, Hoxha conducted a dialogue with the masses through the press and ordered the establishment of local newspapers. Wall newspapers (*flete-ruffe*) were used to criticize "errant" officials and citizens as well as to agitate for women's liberation, the destruction of religion, and other features of the revolutionary program. During the spring and summer of 1967, Albania was engulfed in a wave of controlled revolutionary enthusiasm. In the vanguard of the movement were the nation's youth, playing a role in some ways similar to that of the Chinese Red Guards. However, in the Albanian case, the young revolutionaries operated as auxiliaries of the party and mass organizations rather than as independent agents.

During 1967 the APL announced several major "victories" against "bourgeois" influences in Albanian life. In the economic realm, the collectivization of agriculture was said to have been completed, the size of collective farmers' private plots "voluntarily"

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[29] For a useful summary of these developments, see "Bourgeois Influences in Albania," *East Europe* (New York), No. 9, 1965, pp. 27-28.

[30] For Alia's remarks, see *Zëri i Popullit*, Oct. 28, 1965. For Hoxha's comments, see Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1965-1966* (Reports and Speeches, 1965-1966), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1971, pp. 132-66.

[31] For the text of these directives, see *DK*, Vol. 4, 1970, pp. 603-14.

[32] For a more detailed account of developments during this period, see the author's "Albania in the Sixties," in Peter A. Toma, Ed., *The Changing Face of Communism in Eastern Europe*, Tuscon, Ariz., University of Arizona Press, 1970, pp. 249-80; and Peter R. Prifti, "Albania," in Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, Eds., *The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971*, Minneapolis, Minn., University of Minnesota Press, 1972, pp. 198-220.

[33] For the text of Hoxha's report, see Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1965-1966*, pp. 205-53. It may be noted that the public phase of China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution began two months later, in April 1966.

[34] *Zëri i Popullit*, March 6, 1966.

[35] *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1966.

[36] For Hoxha's address, see Enver Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968*, Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1969, pp. 3-63.

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

The mosque of Hadji Ethem Bey on Tirana's central Skanderbeg Square, closed for services by Albania's Cultural Revolution, is preserved as a "cultural monument"—open only to foreign tourists.

—Paolo Koch for Rapho-Guillumette.

reduced by 50 percent or more, and salary differentials among workers narrowed.[37]

On the religious front, all churches in Albania had been closed and all the country's clergymen unfrocked by the end of the summer, after which Albania proclaimed itself the world's "first atheist state" and formerly revoked the charters under which the nation's three religious bodies had operated. But the anti-religious crusade did not stop at the destruction of the institutional church; it also sought to eradicate all religious "attitudes and prejudices." To this end, the party encouraged the celebration of birthdays in place of name days, drew up lists of approved (nonreligious) names for children, sought to replace religious holidays with national holidays, and attempted to popularize "socialist patriotism" as a substitute for religion.[38]

Also in 1967, a massive offensive to emancipate the nation's women was launched. In reports to the June 1967 Plenum of the APL Central Committee, Hoxha and Alia urged that existing customs, practices, and attitudes that discriminated against women be eradicated, and that henceforth women be educated to their full potential, encouraged to work, and granted more responsibility in the management of the party, government, and economy.[39] The APL leadership hoped that these measures would overcome the socially conservative attitudes of women, which it viewed as a hindrance to the modernization and socialization processes, and promote greater female participation in the labor force.

On still another front, the leadership moved to head off the rise of an independent-minded technocracy which might at some future time be tempted to challenge the primacy of the party in the economic sphere. Pointing to the "unprecedented political and ideological anarchy" that had accompanied Yugoslavia's technical revolution, the October 1967 APL Central Committee Plenum directed that the nation's rapidly expanding technical elite be subjected to a rigorous program of "ideopolitical" education to ensure they would be imbued with an "orthodox" Marxist-Leninist outlook and a strong sense of community with the working class.[40]

The year 1967 marked the high tide of the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution. Not only was the scope of the movement substantially broadened, but the party leadership also succeeded in mobilizing a substantial degree of mass popular support. Besides utilizing the nation's youth to generate enthusiasm for the program, the regime during the year staged congresses of the country's leading mass organizations—the United Trade Unions of Albania (April 24-26), the Union of Albanian Labor Youth (June 26-29), the Democratic Front (September 14-16), and the Union of Albanian Women (October 25-28)—which were in effect rallies on behalf of the "revolutionization" movement. At the same time, the Albanians received enthusiastic support from the Chinese, whose Cultural Revolution also reached its zenith during 1967.[41]

[37] Radio Tirana, May 1, 1967.

[38] See Hulushi Hako, *Akuzojmë Fenë* (We Accuse Religion), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1968, pp. 113-27; Petro Lalaj *et al.*, Eds., *Materiale mbi Lëvizjen Revolucionare Kundër Fesë* (Material Concerning the Revolutionary Movement Against Religion), Tirana, Librit Politik, 1973, pp. 29-36.

[39] For Hoxha's report, see Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968*, pp. 154-85. For Alia's report, see *Bashkimi* (Tirana), June 18, 1967.

[40] Radio Tirana, Oct. 21, 1967.

[41] See New China News Agency (Peking), Sept. 27, 1967. Chinese solidarity with Albania extended to providing help in enabling Radio Tirana to become a major international broadcasting facility capable of propagating the anti-Soviet "Marxist-Leninist" line of communism to Europe, Africa and the Middle East. Radio Tirana's foreign broadcasts expanded from 63 hours a week in 1960 to 487 hours a week (in 17 languages) in 1970 (see British Broadcasting Corporation, *BBC Handbook, 1972*, London, 1972, pp. 94, 114).

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Despite these successes, Albania's rulers recognized that the revolutionary struggle would be long, that opposition to their program continued to exist in varying degrees not only among older-generation Albanians but, more important in the long run, among the nation's youth and intellectuals, who chafed under the ideological strictures imposed on them.

Battling for Minds

Looking ahead, the APL leaders assigned major responsibility to the school system in the task of molding the new socialist person. On March 7, 1968, Hoxha outlined a program for the "further revolutionization" of Albanian education, defining the primary goal as the creation of a "truly revolutionary" socialist working class and intelligentsia thoroughly grounded in the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. The party leader called for the production of new textbooks reflecting "the principles of dialectical materialism and Marxist-Leninist analysis" and the revision of courses in Marxist-Leninist theory to emphasize more strongly "the Albanian experience in the building of socialism." [42] (In line with this prescription, the first full-length official history of the Albanian Party of Labor was published during 1968, and in May of the same year the first volumes of Enver Hoxha's *Works* made their appearance.) An education reform bill adopted in December 1969 [43] stipulated that Albanian schooling was to combine three major and complementary components—academic study, productive work, and physical and military training—a combination which it was hoped would effectively instill the desired social values without the disruption of education that had accompanied the Chinese Cultural Revolution.

Meanwhile, the regime kept up its pressure to bring recalcitrant intellectuals into line with the goals of the "revolutionization" movement. It was not until April 1969, however, that divisions within the Albanian Union of Writers and Artists were brought sufficiently under control to permit convocation of the Union's Second Congress, originally slated for November 1967. At the Congress, Chairman Dhimitër S. Shuteriqi engaged in extensive criticism of himself and the Union for failing to carry out the directives of the October 1965 Central Committee Plenum regarding literature and the arts. He acknowledged that Albanian literary and artistic work still "did not sufficiently reflect socialist reality" and was not making a positive contribution to the Ideological and Cultural Revolution.[44] A keynote address by Ramiz Alia condemned the continued "liberalism" and "indifference" of Albania's intellectuals and warned that the party would tolerate no further deviations from "Marxist-Leninist positions in politics and the arts." [45]

During 1968-69, the party also pursued its anti-bureaucratism campaign with a new movement for "working-class control." In a report to the APL Secretariat on April 9, 1968, Hoxha indicated that this drive had two objectives: first, to use laborers as a counterpoise to the technocrats by creating workers' committees in enterprises; and second, to increase employees' responsibility for their own discipline and morale.[46] In July 1968, the regime issued new directives further decentralizing economic planning and administration, but the leadership made it explicit that, in taking such steps, it would not tolerate the excessive dispersion of control seen in Yugoslav economic "self-management." [47]

The last major action in this phase of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution was taken at the

An Albanian woman operates a machine in a consumer goods plant.

—Photo from *Shqiperia Socialiste Marshon* (Socialist Albania on the March), Tirana, Naim Frasheri, 1969, p. 27.

[42] *Zëri i Popullit*, March 10, 1968.
[43] Ibid., Dec. 25, 1969.
[44] *Drita*, April 25, 1969.
[45] Radio Tirana, April 27, 1969.
[46] For Hoxha's report, see Hoxha, *Speeches, 1967-1968*, pp. 221-50.
[47] Radio Tirana, July 10, 1968.

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December 1969 Central Committee Plenum when Hoxha announced the launching of two new drives—the so-called "proletarian-discipline" and "actions-through-concentrated-blows" campaigns.[48] The first was essentially an educational campaign aimed at stimulating workers to fulfill production norms, to cut down on unauthorized absences, and to take better care of their machines and tools. The second called for "voluntary" participation by workers in such public tasks as digging irrigation or drainage ditches, planting trees, and constructing workers' housing. Both these measures, it was hoped, would help to raise the "socialist consciousness" of the working class.

It should not be overlooked that this period of intense revolutionization of Albanian society at large was accompanied by an intensification of the ongoing process of social transformation of the Albanian Party of Labor itself. As the leadership evidently recognized, the ultimate success or failure of the movement would hinge on the ability of district and local APL organs to generate popular support for the party's directives.

Through an accelerated campaign of party recruitment, the APL was able to bring about significant changes in the party rolls in the five years beginning in 1966.[49] By 1971, laborers had replaced white-collar workers as the single largest social category (36 percent) among APL members. Reflecting the women's emancipation campaign throughout Albanian society, the share of women in the party membership rose from 12.5 to 22.5 percent over the same period. The leadership also fixed more demanding apprenticeship requirements for candidate members and has insisted that party members become "model revolutionaries" both at work and in their private lives. Finally, since 1968, the APL has sought to "proletarianize" its local organization by placing workers in leadership positions.

At this point, let us return briefly to the question of the similarities and differences between the Chinese and Albanian cultural revolutions. There were quite obvious coincidences in timing and in broad objectives as both regimes reacted to what they perceived as the growing threat of Soviet-style "revisionism" to the achievement of their revolutionary goals. However, several noteworthy differences between the two movements at their zenith should be noted. The Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution was not marked by an intense intraparty power struggle, or by the virtual deification of the party leader, Enver Hoxha. It did not result in the enhancement of the political power of the military, nor did it lead to the establishment of distinct revolutionary political institutions or the weakening of existing mass organizations. It did not entail violence, the public humiliation and degradation of leading cadres, or temporary economic disruption. It did not bring a radical restructuring of the educational system. Nor did it involve a repudiation of the Western cultural heritage or a sudden accentuation of Albania's isolation from the outside world.

The Revolution Challenged

As Albania entered the 1970's, there appeared to be a number of factors, both internal and external, pressing for a relaxation in the intensity of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution. In effect, the revolution experienced a challenge from several sectors which was at least acknowledged and to some extent tolerated by the leadership during 1970-72.

Students of the State University of Tirana volunteer their labor for construction of the 54-kilometer Elbasan-Prenjas rail line.

—Eastfoto.

[48] See Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1969-1970* (Reports and Speeches, 1969-1970), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1970, pp. 264-83.

[49] Party membership grew from 66,327 in 1966 to 86,985 in 1971, an absolute increase almost equalling the total growth of the APL from 1948 to 1966. See *Kongresi IV i PPSh*, pp. 121-30, 277–85; *Kongresi V i partisë së Punës të Shqipërisë (The Fifth* Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor) Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1967, pp. 341-47; and *Kongresi VI i Partisë së Punes të Shqipërisë* (The Sixth Congress of the Albanian Party of Labor), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1972, pp. 476-80.

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The first factor which seemed to impel the regime toward a toning down of the cultural revolution was the restiveness of the general population after four years of constant and seemingly endless demands. In apparent recognition of this discontent, Hoxha's speech at the December 1969 Central Committee Plenum took a clearly conciliatory tone, seeking to justify the sacrifices demanded of the working class on the ground that they were "directed toward the defense of the nation, the freedom of the people, and the well-being of man." Hoxha also introduced a new concept of "socialist humanism," which he defined to mean the love the worker expresses for the people through his labor.[50] Six months later he also cautioned tactless and insensitive supervisors in the following terms:

People should not just be asked to work, produce, sacrifice, and fulfill the plan. These are all correct demands. They are essential and important, but they do not constitute an end in themselves. Everything that is produced in the country is for the benefit of the workers. Since this is the case, we must severely criticize and denounce the methods and practices of some cadres, particularly in the state organs and economic enterprises, who show an interest in everything from screws to cows, but who overlook man, the most important element in every kind of work.[51]

There was also evidence of a mood of rebellion among the nation's youth at being forced into a rigid, party-controlled mold. The suicide of two leaders of the UALY organization in Tepelene district in September 1969, apparently over excessive gossip about their private lives spread by party members in the area, underlined this trend and apparently evoked demands by young people that they be given a greater voice in managing their own affairs, and that younger, "better qualified" personnel replace older cadres.[52] Clearly, the APL leadership could ill afford to alienate youth in a country where people below the age of 30 comprised some 60 percent of the total population.

Also impeding the progress of the cultural revolution were entrenched conservative attitudes in the countryside. In major addresses during the last half of 1969, Hoxha repeatedly expressed distress over the slow progress in emancipating women and in eradicating "gossip, rumors and other undesirable social traits."[53] Hoxha's remarks, while expressing disappointment with the lagging pace of reeducation, also carried an implicit acceptance of the fact that things could only be pushed so fast.

On the international front, Albania's heightened sense of insecurity in the aftermath of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine drove Tirana to seek accommodation with its neighbors, Greece and Yugoslavia; to expand diplomatic, commercial and cultural ties elsewhere, primarily in Western Europe and the Third World; and even to contemplate—in some circles—normalization of relations with the United States.[54] Such actions and ideas tended to bring into question the practicality of an uncompromisingly radical domestic posture.

These pressures for a moderation of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution appear to have found a voice at the leadership level in the persons of three AFL Central Committee members—Fadil Paçrami, Todi Lubonja and Agim Mero—who enjoyed a brief prominence in the years 1970-72. All three men had held or were currently holding influential positions connected in some way with implementation of party policies in the fields of culture and youth. Two of them—Paçrami and Lubonja—had served at different times as chief editor of the party daily, *Zëri i Popullit*. In the late 1960's, as Secretary of Propaganda of the Tirana district party organization, Paçrami had played a leading role in trying to rally the intellectuals behind the Ideological and Cultural Revolution. Lubonja, a former head of the UALY and extremely popular with Albanian youth, was appointed Director General of Radio Tirana in late 1970 or early 1971 and presided over Albania's advent into the television era. Mero, who was serving as UALY Chairman in 1970, was named rector of the State University of Tirana in the spring of 1972.

On the basis of subsequent accusations against them, it appears that the three men played a major role in urging upon the Albanian leadership the desirability of loosening the restraints on culture and youth, arguing that the persistence of "conservative" influences, rather than liberal tendencies among youth and the intellectuals, posed the most serious obstacle to the building of socialism in Albania.

[50] Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1969-1970*, p. 281.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 383.
[52] See *ibid.*, pp. 134-63, and *Zëri i Popullit*, Feb. 20, 1970.
[53] Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1969-1970*, pp. 115-78.
[54] For a discussion of these developments see Peter R. Prifti, "Albania's Expanding Horizons," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), No. 2, 1972, pp. 37-39; also, *The New York Times*, Sept. 13, 1973.

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Hoxha, for his part, appears to have been willing to tolerate a relaxation of the hard line in the youth and cultural sectors so long as this did not have a disruptive effect on such crucial institutions as the economy, the schools, the party, and the mass organizations.[55]

By the end of 1972, however, Hoxha had become disenchanted with the results of the softer line. According to various official accounts, discipline among the nation's youth had seriously deteriorated. Not only were young people wearing their hair long, dressing in "mod"-style clothing, using vulgar language, and defying parents and teachers, but they were also committing various types of petty crimes and leaving their jobs without authorization. Instead of narrowing the generation gap, the new program had widened it. Absenteeism and the rate of student failures in the nation's schools and the State University of Tirana had reached alarming proportions. Young people were beginning to demand more recreational facilities, and worker discipline was being undermined by the "irresponsible" conduct of younger laborers.[56]

Discord also continued to prevail among the nation's writers and artists. According to the later charges against Paçrami, he had emerged as a spokesman for a "new wave" which wanted to discard Albanian themes and socialist realism, preferring instead to treat "universal problems" from an "existential" and "Freudian" viewpoint. A conflict had also developed between Albanian intellectuals of the pre- and post-1960 periods.[57]

The regime attributed some of its problems to the infiltration of foreign influences through foreign telecasts, books, and tourists. The Albanian Radio-Television Service was accused of having sought to imitate its foreign counterparts in its programming. Moreover, the Union of Albanian Labor Youth and the Union of Writers and Artists were severely criticized for their failure to deal effectively with the problems that had developed within their organizations.[58]

In sum, the events of 1970-72 in Albania underscored the fact that both "liberal" and "conservative" tendencies continued to pose a serious threat to the goals of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution. While Albania's leaders in this period displayed somewhat greater flexibility in dealing with these internal pressures, their disillusionment with the results of relaxed policies finally led them to move back toward rigid cultural controls.

Albanian citizens stop to read the latest official messages on a wall newspaper (flete-rrufe).

—Eastfoto.

A New Upsurge

By early February 1973, Hoxha had apparently decided to reinstitute the APL's hard-line policy on the ideological-cultural front.[59] He first announced his intention to "intensify the ideological struggle against alien manifestations and liberal attitudes toward them" in a secret speech to the apparat of the APL Secretariat on March 15 [60] and then gave a full, public exposition of his views at the June Plenum of the Central Committee. The new hard line was immediately manifested in the Plenum's decision to expel Paçrami and Lubonja from both the Central Committee and the party, while Mero, after expressing "abject" and "sincere" self-criticism, was demoted to candidate membership in the Central Committee.[61]

[55] For the APL leader's position on this point, see Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1970-1971* (Reports and Speeches, 1970-1971), Tirana, Librit Politika, 1972, pp. 281-99.

[56] See, for example, *Zëri i Popullit*, Aug. 15, 1972, and Feb. 23, 1973; and Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1972-1973* (Reports and Speeches, 1972-1973), Tirana, Librit Politik, 1974, pp. 297-387.

[57] See *ibid.*, pp. 308-25, 398-420.

[58] See *ibid.*, pp. 222-50, 260-96, 297-387.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 211.

[60] This was first published in *ibid.*, pp. 260-96.

[61] For the text of Hoxha's report see *ibid.*, pp. 297-387. The text of Hoxha's closing speech at the Plenum was published in *ibid.*, pp. 388-425. It was announced at the Plenum that Paçrami and Lubonja had been assigned to perform manual labor. Subsequently, Mero was relieved of his duties as rector of the State University of Tirana.

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Following the June Plenum there was a massive shakeup in the leadership of the Union of Writers and Artists. Dhimitër Shuteriqi, one of the country's most prominent pre-World War II Communist intellectuals and chairman of the Union since 1956, was dismissed from his position, as was the organization's Secretary General, Vilson Kilica. In addition, two of the Union's three secretaries, the editor of its weekly newspaper, *Drita*, and several members of the editorial board of its monthly journal, *Nëntori*, were fired.[62] Dritëro Agolli, a prominent writer who had opposed the Paçrami line, was named chairman of the Union. There were also major leadership changes in the UALY, where First Secretary Rudi Monari was demoted to secretary and two other members of the Secretariat were ousted.[63] There also appear to have been numerous leadership changes in the UALY's district and local organs.[64] These unprecedented measures against the intellectual and youth elites underscored the gravity with which the APL leaders viewed the "ideological deviations" that had arisen within these groups.

In the aftermath of the June Plenum, a nationwide campaign to eliminate "alien influences" in Albania was inaugurated. It has been distinguished by the extensive use of wall newspapers, factory and neighborhood meetings, and personal contacts by representatives of the party and mass organizations to secure mass compliance with party directives. As of June 1974, the regime appeared still not entirely pleased with the results of these efforts. "Weaknesses" and "shortcomings" reportedly continued to be prevalent in such areas as the "arts" and culture," the "struggle against bureaucratism," and the agricultural sector of the economy.[65]

It seems likely that the current reintensified phase of the Albanian Ideological and Cultural Revolution will continue for the immediate future. Albania's present rulers seem to be unwilling to abandon the revolutionary line they have steadfastly pursued since the 1950's. They appear to be firm and sincere, if somewhat unrealistic, in their commitment to revolutionary change in Albania and the world. As Hoxha declared in February 1973:

No, comrades, we cannot, nor do we have any need to follow the "European road." On the contrary, it is Europe that should be following our road, because from the political perspective she is behind us. She is a great distance away from what Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and our party have tried to achieve.[66]

In the long run, the fate of the Ideological and Cultural Revolution will be affected by both internal and external developments. First, it is likely there will be significant leadership changes in the APL during the late 1970's and early 1980's. The average age of the APL Politburo in 1974 is 57 years, and Hoxha is 66. The infusion of new blood into the ruling elite could weaken both its cohesiveness and its commitment to a policy of revolutionary militancy. Second, as the educational level of the Albanian people continues to rise, as radio and television ownership in the country becomes more widespread, and as economic expectations continue to grow, the leadership will find it increasingly difficult to insulate the population from outside influences and to maintain its austere revolutionary regimen.[67] Finally, Albania's future policies will be influenced by developments within the world Communist system—especially after the passing of Tito and Mao Tse-tung.

[62] *Zëri i Popullit*, July 26, 1973.
[63] *Ibid.*, July 24, 1973.
[64] *Ibid.*, Nov. 7, 1973.
[65] *Ibid.*, June 1 and 25, 1974.
[66] Enver Hoxha, *Raporte e Fjalime, 1972-73*, pp. 243-44.
[67] In 1973, one of every three Albanians (740,000) was attending school (Radio Tirana, Sept. 1, 1973). By the end of 1973, there were approximately 35,000 television receivers and some 300,000 radios in the country.

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Books

Convergence—A Fallacy

By Kurt London

WILFRIED VON BREDOW: *Vom Antagonismus zur konvergenz: Studien zum Ost-West Problem* (From Antagonism to Convergence: Studies of the East-West Problem). Frankfurt-am-Main, Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1972.
JEROME M. GILISON: *British and Soviet Policies: A Study of Legitimacy and Convergence.* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
LEON GOURÉ, FOY D. KOHLER, RICHARD SOLL, and ANNETTE STIEFBOLD: *Convergence of Communism and Capitalism: The Soviet View.* Miami, Center for Advanced International Studies of the University of Miami, 1973.

RELATIONS BETWEEN East and West have evolved in recent years under broad slogans such as peaceful coexistence or détente, which are mutually acceptable concepts. A third such conceptual umbrella, convergence, has been violently rejected by Moscow. In the West, however, the thought that bourgeois and socialist societies could slowly but inescapably drift toward each other and eventually converge has fascinated many political thinkers. Among recent writings about convergence, the three books under review are of particular interest: one is a scholarly analysis of the evolving theory; the second offers a comparison of the British and Soviet governments to assess the possibility of eventual convergence; and the third (and in the reviewer's opinion most important) presents a documented American portrayal of the Soviet view of convergence.

Wilfried von Bredow, a professor of political science at Marburg University, has undertaken an elaborate scientific treatment of concepts of convergence in the typical German academic manner, probing all possible aspects of the fusion of different political and economic systems. The author delineates several hypothetical types or situations of convergence. The first two he calls illusory because they would depend on one of the systems accepting the other. The third pictures a situation in which both systems would develop toward a new goal, involving a quasi-mutual transformation into a new form of society. While at first glance this concept sounds somewhat naive, von Bredow finds it conceivable that the "natural law of an industrial society" could force the two inimical systems toward a structural rapprochement which might be called a "planned market economy." Under a fourth type of convergence, both systems would develop and move toward each other under the impact of industrial growth; however, they would stop short of merger and would rather become two parallel systems which were no longer antagonistic. They would differ in many ways quantitatively and qualitatively yet show certain similarities. (The French scholar Raymond Aron is said to believe in such a possibility.)

As von Bredow makes abundantly clear, the main factor that argues against any possibility of East-West convergence is Marxist-Leninist ideology. His analysis of the roots of Soviet ideological objections is particularly useful. In the Soviet view, any attempt at convergence would weaken socialism because it would tend to narrow down the basic conflict between capitalism and socialism and diminish the difference between a Marxist-Leninist and a bourgeois class state. Convergence is therefore anathema to Moscow. By contrast, the ideologists consider that peaceful coexistence is in the interest of socialism and can help increase its strength. Peaceful coexistence, it is argued, does not lead to ideological compromise and leaves intact the fundamental antagonism between the two systems of government and society, even though they may achieve a measure of cooperation. Buttressing the Marxist-Leninist attitude on convergence is a belief that capitalism

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and imperialism are in a process of decline, although the capitalist states are still strong enough to strike mutually useful agreements with their adversaries. But such cooperation, it is insisted, in no way affects Marxist-Leninist hostility toward the whole fabric of imperialistic ideology, ranging from capitalist economics to "idealistic" philosophy and religion.

Given this implacable attitude on the part of the Communists, it is hard to see how East and West could advance toward a systemic merger without a revolution that would enforce convergence on one or the other at a terrible cost in human and material terms. For the time being, peaceful coexistence and détente thus appear to offer more realistic approaches to accommodation.

THE COMPARATIVE study, *British and Soviet Politics,* by Professor Jerome M. Gilison of Johns Hopkins University, is a curious book. In comparing two political systems that are generally viewed as diametric opposites, the author tries to make a case for the existence of "underlying similarities" that could one day lead to convergence. He submits that the "social and economic environments in these two countries are sufficiently similar to provide," as he puts it, "similar but not identical 'loads' on [*i.e.*, problems for] the political system." While he acknowledges that the ideological superstructures in the two countries "are sufficiently different to suggest dissimilar solutions for the similar problems that confront the political systems," he nevertheless finds it conceivable that the USSR and Great Britain could eventually converge into a single type of post-industrial welfare state.

In asserting the "similarities" of the two systems, Gilison gives a new twist to the concept of legitimacy, relating it to success in governmental problem-solving in a way that supports his strained arguments. He also manifests an astounding inability—or unwillingness—to distinguish between Soviet pretenses and Soviet realities. For example, he compares the constitutional foundations of both systems; yet, as everyone knows, the 1936 Soviet Constitution is a document full of high-sounding principles that have never been enforced and that in fact have been deliberately ignored by successive regimes. Similarly, the author claims that both the British and the Soviet peoples are ruled through "representative organs of government" and that the party in power is "the choice of the people and is responsive to the people's best interest, whether expressed or not." These assertions are disturbing. The Supreme Soviet—the so-called parliament of the USSR—is widely acknowledged to function as a mere rubber stamp for the decisions of the Politburo, while the British Parliament is equally recognized for the enormously important and independent role it plays in the governmental structure. As for the party in power being the "choice of the people," citizens of the USSR have, of course, never had a chance to exercise a genuine political choice, and it is at least problematical whether a majority would support the regime in an open vote. There is only one party in the USSR—the Soviet Communist Party—and one may certainly question whether it rules in its own or the people's "best interest." Gilison also equates the stability of the two systems, ignoring the fact that British parliamentary democracy has existed for centuries while the 60-year-old Soviet

KURT LONDON—Professor Emeritus of International Affairs, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University; author of *The Permanent Crisis,* 1968, and editor of a forthcoming volume, *The Soviet Impact on World Politics,* among other works.

NORMAN D. PALMER—Professor of Political Science and South Asian Studies at the University of Pennsylvania; author of numerous works including *The Indian Political System* (2nd ed.), 1971, and *South Asia and United States Policy,* 1969.

HANSJAKOB STEHLE—Noted West German journalist and editor of a 1971 study, *Nachbarn im Osten: Herausforderung zu einer Neuen Politik* (Neighbors in the East: Challenge for a New Policy), the fruit of his 15-year experience as a correspondent in Eastern Europe; currently correspondent in Rome for West German Radio (Cologne) and *Die Zeit* (Hamburg).

HAROLD P. FORD—Director of Research, Institute for the Study of Ethics and International Affairs, Georgetown University (Washington, DC).

LUCIEN BIANCO—Director of Studies in the Economic and Social Sciences Section of the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes of the Sorbonne (Paris); author of *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949,* 1971.

ROBERT R. SIMMONS—Assistant Professor, Department of Political Studies, University of Guelph (Ontario, Canada); author of the forthcoming *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow, and the Korean Civil War.*

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system has yet to prove its historic durability.

In the process of comparison, Gilison acknowledges that the Soviet government "tries to 'mold' its citizens," while the British government tries "to please and impress its citizens." These objectives are so disparate that one wonders why they did not dissuade the author from his comparative efforts altogether. Gilison's position (stated in his concluding chapter) is that "it is important to illuminate the similarities precisely because the differences between the Soviet and British systems have so often been exaggerated." The reviewer submits that exaggeration in this respect is hardly possible, so profound are the differences in all aspects of social, economic and political life of the two systems.

In arguing the possibility of convergence, Mr. Gilison points on the one hand to "a notable transformation of the established Western state systems from laissez-faire to welfare," and on the other to "a retreat of the Soviet Union from the ramparts of revolution to the quest for more chemical fertilizers, plastics, Fiat automobiles, and a comfortable style of life." One has to conclude that he is simply not in touch with the realities of the Soviet scene. The regime's ongoing repression of individual freedoms, censorship of the press, and suppression of any deviations from the one-party line hardly constitute or contribute to "a comfortable style of life," nor does the quest for fertilizer indicate that Moscow has abandoned its revolutionary goals.

VERY DIFFERENT from Gilison's work is the eminently reasonable, well-researched and factual study jointly undertaken by Leon Gouré, Foy Kohler, Richard Soll, and Annette Stiefbold. The work is organized in two parts, one presenting an analysis-in-depth of the Soviet view of convergence and the other providing back-up documentation from primary sources. Covering some of the same ground as von Bredow, the authors show that convergence is regarded by Moscow as a Western concept aimed at the "death of ideology" and at the transformation of the Soviet system into an "essentially open and consumer-oriented society." In Soviet eyes, convergence takes on the coloring of an "insidious form of Western ideological subversion"—a new camouflage for anti-communism — which would interfere with peaceful coexistence by trying to extend it into the "spheres of class relations and ideology." The very fact that convergence is considered possible in some Western circles is read as a danger signal of alien intentions to achieve a "softening or weakening of communism," which—in *Pravda's* words—constitutes a "slander against socialism."

The study outlines Soviet criticisms of specific approaches to convergence by such scholars as John Kenneth Galbraith, Raymond Aron, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Daniel Bell. The last author's work, *The End of Ideology,* is considered intellectual anti-communism and is as disagreeable to Soviet party ideologists as—say—Walter W. Rostow's *Stages of Economic Growth.* The effort of several of the writers named to link the convergence theory with the possibility of mutual agreements in matters of military policy and armaments is condemned as having no "scientific justification." According to Soviet commentators, all convergence theories provoke the contempt of intellectuals in the USSR (a claim that disregards such notable exceptions as the scientists Andrei Sakharov and Peter Kapitsa).

How do such attitudes affect Moscow's conduct in the field of international relations and specifically Soviet-American relations? The authors recall the Soviet reaction to the "bridge-building" concept advanced by the administration of former US President Lyndon B. Johnson during the 1960's—a concept that could have represented a first tentative and theoretical step toward convergence. The Soviet scholar G. A. Arbatov, a leading Americanologist, quickly moved to demolish the concept on the ground that it could become "a platform for the initiation of subversive activity directed toward the destruction of the socialist commonwealth." *Kommunist,* the Soviet theoretical journal, called the notion of "bridge-building" a new form of "psychological warfare" and an interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries. Thus, the least whisper of a possibility of convergence in the US official posture provoked a strong rebuff from Moscow.

The Soviet attitudes outlined and documented in this careful study should open the eyes of people who, in a sincere desire to see East and West come to terms, have seized on convergence as an eventual solution to the fundamental antagonism between the two systems. The simple truth is that convergence is not now, and can never be, taken seriously by Moscow. The only mutually acceptable means of achieving rapprochement—and, on the other side of the coin, avoiding confrontation—are the *ad hoc* approaches represented by peaceful coexistence and détente.

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The Communist Tug-of-War in India

By Norman D. Palmer

BHABANI SEN GUPTA: *Communism in Indian Politics.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.
CHI-HSI HU: *Pékin et le mouvement communist indien* (Peking and the Indian Communist Movement). Paris, Armand Colin, 1972.
MOHAN RAM: *Politics of Sino-Indian Confrontation.* Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1973.
VIJAY SEN BUDHRAJ: *Soviet Russia and the Hindustan Subcontinent.* Bombay, Somaiya Publications, 1973.
ASHA L. DATAR: *India's Economic Relations with the USSR and Eastern Europe, 1953-1969.* London, Cambridge University Press, 1972.

INDIA PROVIDES a unique case study of competitive communism, with important internal and external dimensions and ramifications. The study can be carried on at three levels: (1) competition within and among the three identifiable Indian Communist parties and other less discernible groups in the Indian Communist movement; (2) relations of the Indian CPs with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the international Communist movement; (3) relations between India and the two Communist giants. This complicated and interlocking pattern gives rise to two major questions: (1) To what extent is communism in India an independent, indigenous force, and to what extent is it affected by the international Communist movement or the policies and actions of the major Communist states? (2) To what extent has India been penetrated and influenced by the major Communist powers, as reflected in its domestic and foreign policies?

The five important books under review offer different approaches to the competitive aspects of Indian communism and to the policies of the Communist states *vis-à-vis* India. Bhabani Sen Gupta, a distinguished Bengali novelist, journalist and scholar, treats communism in India "primarily as an Indian political force within the Indian political system" and as "an internal challenge within a nation to an existing system, rather than an alien concept introduced from the outside and directed by an external Communist power." His work is probably the most insightful study yet made of Indian communism in its regional and national setting.

The other four volumes pay less attention to the inner dynamics of Indian communism, concentrating instead on its international dimensions and implications.[1] Two of the works focus on China and India, and two on the Soviet Union and India. Chi-hsi Hu's brief monograph reviews relations between the People's Republic of China and the Indian Communist movement since 1949, "in the double context of Sino-Soviet rivalry and Sino-Indian interstate relations." Drawing extensively on Chinese sources, it offers a balanced presentation of this complex story from the vantage point of Peking, highlighting the importance placed on India in the Chinese revolutionary world strategy. The study is perhaps most valuable for the light it throws on the broad workings of Chinese foreign policy, especially during the course of the Cultural Revolution, although it also offers useful insights into the Indian Communist movement.

The volume by Mohan Ram, a well-known leftist Indian journalist, surveys the entire course of Sino-Indian relations, mostly at the interstate level. It ranges in coverage from such basic themes as the competition between the Soviet Union and China in South Asia to timely subjects like the implications of the 1971 Indo-Soviet treaty of "peace, friendship and cooperation" and the effects of the emergence of Bangladesh on Sino-Indian relations. While these are important topics, the volume provides less original material than two earlier works by Mohan

[1] Sen Gupta has dealt with these international aspects in other writings, notably *The Fulcrum of Asia*, New York, Pegasus, 1970.

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Ram which—like Sen Gupta's—focussed directly on the Indian Communist movement, though in a more sensational and less balanced way.[2]

Adopting the Soviet practice of referring to India and Pakistan as "two Hindustan states," Vijay Sen Budhraj—a member of the Political Science Department at Kurukshetra University, with an American Ph.D. but obvious pro-Soviet leanings—deals with Soviet policies toward "the Hindustan subcontinent" in terms of "state interest." His treatment of Soviet relations with Pakistan is particularly interesting if also controversial. He describes the "new" Soviet Pakistan policy that began to take shape in 1964 and 1965, and he insists that for all its special ties with and aid to India, "Moscow never wanted the breakup of Pakistan."

The study by the late Dr. Asha Datar is by far the most specialized and the most extensively documented of any of the five volumes reviewed. It was the doctoral dissertation of a promising young Indian economist whose career was abruptly terminated by a fatal motor accident in March 1971, shortly after she had joined the World Bank as a professional trainee. From an Indian perspective, it covers the economic relations of India with the USSR and East European countries from 1953 to 1959, in terms of trade and credit and not just of aid relationships. Weighing costs and benefits, it considers the role of external finance from Communist states in India's development efforts, the terms and conditions of aid, and overall aspects of India's relations with centrally-planned economies. It concludes that Soviet credits to India, while small in relation to credits from the United States and other non-Communist Western countries, were "useful beyond their actual contribution" in two ways—by providing the means "for building up heavy industry in the public sector when other donors were reluctant to do so," and by having an "aid-inducing" effect on non-Communist countries.

IN SAMPLING THE rich fare of information and opinion offered in these several volumes, one develops a broad sense of the ebb and flow in the relations of the Soviet Union and of China with India. In the early years of India's independence, its relations with the USSR were neither close nor cordial—and those with Communist China from 1949 to 1954 were generally distant, marred specifically by adverse reactions in India to Chinese military moves in Tibet in 1950-51. But after 1954 India developed increasingly close contact with both Communist states, whose growing differences with one another did not become clear until the latter part of the decade. Both Hu and Ram call attention to the Chinese view that the first open revelation of Sino-Soviet differences was made by Moscow in an official statement of September 9, 1959, urging India and China to settle their border disputes through mutual consultation—a statement that the Chinese regarded as the first rebuff of one socialist country by another. After 1959, India became a major battleground in the growing Sino-Soviet conflict. In the Indian-Chinese border war of 1962, the Soviet Union, after first advising Nehru to compromise, swung over to a pro-Indian position. In the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 China strongly supported Pakistan, while the Soviet Union struck a more neutral stance, thus giving it an opportunity to assume the role of mediator both at the Tashkent Conference of January 1966 and in its later relations with India and Pakistan. During the 1971 crisis in South Asia, however, the Soviet Union became completely identified with the Indian position, especially after the signing of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty in August.

Budhraj devotes an entire chapter to "Soviet Russia and the Breakup of Pakistan." He is of the opinion that "Moscow did not want war so close to its frontiers" and that "it left nothing undone to prevent the Indo-Pakistan war." This is partly but not entirely the case. It seems clear from the record that in the final stages of the 1971 crisis Moscow exerted no great pressure to dissuade the Indian government from moving into East Pakistan. Moreover, the Soviet treaty with India had the result, however unintended, of strengthening the hands of those Indians who favored a military solution of the crisis. It is true that once the war started, the Soviet Union tried to keep the conflict localized and to bring it to a speedy conclusion—but only after India had achieved its military objective of forcing the surrender of the Pakistani troops in East Pakistan. Budhraj does call attention to two interesting points—that in spite of its pro-Indian orientation throughout the 1971 crisis, the Soviet Union did not suspend its economic aid to Pakistan, and that the Soviet press "singled out China or the United States for denunciation rather than Pakistan." Since 1971 the Soviet Union has maintained its close ties with

[2] *Indian Communism: Split Within a Split*, Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1969; and *Maoism in India*, Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1971.

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India, while establishing extensive ties with Bangladesh and improving its relations with Pakistan. Apparently, it believes that it has more to gain from stability than from instability in South Asia. Thus, there may be some basis for Budhraj's overall conclusion that "broadly speaking, the Soviets have played a constructive role in the subcontinent," though this conclusion will be sharply challenged in many circles in India and elsewhere—and certainly in Communist China.

For pragmatic rather than ideological reasons China sided with Pakistan during all stages of the 1971 crisis in South Asia. In one sense, this seems to have been a strange posture that was contrary to China's basic interests, to its past condemnation of reactionary military regimes, and to its strong support of national liberation movements. However, China's negative attitude toward the resistance movement in Bangladesh was conditioned by its past ties with Pakistan, its antipathy toward India, and—above all—its suspicions of Soviet intentions in the subcontinent and elsewhere. As Mohan Ram observes, "China's attitude to India and Bangladesh, predictably, was a function of the larger Sino-Soviet ideological dispute." Seemingly, China's paramount concern has been to counteract the influence of both the American "imperialists" and the Russian "social imperialists" and to promote its own revolutionary aims and objectives in developing countries. In this connection, Hu's reference to what he calls "ultra-Maoism," which unlike "neo-Maoism" is more anti-Soviet than anti-American, may be relevant. As applied to India, according to Hu's interpretation, "ultra-Maoism constitutes the reply par excellence of the Chinese Communists to the Soviet-American politico-economic domination over the underdeveloped countries."

China has strongly denounced the much-discussed and still nebulous Brezhnev proposal, first advanced in 1969 and renewed since 1972, for "a system of collective security in Asia." Pakistan has shied away from this proposal, and India, after some tentative expressions of interest, has taken an equivocal position regarding it. Soviet spokesmen have occasionally referred to the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971 as a major step in the implementation of the Brezhnev proposal, but the Indians have apparently been embarrassed by this interpretation. This important subject is not discussed at any length in any of the books under review, although Ram and Budhraj do refer to it.

MUCH ATTENTION is given in the studies of Sen Gupta and Hu to the relations of the Chinese Communists—and to some extent of the Soviet Communists and the international movement—with the three Communist parties that have emerged in India. The oldest of these is the Communist Party of India (CPI). Except for a period in 1949-51 when it seemed to espouse the Chinese or Maoist path, the CPI has generally been identified with the Soviet Communists; but while it has been increasingly anti-Chinese, it has not been just an Indian agent of the CPSU. Indeed, it has often shown a high degree of independence and nationalist orientation, as well as of factionalism and division. The second party, which calls itself the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), emerged from a split of the CPI in 1964. For a time it was labeled pro-Chinese, but Sen Gupta gives a more accurate characterization: "The new Communist party . . . was at best a limited ally of the CCP in its conflict with the CPSU, never a partisan. Even this partial alliance was one-sided and short-lived." Gradually China became alienated from the CPI(M), especially when the new party began to participate in elections and even in coalition governments in West Bengal and Kerala.

As Mohan Ram points out, originally the CCP "did not attack the CPI(M) directly; it chose to make the CPI the surrogate target." But since 1967 it has been openly critical. In 1967, irked by the CPI(M)'s weakness for the constitutional path and its aversion to armed struggle, the Chinese issued a call for armed revolution in India and the formation of a true Maoist party, "splitting the CPI(M) if need be." The Chinese hailed the Naxalbari uprising in 1967 as the beginning of a genuine revolutionary struggle in India. In 1968, the more radical Maoist elements in the CPI(M) and other Maoist groups formed the All-India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), converting the name a year later to the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).

In the CPI(M-L), China seemed to have found a faithful agent and ally to promote the Indian revolution in accordance with the Chinese path and to play a part in the world revolutionary struggle directed by Peking. But while the leaders of the CPI(M-L) remained overtly loyal to "the *Thought of Mao Tse-tung*," they came to differ greatly among themselves in the interpretation of Maoism and of the Chinese model of revolution as applied to

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Indian conditions. Under the leadership of Charu Mazumdar, the party resorted to its own tactics of revolutionary terror without "guidance" from the Chinese. Before his death in a Calcutta jail on July 28, 1972, Mazumdar was denounced by the CCP and expelled from the CPI(M-L). It seems reasonable to suppose that the CCP has come to consider the CPI(M-L) a somewhat feeble and unreliable instrument for promoting a Chinese-type revolutionary struggle in India.

The competitive struggles within as well as among the Communist parties and groups in India have greatly weakened the Indian Communist movement. On the whole, the dominant groups in the CPI have followed a pro-Moscow line, have tended to favor a revolution from above, and have generally been willing to follow the constitutional path and work within the existing political system, even though their ultimate objective is to destroy and replace that system. The CPI(M) has been more "leftist," has fluctuated between Maoist and non-Maoist lines, has favored revolution from below, and has generally been willing to contest elections and even to participate in governments, but with less tolerance of the existing system than the CPI has shown. The CPI(M-L) is the only really Maoist Communist party now in existence in India, but the fidelity of its adherence to the Maoist path (at least as interpreted by the Chinese) has been questioned by some of its own adherents as well as by its critics, and in recent months by the Chinese themselves.

None of India's Communist parties has had much success at the polls or in other types of activity except in certain states and under certain circumstances. In the latter connection, Sen Gupta rightly stresses the regional character of Indian communism, even though one of the parties, the CPI, has no strong regional base. The CPI does have a limited hard-core following in West Bengal and Kerala, but in recent years it has been overshadowed in these states by the CPI(M), which also has some solid support in Andhra Pradesh. The CPI(M-L) is influential mainly in West Bengal, with some collateral support in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.

AS MOHAN RAM pointed out in his earlier books, the great divide in Indian communism has increasingly come to be between Maoists and non-Maoists. In this classification, both of the major Communist parties belong on the non-Maoist side. Only the CPI (M-L), which abjures the parliamentary path, is clearly, if not purely, Maoist (other Marxist revolutionary groups exist in great abundance, especially in West Bengal, but they seem to offer little more than a capability for terrorism and violence). In the relatively open arena of Indian politics, the non-Maoist parties far overshadow the Maoist groups. But in the larger social setting, especially in Kerala and West Bengal, the Maoists may eventually prove to have deeper roots and greater strength than the non-Maoists. Insufficient attention has been paid to this factor, which in Mohan Ram's view could prove to be of decisive importance in India's political future.

Sen Gupta strikes a somewhat different note in looking toward the years ahead. He believes that the splintering of the Communists has both strengthened and weakened the Indian Communist movement, and that in spite of many evidences to the contrary, "communism in India has entered a period of growth." He holds that much will depend on the success of the Communists in developing a broader social base, especially among the peasantry,[3] in establishing deeper roots in West Bengal, in attracting significant support outside of West Bengal and Kerala (he suggests that Bihar and Andhra Pradesh are the most likely "targets of opportunity"), and in "working together, in rivalry and competition." If these developments occur, he believes that "overall Communist strategy and tactics may be moderate rather than extremist."

Whether the Maoists or non-Maoists among the Indian Communists will prove to be stronger, or whether the Indian Communist movement, in spite of its history of divisions and traumas, will grow in strength or become weaker, can only be matters for speculation in the present generally confused state of the Indian political, economic, and social scene. For the time being, competitive communism will continue to survive as a political phenonemon in India, feeding both on the tensions between the "parliamentary" and the "revolutionary" way and on the appeal of radical solutions to critical problems and needs—solutions which the Communists have not had to put to the test, since they have so seldom held political power. As Sen Gupta observes in the concluding sentence of his book, "the challenge is taller than the men and women who have been trying to meet it—including the Communists."

[3] See Bhabani Sen Gupta, "Indian Communism and the Peasantry," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1972.

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Two Polish Leaders

By Hansjakob Stehle

PETER RAINA: *Gomulka, Politische Biographie* (Gomulka, Political Biography). Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1970.
ADAM BROMKE and JOHN W. STRONG, Eds.: *Gierek's Poland.* New York, Praeger, 1973.

THROUGHOUT ITS eventful history, Poland has had to cope with a hard reality from which there is no escape—its geographical situation. How great an impact geopolitics has had on successive Polish regimes, and how little change can be brought about even by a shift in leadership as dramatic as that from Wladislaw Gomulka to Edward Gierek, becomes apparent as one reads the two books under review. The first has unexpectedly become an "obituary" for Gomulka, although written well before the former leader's death last year. The second is a collection of articles on the Gierek era, which began in December 1970; to the credit of its editors, this collective effort marks the first time that experts from Poland and the West, authors with the most varied ideological backgrounds, have collaborated in a joint publication.

Just as Marshal Józef Pilsudski, with all his strengths and weaknesses, molded the history of Poland between the two world wars, Gomulka's personality left its imprint on Polish history in the quarter-century after 1945. Peter Raina, an Indian historian who spent five years in Poland doing research on Gomulka, has collected many revealing and even new biographical details about this forceful and controversial Communist leader. However, the author's presentation suffers from an overly emotional approach that presumably can be attributed to an unsettling transformation in his views during the course of his stay in Poland. This is slightly—but only slightly—less apparent in the German-language revised edition of his book than in the original Polish-language version, which Raina wrote for an émigré publishing house in London.[1]

The German version omits a significant remark that Raina made in the very first paragraph of the Polish version—to wit: "When I came to Poland in 1962 for the first time . . . I was a naive follower of Gomulka . . . . When I left Poland in 1967, my relationship to Gomulka had changed radically." One is prompted to comment that if Raina shifted from the role of hero-worshipper to that of critic, he did not lose much of his naivété in the process. The psychological aspects of his study of Gomulka are, to be sure, convincing—offering the portrait of a dedicated, pedantically "purist" Communist who was often blind to reality. But is it really true that Gomulka was "neither a liberal nor a national Communist but only a doctrinaire," as Raina asserts? Liberalism certainly was foreign to Gomulka, and his doctrinaire traits —though mixed with pragmatism —were unmistakable, yet to deny the national element in Gomulka's makeup is to fail to recognize a basic thread in the fabric of the man.

Raina's error consists primarily in the fact that he does not pay much attention to the political-historical environment which shaped Gomulka—that is, the impact upon him of developments in the Soviet Union and in world communism. For example, the author does not mention the profound shock and after-effect suffered by Poland's Communists, and by Gomulka personally, when the Moscow-dominated Comintern dissolved their party in 1938. Nor does he show much understanding of the schism between "Muscovite" Polish Communists who returned to Poland in 1944-45 and the "partisans" who—like Gomulka— had resisted the Ger-

[1] Peter Raina, *Wladyslaw Gomulka—Zyciorys polityczny,* London, Polonia Book Fund Ltd., 1969.

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man occupation from within the country.

In particular, Raina misrepresents Gomulka's attitude during the Warsaw uprising of 1944, maintaining that Gomulka encouraged the Russians to abandon the insurgents. Without indicating the exact source, the author cites the existence of documentary proof. This is obviously a reference to a situation report first published in 1958—a communication from Gomulka to Moscow dated January 12, 1944.[2] In it, Gomulka described anti-Soviet sentiment in Poland, but not—as Raina asserts—in order to persuade the Russians to withhold help from the underground. In fact, Gomulka wrote (though Raina does not mention it) that "compared to the ghastliness of Hitler's terror, the Polish population is less and less concerned by the Bolshevik bogey." Gomulka also stated that the anti-Soviet campaign of the London-connected underground movement "Armja Krajowa" (AK) had quieted down somewhat and that the AK had given up the idea of a civil war. Inexplicably, Raina claims just the opposite—attributing to Gomulka the assertion that the AK was "promoting a civil war."

More broadly, Raina disregards a dominant feature of all political chapters in Gomulka's life—the worry, which nearly became an obsession, that Poland would once again, as before in its history, be ground down between the Germans and the Russians. This explains Gomulka's early, emphatic rejection of the AK theory of the "two enemies" and his consistent efforts thereafter at accommodation with Moscow. At the same time, it explains his ultimate attempt to counterbalance Poland's inevitable ties to the Soviet superpower by seeking an understanding not only with Communist Germany but with Bonn (in Gomulka's view, a reunited Germany was inevitable in the long run—as he told this reviewer in an interview in 1970). In retrospect, it is not really surprising that Gomulka abandoned his rigid anti-FRG position—a change about which Moscow was not consulted (and for which Raina offers no explanation whatsoever). The shift was obviously prompted by Bonn's new *Ostpolitik,* which on the one hand conjured up specters of Rapallo (for Poles, the symbolic threat of German-Soviet rapprochement at the expense of Poland) and which at the same time offered the possiblity of securing the Polish-Western border without relying solely on Soviet guarantees. There is some irony in the fact that Gomulka was overthrown because of his domestic political policies—*after* the foreign policy justification for his rigid and puritanical regime (the longstanding "German danger") was undermined by the boundary treaty negotiated with Bonn.

WAS GOMULKA'S FALL really a "turning point" in domestic policy? So claims Mieczyslaw Rakowski, one of the Polish nationals among the seventeen authors of the second book under review. Rakowski, who is chief editor of the Warsaw weekly *Polityka,* freely admits that in Gomulka's time, "in many centers of power, democracy was becoming merely an empty slogan"; he claims, however, that since Gierek's assumption of power "conditional" popular confidence has been replaced by "authentic" confidence.

Rakowski and the other Communist authors in this collection are generally in accord with its Western and émigré contributors in analyzing Gomulka's fall, and specifically the conditions that led to the riots of December 1970, but they differ with respect to their perspectives on the present and future. In contrast to Rakowski, for example, Vincent Chrypinski, Professor of Political Science at the University of Windsor, emphatically doubts the possibility of real internal reforms or of "a break with old authoritarian tendencies"; he also asserts that under Gierek, "the majority of the people . . . seem to have no great confidence in [Poland's] prospects, with most of their doubts centering . . . on the country's economy."

Undoubtedly, improvements have been made over the last three and a half years in the system of economic planning, the production mechanism, and the general living standard in Poland. Gierek's more pragmatic style of leadership has been an asset in this effort, but his situation is not unlike his predecessor's in that he has run into ideological barriers of the sort which limited Gomulka's options after 1956. Doctrinal considerations have, for example, affected the much discussed system of "workers' self-administration," as pointed out in an article by Alexander Matejko (a sociologist at the University of Alberta). Some of the authors from Poland also speak of other pressing difficulties. Foreign trade, despite all attempts at reform, faces "complex problems" the solution to which "remains to be seen," writes Witold Trzeciakow-

[2] *Kszaltowanie sie podstaw programowych Polskiej Partii Robotniczej w latach 1942-1945* (Formation of the Basic Program of the Polish Workers' Party during the Years 1942-1945), Warsaw, Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1958, pp. 205-20.

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ski (Director of Research of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Trade). Agriculture—which under Gierek as under Gomulka has in large part been left in private hands—is still caught in a "vicious circle" in spite of major material incentives: "The low standard of farming methods results in insufficient incomes, yet low incomes perpetuate the low standard of farming," in the words of Witold Lipski (Editor-in-chief of the Warsaw journal *Wieswspolezesna* and a *Sejm* Deputy).

In an essay on cultural developments, Georges H. Mond (lecturer at the University of Paris) writes of the role of Polish intellectuals as "the conscience of the nation." His assessment strikes the reviewer as overly roseate, since censorship has recently been on the upswing in Poland, while literary output is at an all-time low, owing to the legal or illegal emigration of many eminent intellectuals.

With respect to church-state relations, Gierek has tried consistently to avoid inflaming the ever-smoldering conflict between the Communist regime and the Catholic Church. He has entered into direct negotiations with both the Episcopate in Poland and the Vatican in Rome. The combination of foreign policy considerations and ideological caution prevents him, however, from developing a clear-cut policy toward the Church. Acording to one Polish contributor (Jerzy Turowicz, Editor-in-chief of Cracow's *Tygodnik Powszechny*), part of the problem is that the Episcopate does not recognize that Polish Catholicism is changing. Another author refers to the fixed stance on both sides: "For the Church, Poland is Catholic, for the Communist Party, Poland is socialist . . . . These two positions are mutually exclusive" (Ludwik Dembinski, Associate Professor of History at the Catholic University of Lublin). Nonetheless, there seems to be some progress toward church-state accommodation. It is regrettable that Stanislaw Staron (Professor of Political Science at the University of Vermont)—in referring to a "basic declaration" issued in 1971 by Aleksandr Skarzynski, Director of Poland's Office for Religious Affairs—fails to call attention to Skarzynski's acknowledgment, for the first time, that the regime was prepared to respect the *permanent* character of the Church's religious activity and to appreciate the social value of its educational function. If this declaration has not yet had any juridical consequences—for example, in the form of a contractual *modus vivendi* with the Vatican—it is only because the options open to Poland in foreign policy are even more limited today than in Gomulka's time as a result of Moscow's tightening of diplomatic and ideological controls in the wake of the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968 and the Polish riots of 1970.

Warsaw historian Andrzej Micewski (in one of three final essays on foreign policy) ventures the opinion that "the Russian variant [*i.e.*, Soviet alignment] of Polish policy is no longer incompatible with the expansion of other international ties"; if this is his theory, it has not evolved much in practice. The latter point is touched on by Adam Bromke in a comparison of Warsaw's and Bonn's foreign policies; he notes that a German chancellor has more maneuverability within the Western alliance than a Polish party chief within the Eastern Alliance, even if both may, to be sure, risk some moves of their own. A final word is offered by Gierek's Deputy Foreign Minister, Stanislaw Trepczynski, who—in acknowledging frustrations in the realm of foreign policy—consoles himself with the statement: "Never . . . has Poland felt as safe as she does at present." He is right, of course. However, it is also true in history that the greater the security a nation achieves, the higher the price it pays.

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In Quest of Chinese Reality

By Harold P. Ford

JAMES CHIEH HSIUNG: *Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.
WINBERG CHAI, ED.: *The Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China.* New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1972.
ISHWER C. OJHA: *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition: The Diplomacy of Cultural Despair.* 2nd ed., Boston, Beacon Press, 1971.
WILLIAM W. WHITSON, ED.: *The Military and Political Power in China in the 1970's.* New York, Praeger, 1972.

THOSE APPROACHING the study of China would be wise to heed the counsel of Albert Schweitzer, who warned scholars not to impose their own particular preconceptions on the objects of their scrutiny. Schweitzer's personal concern was about the historical Jesus, who—he observed—tended to take on mystical, Marxist, meek-and-mild, or politically rebellious attributes depending on the individual mind-set of the historian examining him. To some extent, the same tendency to interpret events and people according to the preconceived notions of the writer has also vitiated the literature on contemporary China. Too often the eyes of the beholder have reduced the infinite complexity of that dynamic society to caricature—agrarian reformers, a red dragon about to spring, Red Guards amok, or hospitable hosts. Unfortunately, the same criticism applies to a degree to some of the books under review.

There is no easy short-cut, no narrow interpretive concept, however perceptive, that can in itself bring us to an understanding of China's international policies and behavior. The key to such understanding is not to be found, for example, simply in sifting through a modest collection of Chinese documents, even though editor Winberg Chai claims that such "operational guides" reveal not only the present shape of China's foreign policy but also what it "will be after the death of Mao." Neither is it to be found in Ishwer Ojha's involved and questionable concept of "cultural despair," which he sees as a basic underlying motive force behind China's diplomacy. Nor, again, are the mainsprings of China's international strategy to be found quite so exclusively in internal military politics as William Whitson maintains.

The foreign policy of any great world power is, in the final analysis, the end product of a disparate and dynamic mix of variables. China's own particular mix includes Maoist revolutionary impulses; the sense of a great historical past; a drive to gain a place of dignity and influence in the community of nations; Chinese perceptions of exploitable opportunities in the international arena and of Soviet and other threats to China's security and interests; the need to give high priority to special import needs; differing vested institutional interests within China; competition between Chinese leaders; and so on. Only within a framework of broad dimensions can China's international conduct be understood. Indeed, one's approach needs to display a breadth and humility such as characterized Mr. George Kennan's 1954 assessment of Soviet world policy;[1] it means, he wrote,

. . . a thousand things; it means history . . . it means the combination, in unknown proportions, of natural law and chance . . . it means, God knows, not only the motivation of people in Moscow but also the way the West has appeared to Moscow and influenced Moscow over the course of the ages; it means not only elements of strength in Soviet society, but

[1] "The Soviet Union and the Noncommunist World in Historical Perspective," In C. Grove Haines, Ed., *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism,* Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954, pp. 3-4.

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also the elements of weakness in our own; it means, among other things, ourselves, with all our inadequacies, with the limitations of our own behavior.

Happily, one of the books under review—Professor James Hsiung's study of the interaction between law and policy in China's foreign relations—does take such a broad and at the same time humble approach. In effect, it is as if the author had substituted "Peking" and "Chinese" for "Moscow" and "Soviet" in Kennan's passage just quoted. Professor Hsiung conscientiously endeavors to avoid letting any preconceptions color his judgments and sets out to treat his subject with—in his words—"a consciousness of the insufficiency of any singularistic approach." His study is a work of integrity and scholarship, distinguished by its dispassionate objectivity and thoughtful analysis.

Professor Hsiung conceives of policy as a mixture of "national interests, historical experience, reciprocity, and even prestige and 'vanity,' as well as cultural-ideological factors." His conception of law is equally broad and is always painstakingly set in the cultural-political context. The author sees the manner in which the state applies law as the key to its real attitude toward international norms and its real view of world order, as distinct from its doctrinal posture:

. . . by studying a state's actual espousal, interpretation, and application of norms of international conduct, one will be able to infer much about the implicit position of that state regarding world order as a whole, which may or may not conform to the official doctrine or ideological stance which the state professes.

Professor Hsiung's study is useful not only to those students interested in Chinese attitudes and practices with respect to treaties, sovereignty, recognition, the use of force, and the pacific settlement of disputes, but also to those more broadly concerned with the motivations behind these attitudes and practices. Of special interest are the author's assessments of Sino-Soviet relations and the motives behind China's development of nuclear arms.

In Professor Hsiung's view, China finds itself "caught in a very uncomfortable position between a militant ideology and a physical milieu compelling practical sobriety." He concurs with many other scholars that China's actual record of conduct is a fairly prudent one which appears to reflect a general respect for international law as well as a realization of the practical benefits of reciprocity in dealing with other nations. The author optimistically concludes that international law may help to maintain "a minimum framework" within which certain basic needs of international life can be satisfied, and may thus contribute to a *modus vivendi* that would abate China's exaggerated sense of self-righteousness. More broadly, Professor Hsiung sees a consensus on international legal values and practice as a potential means of bridging the gulf between the conflicting perspectives of East and West, and of reducing the perils of a crude world order in which "awesome available power has been unrestrained and guided only by one's sense of self-righteousness."

IN CONTRAST TO Professor Hsiung's study, Professor Winberg Chai's book is marred by numerous unsubstantiated and highly subjective judgments and opinions that are open to question. A typical example is the implicit contrast the author draws between the "aggressive" motives of the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand and the nonaggressive ones of China on the other for developing nuclear weapons: of China, he writes, her "nonaggressive intentions can be seen through her various nuclear disarmament proposals."

Professor Chai's book does provide a useful collection of speeches, articles, communiqués, and other source materials, some of which have not previously appeared in translation. These would be of much greater value to the China scholar, and particularly to the uninitiated, however, if they were accompanied by more measured commentary.

THE INTERPRETATIONS of China's foreign policy advanced in Professor Ojha's book are, in the main, more carefully drawn than those of Professor Chai, notwithstanding the former's earlier-mentioned excessive preoccupation with the theme of "cultural despair" as an explanation of China's policy. Professor Ojha's discussion of the three-sided entanglement of China, Tibet and India, and his survey of China's international trade practices are particularly perceptive; and he addresses an issue of special interest to many China scholars in arguing that the impact of the Cultural Revolution on China's foreign policy was not as great as has been generally believed. On the other hand, his excessive emphasis on US actions in Indochina and their impact on Chinese foreign policy tends to obscure and minimize China's distrust of the USSR as a major determinant of

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that policy—a treatment that does not jibe with Peking's moves with respect to the United States since Professor Ojha's book went to press.

WILLIAM WHITSON'S collection of articles assessing the role and influence of the military in Chinese politics and policy is a mixed blessing. While it enhances our understanding of Chinese military-political matters, certain of its essays replow already familiar ground or confuse as much as they enlighten. In this reviewer's opinion, the editor's introduction imposes upon the individual contributions to the volume a greater unity of interpretation and conclusion than their content actually warrants. This applies particularly to Dr. Whitson's insistence that internal threats have been and are likely to remain "far more important" than external threats in determining the policies of the current generation of military leaders—a position which seems to derive quite clearly from the book's concentrated focus on internal military-political rivalries. Dr. Whitson views the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as a "congeries of conflicting loyalties and uneven skills, responsive principally to eleven military region commanders," and he contends that central authority in China over the next five years "must rest on the fortuitous whim" of the regional commanders' collective compromises and conflicting military loyalties. These views appear debatable in light of China's impressive progress in building up its national military might during the last few years (including the continued high-priority development of nuclear arms), and of the apparent ability of Peking authorities in recent months to elicit general responsiveness from the regional administrations.

It should be added that the editor and his individual contributors deserve our sympathy for having suffered the fate of going to press soon after Lin Piao's mysterious disappearance from the scene in the latter part of 1971 and well before the official campaign to disgrace Lin. Because of this, some of the conclusions reached in a number of the essays in the volume have been invalidated, notwithstanding a certain amount of apparent last-minute corrective (but very uneven) editing.

Taken as a whole, however, Dr. Whitson's book has much to commend it. By focusing attention on the highly political nature of the PLA, the divisions and conflicts of loyalty within it, and the interaction between the military and competing institutional influences, the book imparts added dimension and subtlety to our understanding of Chinese politics as a whole.

Another aspect of the book that deserves praise is the wide spectrum of its contributors. Especially noteworthy are Edward L. Dreyer's comparison of the role of the military in the People's Republic of China today with the role of the military in imperial China; Harry Harding's analysis of Peking's overall military policy, which he sees as a balanced one permitting some flexibility in the deployment of ground forces and militia but much less flexibility in strategic deployment of the PLA's more sophisticated branches such as the air force, strategic weapons, and—to some extent—the navy; Scott A. Boorman's discussion of the role of deception in Chinese strategy, and of modern China's debt to the ancient military strategist, Sun Tzu (even though Sun does not measure up in zero-sums and probability calculus); and John E. Coon's analysis of the PLA as an instrument of China's foreign policy.

In view of this volume's excellent assemblage of authors and its treatment of the unique interplay between military and political factors in China, it would be beneficial to see a new edition of this work—carefully revised to take account of developments since the Lin Piao episode.

Indeed, many of the world's preconceptions about China may need to be carefully revised in light of the momentous developments there during the last two years or so. To that end, serious scholarship—not hasty publication on a salable subject, but careful dispassionate reflection—on China and its impact on the world today and tomorrow should be encouraged.

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Chang Kuo-t'ao Remembers

By Lucien Bianco

CHANG KUO-T'AO: *Autobiography.* Vol. 1: *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-27;* Vol. 2: *The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1928-38.* Lawrence, Kans., University of Kansas Press. 1971 and 1972.

THE TWO-VOLUME memoirs of Chang Kuo-t'ao, one of the founders and early leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), are clearly among the most important sources thus far published on the pre-World War II history of Chinese communism. After playing a prominent role in the Communist movement during its initial phase, Chang broke with Mao in the mid-1930's and was finally read out of the party in 1938, after which he adhered to the Nationalist cause. He left China in 1949, moving first to Hong Kong and eventually to Canada, where he still resides. Chang's career in the Chinese Communist movement thus embodies some significant parallels with that of Leon Trotsky in the Russian Bolshevik Party, although Chang of course never attained anything approaching Trotsky's stature. And while Chang's memoirs differ strikingly in character from Trotsky's much earlier account of his own party career, the two have one important feature in common: they both represent challenges by individual participants to the official versions of the history of the authors' respective parties and provide valuable materials for correcting the official accounts. Chang is no more objective—indeed, rather less so—than Trotsky was, but it is nonetheless as enlightening to compare Chang's personal account of some particular episode in the Chinese party's history against the official version as it was to compare Trotsky's account of the Soviet party's early history and Stalin's contribution to it against the official version laid down by Moscow.

Chang's account spans the full 17 years of his association with the Chinese Communist movement. He was not only one of the founding fathers of the CCP in 1921 but the only one of his age to appear in the front rank of party leaders from the outset (only one year older than Chou En-lai, Chang was 24 when he was elected to the first, three-member Central Committee). Like most of the other early Chinese Communists, he was an intellectual of gentry background and a nationalist who turned Marxist when the Russian Revolution seemed to point the way to a solution of China's problems. As early as 1922, however, he began opposing the official Comintern line, especially on the advisability of requiring CCP members to join the Kuomintang. He nevertheless continued to hold various important positions in the CCP leadership until 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek suddenly broke off collaboration with the Communists and nearly crushed the party. (The 1927 disaster forms the dividing line between the first and the second volumes of Chang's memoirs.)

From 1928 to 1931, Chang was a semi-inactive and powerless—or at least tightly-controlled—exile in Moscow. He then returned to China and spent the next four years directing soviets in the Chinese countryside: first in the famous Oyuwan area (on the borders of Honan, Hupeh and Anhwei provinces) and then in northern Szechuan. The last and most dramatic episode in his revolutionary career was his fateful meeting and clash with Mao in June 1935, during a pause in the Long March—an event which, though much publicized, is still not well understood nor rendered completely comprehensible by Chang's narration of his side of the story. The end of the second volume is no more than an epilogue, but a revealing one—especially Chang's account of the first of the Yenan years (1937), which also happened to be his final year in the Communist movement. He de-

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fected for good on April 4, 1938. Long before then, however, he had become thoroughly alienated from Mao and the movement.

CHANG'S MEMOIRS are unique not only because they present a version of the party's past as seen by one of Mao's most famous adversaries, but also for another, very simple and obvious reason: they provide us with a privileged witness's account (even though biased or reconstructed) of numerous meetings, negotiations, and events nearly all the other participants in which have long been either dead or silent. Moreover, no other participant, either pro- or anti-Mao, has told us with such a profusion of detail the circumstances surrounding many important party decisions and how they were reached. (In this respect, Chang reminds us more of the Russian Menshevik Nikolai Sukhanov than of Trotsky, for Chang and Sukhanov both love to recall political meetings and discussions and to impress upon the reader that "I was there.") Not only do we learn the details, but we also get a sense of the atmosphere. Admittedly, what we are given is a subjective description. Another protagonist would have felt things differently; furthermore, Chang is not above embellishing his own role and foresight. There are intentional as well as unconscious omissions, and undue emphasis is sometimes placed on minor points and interventions (especially Chang's own interventions). For the most part, however, Chang's account rings true and is a thousand times fairer and livelier than official party history.

Revealing facts and observations are rarely lacking in Chang's portrayals of his former (and generally not much loved) comrades. In this respect his memoirs provide a welcome supplement to the Klein-Clark *Biographic Dictionary* [1]—a supplement that shows less scholarly restraint, to be sure, but at the same time provides more flavor and, on occasion, illuminating insights into the psychology of the characters. The two volumes contain numerous vignettes of party figures who made history, as well as of the less prominent, second-rank revolutionary leaders. To mention only the former, Mao, Chou En-lai, Li Ta-chao, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, P'eng Shu-chih, Ho Lung and the leading members of the so-called "28 Bolsheviks" clique all become much more familiar to us through Chang's recollections.[2] The portrayals, again, are not always entirely fair, but on the whole Chang's analyses of the motivations behind the attitudes and actions of individual leaders add a valuable dimension to historical interpretation.

Besides the Communist leaders, we also get to know better such non-Communist Chinese political figures as Wang Ching-wei, Wu Chih-hui and Teng Yen-ta;[3] and, more important because we know less about them, Chang also portrays for us the various Comintern emissaries to China. Concerning the latter, it can be said that with few exceptions Chang did not think much of them, but that as a rule the arrival of each new and more inept emissary made him wish that the former one had stayed. Thus, Michael Borodin, whose adventurism and arrogance Chang had resented and criticized, looked like a great man after M. N. Roy's appearance on the Wuhan scene, and even more so after "that young rascal" V. Lominadze had followed both of them. Lominadze himself looked better (or less bad) to Chang after the arrival of an unnamed Pole who came a few years later to act as Pavel Mif's deputy (Vol. 2 pp. 145-46).

THIS LEADS US to the first of three major and interrelated conclusions that—among many others—can be drawn from Chang's memoirs. The first has to do precisely with the manner in which the Comintern's policy was implemented in China. We already knew that the CCP's subordination to the Comintern was strong from the very beginning, but until now we lacked a clear picture of the total disregard shown by Soviet emissaries and Comintern representatives in China for the

[1] Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, *Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 1921-1965*, 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971.

[2] Li Ta-chao was another of the founders of the CCP, while Ch'u Ch'iu-pai briefly led the party in 1927-28 (both were arrested and executed: Li in 1927 by police of the northern warlord Chang Tso-lin, and Ch'u by the Nationalists in 1935). Li Li-san enjoyed his greatest prominence in the party around 1930, when his name became associated with a "left adventurist" policy known as the "Li Li-san line." P'eng Shu-chih played a leading role in the party during 1924-27 but then became a leader of the opposition and eventually of the Trotskyite movement. Ho Lung, a former bandit leader with "secret society" connections, became one of the most famous of the early Chinese Communist generals. The "28 Bolsheviks" were a group of Soviet-trained Communists who managed to gain control of the CCP Politburo after the fall of Li Li-san and also wielded considerable power in the Central Soviet Area of Kiangsi-Fukien during 1931-34.

[3] Wang Ching-wei, one of the early Kuomintang leaders, became head of the Chinese puppet government set up by the Japanese in Nanking during the Sino-Japanese war of 1937-45. Wu Chih-hui, a veteran revolutionary, became a rightist KMT leader, while Teng Yen-ta belonged to the left wing of the KMT and later organized a "third party" critical of the KMT's rightist policies.

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views and feelings of their Chinese comrades. To deal with Chang Kuo-t'ao's opposition to the Comintern's policy of a united front "from within" the KMT, Maring knew no better than to rudely manipulate, threaten, and command. In fact, the CCP Central Committee learned of the January 1923 Sun Yat-sen-Joffe Declaration officially inaugurating collaboration between the KMT and the Soviet Union only after the event, from the press. And later, when Borodin belatedly ended collaboration with Chiang Kai-shek (Sun's successor as head of the KMT) and chose instead to ally with T'ang Sheng-chih, Chang Kuo-t'ao, though he disapproved this new alliance even more strongly than he had the former one, nevertheless took it for granted that Borodin's decision automatically defined the policy to be followed by the CCP, and he did not dare do more than point out to Borodin that "T'ang was worse than Chiang" (Vol. 1, pp. 559-60).

The feelings of the CCP leaders regarding their relationship to Moscow's men in China are aptly summed up by Chang when he writes that "all the time we merely obeyed directives" (Vol. 1, p. 667). Some of the party leaders like Chang T'ai-lei [4] are even described as having been little more than Borodin's or other Soviet advisers' secretaries, and according to Chang Kuo-t'ao they were often the first to emphasize the necessity of finding a suitable scapegoat among the Chinese comrades for the Comintern's successive blunders and failures in China.

In addition to shedding new light on the high-handedness with which the Comintern imposed its will on the CCP in disregard of the party's best interests, Chang's memoirs also support a second, related conclusion—namely, that what for the sake of brevity may be called the "stalinization" of the CCP went much further than has hitherto been recognized. Chapter 2 of the second volume is especially revealing in this regard, for it describes at length the hotbed of stalinization that was the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow, where many subsequent members of the "28 Bolsheviks" group in the CCP were trained as cadres under close Comintern supervision. Here, it should be noted in passing that Chang does not seem altogether fair to one of the first-generation Moscow trainees, P'eng Shu-chih (whom he obviously disliked), when he links P'eng's ideas to those later espoused by "Wang Ming, Ch'in Pang-hsien, and others of the Mif clique" (Vol. 1. p. 412). That P'eng was not the "practical worker type" and preferred writing theoretical articles in *Hsiang-tao Chou-pao* (Guide Weekly) to doing everyday routine work is quite likely, just as it is likely that both Chang Kuo-t'ao and Ch'u Ch'iu-pai resented the preference shown by the first CCP Secretary General, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, in treating P'eng, a "newcomer" to the Central Committee just back from his studies in Moscow, as second-ranking leader of the party. These factors may explain, but do not justify, Chang's lumping together in the same bag two generations of "bookish" (to use Mao's language) or "dogmatist" (as Chang prefers to label them) returnees from Moscow without adding that P'eng later became an opponent of the Moscow line and eventually a Trotskyite.

But in other instances Chang's judgment appears well justified. Wang Ming, for one, did indeed advance his subsequent career by acting as "Mif's running dog" (Vol. 2, p. 88). Years later, moreover, Wang was quick to learn from the Moscow trials that he could brand as "Trotskyites" and liquidate at will disgruntled members of the returned students' group who had tried to resist his manipulations at Sun Yat-sen University (Vol. 2, pp. 574-75). The summary execution of five alleged Trotskyites in Sinkiang Province in 1937 was but one evidence of the extension to China of what Chang calls the "ghostly shadow of Stalin." Many other examples of Stalinist-type practices in dealing with opponents are disseminated throughout the second volume, a clear indication that the disease took hold in China mainly after Stalin's ascendancy.

A third and again related conclusion that emerges from Chang's memoirs is that what Edward Rice has labeled "Mao's Way"—though much less bloody than Stalin's—is not totally unrelated to the latter. In fact, the last 200 pages of Chang Kuo-t'ao's work might well be read as a useful foreword to Rice's examination of "Mao's Way" as it operated in the context of China's Cultural Revolution of 1965-69.[5] As Chang's account shows, Mao—30 years before the Cultural Revolution—was already a master at pulling strings from behind the scenes and getting others to do his dirty work for him. (Ironical-

[4] Chang T'ai-lei was a founder of the Socialist Youth League and a member of the CCP Central Committee in the 1920's. He was killed in the abortive Communist uprising at Canton in December 1927.

[5] Edward E. Rice, *Mao's Way*, Berkeley, Calif., University of California Press, 1972. See review by Allen Whiting in *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1973, pp. 72-74.

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ly, Chang Wen-t'ien and Lo Jui-ch'ing, both of whom have since been purged by the Maoists,[6] were then among Mao's allies or henchmen.) In the intraparty politics of the CCP of the 1930's, truth often mattered much less than considerations of the balance of power, and the conclusion or outcome was, as a rule, known beforehand. Here again, Chang's account of the struggles within the party in that period reminds us of the controversies that had opposed Stalin to Trotsky and others in the Soviet Communist Party during the preceding decade.

BESIDES THE lessons outlined above, there is a lot more to be learned from reading Chang Kuo-t'ao's very extensive memoirs. The two long chapters on the Oyuwan and T'ung-nan-pa soviets, for instance, are full of concrete indications of the relationship between Communist cadres and villagers and of the difficulty the early cadres experienced in explaining to the masses the meaning of such basic terms as "Communist Party" (Vol. 2, p. 241) and "soviet" (Vol. 2, p. 346). Rather than try to exhaust the riches contained in these 1,400 pages, however, it seems more pertinent to add a few caveats to the preceding observations and at the same time to take a closer look at the central character of the story, who is, after all, Chang Kuo-t'ao himself.

To begin with, in pointing out that Chang, albeit reluctantly, nevertheless bowed to Comintern decisions as binding on the Chinese party, the reviewer does not at all mean to misrepresent our revolutionary author as a convinced "internationalist." It was always more natural for him to forgive his cherished "son," the CCP (Vol. 2, p. 147), than to forgive such alien foster parents as the Comintern and the Russian Bolsheviks. Nor, in using the handy term "stalinization" (the connotations of which are well known), did the writer mean to emulate Khrushchev and to explain everything by the "ghostly" —or ghastly—shadow cast by Stalin on the Chinese party. One should point out here that, unlike Trotsky, Chang was no theoretician, and while he quite clearly resented and disagreed with the stalinization of the CCP through the instrumentality of the Comintern, he neither saw nor ever formulated his opposition to Soviet policies in carefully thought-out theoretical terms.

Again, in recalling Mao's mean tricks, let us not idealize his hapless victim, Chang Kuo-t'ao, or let political differences recede into the background, as sometimes happens in Chang's memoirs. To be sure, his clash with Mao in northwestern Szechuan in June 1935 was, above all, a struggle for power, and Chang's main "crime" in Mao's eyes lay in Chang's having at his command more numerous and fresher troops. The fact remains, however, that Chang's presentation of those fateful events, though a most welcome and revealing contribution to our knowledge of a controversial episode in Chinese party history, is among the least satisfactory parts of the two volumes, for Chang's selective memory still leaves us in the dark on many points. Falling back on *a priori* reasoning in the absence of all the facts, one would have to conclude that, had Chang succeeded in outwitting Mao, the founder of the "Central Soviet Area" (Mao) would have had to yield to someone (Chang) who had merely inherited the leadership of an already existing soviet area (Oyuwan), and who furthermore entertained strong reservations about the whole soviet enterprise!

Quite apart from the dubious theory that the forces of history vindicate those who are most attuned to them, personal factors very likely played a considerable part in Chang's defeat and Mao's triumph. Chang seems to have been lacking in perseverance and self-confidence. On many occasions, we find him first disagreeing totally with a decision or directive and then yielding to it in the end. It may have been out of a sense of discipline; but it may also be that things were less clear in his mind at the time he took certain actions than at the time he came to write about them. In any case, a character like Mao was certainly more bent on reaching a goal and accomplishing a vision. At times, Chang even gives the impression of having been unable to stay in one place, of having solicited any mission that would take him away from steady party work in Shanghai. And once away on a mission, as in Wuhan in 1926-27, he does not seem to have led events, but rather to have reacted to them. On occasions, his narration sounds more like the account of a witness than the report of a protagonist.

THIS BRINGS US back again to the question of the reliability of the witness. One may well wonder how Chang can accurately remember the three, four, or five points made by each participant in a discussion that took place 40

[6] Chang Wen-t'ien was purged in September 1959, while Lo Jui-ch'ing (then Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation Army) was one of the first victims of the Cultural Revolution (in late 1965).

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years ago. What one discovers in the rare instances where it is possible to check the accuracy of his very detailed narration does not always diminish one's uneasiness: for instance, Chang's report of his role in the disastrous Nanchang uprising and southern expedition of 1927 does not always coincide with what he himself wrote at the time.[7]

One could also point to factual errors: *e.g.,* Chang's reference to Trotsky as living in Mexico as early as 1929 (Vol. 2, p. 126); and, more important, to apparent contradictions: *e.g.,* if, as Chang claims in his memoirs, he from the outset regarded the establishment of rural soviets in China as nothing more than futile adventurism, how could he have devoted five years of his life to leading one of these soviets? And again, if Chang, as he now professes, left Russia utterly disgusted in 1931, already hated the Comintern at that same time (Vol. 2, p. 146), and even had few illusions left about the CCP itself, why did he wait to defect until it became unmistakably clear that no personal future remained for him in the movement? One could further argue that Mao's cold calculations in his dealings with Chiang Kai-shek in the wake of the December 1936 Sian incident and at the ensuing Lo-ch'uan conference [8] may have proven more fruitful for the Communist movement than Chang Kuo-t'ao's admittedly less cynical (and therefore "rightist") interpretation of the Anti-Japanese United Front that was then entered into by the Communists and Chiang's Nationalists. Every one of these issues will no doubt be raised, along with others, by Mao's sympathizers.

Yet, there is no point in invoking the contradictions of the man or the shortcomings of his work as reasons for dismissing what must still be recognized as one of the most valuable sources on the first two decades of the Chinese Communist movement. It is no longer possible to assess Mao's place in history and the character of the Chinese revolution without taking Chang Kuo-t'ao's testimony into account.

[7] As translated by C. Martin Wilbur in "The Ashes of Defeat," *The China Quarterly* (London), No. 18. April-June 1964, pp. 31-34.

[8] In December 1936, while on an inspection trip to Sian in Shensi Province, Chiang Kai-shek was taken prisoner by one of his generals, the "Young Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, who was dissatisfied with Chiang's weak policy toward Japan. Chiang was released after negotiations in which Communist representatives participated and which paved the way for the subsequent KMT-Communist United Front against Japan. At the Lo-ch'uan conference in the summer of 1937, the CCP leadership discussed implementation of the newborn United Front.

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New Perspectives on North Korea

By Robert R. Simmons

DAE-SOOK SUH: *Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-1948.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970.
ROBERT A. SCALAPINO and CHONG-SIK LEE: *Communism in Korea,* 2 Vols. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1972.

OBSERVERS OF THE Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) have just cause to feel envious of today's "China watchers." Before 1966 specialists on China were, in fact, largely "China listeners" who had to rely for information on careful perusals of radio transmission transcripts and in-depth interviews of defectors. During the past decade, however, the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath have resulted in a massive release of new information about both earlier and more recent internecine political struggles in China. Peking's current "turning out" toward the world has also provided the opportunity for students of China to visit the People's Republic. Consequently, significant new perspectives have been gained on events which previously were inadequately reported.

Meanwhile, observers of the North Korean political system have had to continue to function as "listeners." Restricted in large part to reading the DPRK's official media and occasionally interviewing defectors, they have been able to shed only dim light on the government and society of North Korea. Many important aspects of the Korean scene remain veiled in obscurity, including, for example, President Kim Il Sung's role in the Pyongyang power structure, the origins of the Korean civil war, the handling of the *Pueblo* incident, and the problem of political succession.

There is, however, reason to anticipate that developments in the next few years may result in greater access to information about the DPRK. Pyongyang seems to have made a clear decision to turn to Japan and the West to increase its trade and its access to advanced technology. It is also showing a new interest in cultivating state-to-state relations around the globe in competition with South Korea—as evidenced, for example, by the presence for the first time of North Korean observers at the United Nations in the fall of 1973. These two foreign policy concerns should encourage an exchange of visits and knowledge between North Korean diplomats, technocrats and traders and their foreign counterparts—resulting in interaction which hopefully will spill over into other fields.

The benchmark studies reviewed here belong to the "listener" category in that their authors have still had to rely to a great extent on limited documentary materials or the reports of defectors. In different ways and to different degrees, however, the studies provide important new information on Pyongyang's political system. To use a Korean term, they represent a *ch'ollima* (flying horse) step forward in research on Korean communism.

PROFESSOR DAE-SOOK SUH's collection of documents with commentary can be dealt with rather briefly, since it serves essentially as a kind of appendix to an earlier (1967) valuable monograph he wrote on the history of the Korean Communist movement from 1918 to 1948.[1] Through careful detective work, Professor Suh managed to uncover 124 previously unpublished documents — in Russian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese and English—66 of which he has selected and in most cases translated for the present volume. Because the Korean Communist movement operated clandestinely or in exile for most of the period covered in the study (until 1945), this undertaking was difficult and

[1] *The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948,* Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967.

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time-consuming—but it was also very rewarding, providing important new primary materials for further scholarly research.

Professor Suh's 1967 study provoked charges by the Japanese scholar Kentaro Yamabe of "disorder"—and, by implication, bias—in Suh's use of sources.[2] In his later work Suh seems to parry such criticism by asserting that his selection of documents for publication was made not in order to support a particular thesis or to emphasize a specific period of Korean Communist history but on the basis of the contextual importance of materials to the movement as a whole. In the reviewer's opinion, the most relevant criticism to be leveled at Suh—at least with respect to the later volume—concerns not his choice of documents but his tendency to accept the material in them at face value. This problem is particularly noticeable because of his reliance on documents as his sole source of evidence. The trouble is that one document without corroborating testimony can be as deceptive as having only one witness to an automobile accident.

For this reason the Suh collection is better read in tandem with the pre-1948 coverage in the second study under review, a two-volume comprehensive history of modern Korea by Profs. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee. The latter work — by drawing on a broader range of information, including interviews with area specialists and defectors as well as documentary materials — fleshes out and sometimes even corrects the Suh work. Perhaps one example will suffice to illustrate the difference in approach and conclusions. On page 478, Professor Suh asserts:

Despite the commonly accepted notion that the Russians masterminded the coalition between the Communists in the North of Korea and the Yenan group, the coalition was actually initiated by the Yenan group, the North China Korean Independence League which changed its name to Shinmin-tang [*New People's Party*]. *This is made clear by the next document introduced, item 64, which is comprised of the reports of the two leaders, Kim Tu-bong of the Yenan group and Kim Il Sung. Kim Tu-bong stated explicitly that "the* Shinmin-tang *proposed a coalition" and that it was "received with sincerity" by the Communist Party in the North.*

According to Professors Scalapino and Lee, however, the preponderant evidence supports the "commonly accepted notion" which Suh disavows. Pointing out that documents such as these two reports can be misleading, and maintaining that in this case they contained information that was "probably false," the authors conclude (p. 358):

Despite the Communist assertion that the merger was undertaken at the initiative of the New People's Party, the likelihood is overwhelming that it was in fact planned and executed by the Soviet-Kapsan faction, using maximum pressure upon any who resisted.

With respect to the pre-1945 era, both the Suh and the Scalapino-Lee works vividly describe how the Communists either were driven into exile and for many years widely dispersed—in Yenan, Manchuria and Siberia—or else were forced to live "underground" on the peninsula. Both works tend to focus on the factional splits that resulted from these geographic separations rather than to look upon prewar Korean communism as a mass movement (albeit a fragmented one), with its separate segments dependent upon foreign sponsors. While this description is not inaccurate, it somewhat obscures what was ultimately the most powerful element in the movement—the cement of nationalism.

THE SCALAPINO AND LEE study continues the story of Korean communism from World War II to the present, tracing the traumatic impact of the country's partition and the civil war of 1950-53, and reviewing the course of North Korea's development under the regime of Kim Il Sung. The study is easily the best work yet written on the Korean Communist movement, notwithstanding the limits of "listener"-type literature already noted. In conducting their research, the authors have relied —partially and selectively—on social science methodology (*e.g.*, they offer a content analysis of one year's editorials in *Nodong Sinmun,* the Communist party daily) and on intensive interviewing of 34 North Korean defectors.

One of the important contributions of the study is the historical perspective it provides on the Korean civil war, often treated as the threshold event for the development of the next two decades. The authors emphasize that the foundations of the war launched in 1950 must be sought in the arbitrary division of Korea by the Great Powers in 1945. They

[2] "A Note on *The Korean Communist Movement* by Dae-sook Suh, with Special Reference to Source Materials Used," in *The Developing Economies* (Tokyo), June 1967, pp. 405-12.

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clearly demonstrate that both the Soviet Union and the United States feared results contrary to their interests had Korea been allowed immediate independence after World War II. During wartime parleys, the Allied leaders initially agreed to establish an international trusteeship over all of Korea, but no steps were taken to implement this plan. As the war drew to a close, the impending surrender of Japanese forces led Moscow and Washington to agree to a division of the peninsula at the 38th parallel into what were supposed to be temporary occupation zones, establishing Soviet control in the north and American control in the south. Subsequently, however, all unification efforts failed. Thus a nation of uncommon nationalism was torn apart.

Most students of the Korean civil war have viewed the DPRK regime as a mere instrument of the Russians: Stalin, so this version runs, pulled the trigger which started the war in June of 1950. The wide acceptance of this premise has led to the neglect of research on the role of the North Korean leadership. The Scalapino-Lee study offers much implicit evidence that Pyongyang was not simply a passive "gun" for an itchy Soviet trigger finger—in short, that it was not a regime so subservient to Moscow that it lacked its own political dynamics. The volume also provides important information on the wartime roles of leaders in the South as well as in the North, suggesting—at least to this reviewer—that regardless of the enormous influence of the Great Powers, the genesis of the war must be sought on the Korean peninsula itself.

As the study makes clear in abundant detail, if Moscow did promote the invasion from the North, it certainly lost its enthusiasm in a hurry. In the wake of the UN-sponsored counteroffensive by American troops, who quickly rolled back the DPRK forces after the Inch'on landing, the Kremlin seemed willing to sacrifice North Korea's independence in order to avoid direct involvement in the conflict. It was only the intervention of Chinese troops that saved Pyongyang from total defeat toward the end of 1950. There is also evidence to indicate that the weapons which the USSR supplied to the DPRK were second-rate and inadequate. And only once in the ensuing stalemate—in April 1952—did Moscow offer any kind of gratis aid to the North Koreans, in the form of 50,000 tons of flour.

Born of this experience was the DPRK's doctrine of *chuch'e* (self-reliance), which was proclaimed in 1955 and which led to Pyongyang's increasing independence from both Russian and Chinese influences. In outlining the impact of this doctrine, Professors Scalapino and Lee offer some useful insights into the relationships among the three countries in the intervening decades.

Indeed, one of the great merits of the study is the authors' creation of a consciously comparative framework within which they describe North Korean parallels to—as well as departures from—the Russian and Chinese experiences. In their view, Pyongyang's style of leadership appears to have been patterned after China's "mass line," while its economic development plans have been based in large measure on the Soviet model, which emphasizes the heavy industrial sector.

One caution must be noted with respect to the authors' assessment of the North Korean regime. While it is understandable that they had to rely on indirect testimony from sources that were sometimes far from impartial, this circumstance unfortunately creates an impression of anti-Communist bias in some of their remarks. For example, they write disparagingly of Pyongyang's vigorous efforts to achieve economic advances, and they tend to ignore the apparently firm support of the government by the North Korean populace. The authors have made a conscious attempt to correct for the element of distortion by cross-checking their oral and documentary sources, but they are not always successful in this endeavor.

Overall, however, the Scalapino and Lee volumes must be judged an original and imposing work of research on a Communist regime that has been little known and little understood. It seems certain that other scholars will build upon this pioneering study both through more detailed methodological analysis of its findings and—hopefully—through increasing access to direct sources and contacts in North Korea.

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Notes & Views
Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to the Editors, Problems of Communism, *US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 20547.*

CHINA WATCHERS

TO THE EDITORS: Many of your readers may detect a familiar ring in the accompanying article published by a team of Soviet researchers, describing their efforts to obtain information about a certain country — in this case China — by screening that country's press. Is there poetic justice in the difficulties mentioned by the Soviet researchers: cryptic language, scarcity of factual information, use of propaganda exhortations instead of objective reporting, and "distortions of reality"? At any rate it is interesting to note that the Soviet students of the Chinese press have adopted pretty much the same techniques used by Western students of the Soviet press in their attempt to penetrate to underlying truths.

The article, entitled "From an Experiment in Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of the PRC Press," is signed by V.G. Gelbras, G.G. Zarubin and G.S. Lonshchakov. It appeared in a modest-circulation (980 copies) collection of papers on methodological problems of content-analysis issued in 1973 by the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociological Research.

JAMES CRITCHLOW
Senior Soviet Analyst
US Information Agency

(EDITORS' NOTE: The article below has been slightly abridged for reasons of space.)

1. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of contemporary Chinese newspapers, like content analysis of the press of other countries, is based on eliciting the interests, values and norms of different groups as well as the actions of classes and social institutions in the given society. Most of the presently known procedures of content analysis are used here. However, in consequence of the specifics of the PRC press, its study is associated with the emergence of a number of special methodological and methodic problems.

Among the specifics of the PRC periodical press are: (a) peculiarities of the language of the Chinese newspaper; (b) the extreme scarcity of factual—and especially statistical—information; (c) the pronounced "campaign" character of reporting; (d) the large number of distortions in reproducing reality. What are the possible means of overcoming the difficulties which confront the researcher?

2. In analyzing the PRC press, it is essential to take into consideration certain peculiarities of the Chinese language . . . as well as transformations of the lexicon and terminologies which are associated with the public life of the country in recent years. We might note here only one of the peculiarities of the contemporary language of the Chinese newspaper, formed by traditional methods of propaganda and political struggle, *i.e.*, the use of short forms of slogans, directives and campaigns, as well as aphorisms and images sometimes borrowed from ancient literature, etc. . . . In recent years in China there have come into currency new word-formations and formulas meant to serve the activities of the present leadership. Some of them have in public life anything but the meaning which should follow from direct translation.

3. Analysis of Chinese texts is traditionally laborious. When there are relatively few specialists who know the language well, study of the PRC press calls for completion of an enormous volume of work by each staff member. For purposes of reducing the workload we have applied a sampling method. The press itself is seen in this connection as a kind of sampling observation, and sampling analysis of the press therefore as a "sample of samples." Determination of the number of issues of a newspaper necessary for analysis with a given magnitude of error (in other words, determination of the optimal sample size) is carried out by the usual methods of the general theory of statistics. Through application of the sampling method it is possible to attain substantial labor economy with the smallest possible reduction in precision. Thus, in order to determine the rate of creation of new primary CCP organizations with a precision of 20 percent, it proved sufficient to use only 48 issues of the newspaper *Jen-min Jih-pao* insead of a full year's set. . . .

4. Insufficiency of official statistical information makes it necessary also to develop methods of analyzing the PRC press which permit the construction of various kinds of statistical indices commensurate with those accepted in world practice. Thus, it is necessary to solve problems which do not arise when analyzing the press of countries with a well-developed statistical service. In analyzing Chinese newspapers it is necessary to reconstruct indices of: a) demographic statistics—determination of the size of population, its composition by age and sex, distribution by provinces, etc.; b) economic statistics—determina-

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tion of the number of production units, volume of completed production, efficiency of production, etc.; c) social statistics—determination of the number of workers, office-workers and peasants, basic sources of replenishment of ranks of workers and office-workers, etc.; and d) statistics of the party and public organizations. It is also necessary to resort to press analysis to follow changes in the personal composition of the PRC leadership, to ascertain the structure of economic management, the organizational structure of the organs of power, etc.

5. The problem of distortions is the most complex of all those enumerated, and not yet completely solved. The tendency of the contemporary Chinese press to commit deliberate distortions of reality derives from the chief function of that press as an instrument of manipulation. In the PRC the "communicator" and the "receiver" occupy markedly polar positions not only in the process of mass communication but also in the structure of society. The usurpation of the functions of administration and information by a small group of people, the isolation of working people from the decision-making sphere, and the liquidation of organs of control over the activities of administrative organs have led to the appearance of a unique "kingdom of crooked mirrors." From the reflection in such "mirrors" the researcher must recreate the real situation in the country. For example, in studying the attitudes of different strata of contemporary Chinese society through the newspaper *Jen-min Jih-pao*, we come up against a reduction in the number of facts of public dissatisfaction, whereas it is practically impossible to determine the measure of distortion. Nevertheless, special methodologies make it possible to obtain certain characteristics with adequate precision. In particular, rates of growth and incremental growth, which are relative quantities, should be equal —given fixed proportional distortion—to the real ones. . . .

6. However, the abovementioned shortcomings help in determining some parameters. This applies to delineation of the directives and plans of the current Chinese leadership. Owing to the tight linking of the PRC periodical press with the organs of power, the press carries — practically speaking—no reports which do not correspond to ideological directives or the goals of domestic and foreign policy. Thus, from the articles in the foreign-policy section of the press it is possible [to ascertain] the structure of attitudes of the PRC leadership toward all countries of the world. For the period May 20—June 20, 1972, in *Jen-min Jih-pao* only 24 percent of references to various states were neutral (142 references out of 585); the rest were tendentious, either positive or negative. There is sufficient basis for certainty that the negative size of the chronological average of press evaluations (in points) corresponds to the negative attitude of the PRC leadership toward a given country (and, similarly, the positive size to the positive attitude). By this method one may determine the parts of the world where the attention of the rulers of present-day China is fixed at a given point of time.

NOTICE OF ERRATA

1. In providing the origin of the Russian acronym "GULag" in footnote 1 of Robert Sharlet's essay-review "Gulag: A Chronicle of Soviet Extralegal History" (*Problems of Communism*, May-June 1974, p. 65), the editors failed to furnish the complete Russian title for "Main Administration of Corrective-Labor Camps," which is *Glavnoe Upravlenie Ispravitelno-Trudovykh Lagerei*.
2. The source of the cover photo of Chou En-lai on the March-April issue was Photoreporters, Inc., not EUPRA.

A MATTER OF LABELS

TO THE EDITORS: In reading Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein's "China's Political Spectrum" in the March-April 1974 issue, I found the authors' "four-line" interpretation of the Chinese political struggle quite intriguing at first blush, but immediately afterward I wondered whether this new "reclassification" really advances the discussion any further. We are all aware that the old duality/polarity "Left" and "Right" is somewhat weather-beaten. I cannot, however, agree that the four categories—militant fundamentalists, radical conservatives, eclectic modernizers and westernized Chinese—do anything other than make subdivisions of four where before there were two. In "Left" in the conventional sense, we have a handy, recognizable stereotype which suggests a propensity toward radical change, possibly involving revolution and egalitarianism, and—in the Chinese case—away from traditional habits of thought and action. Those on the "Right" may wish to cling to older traditions and practices, utilizing the techniques of pragmatism, opportunism, and even a form of boldness (for the "Left" in China does not monopolize zeal and determination).

The real difficulty attaches less to the labels which are pinned on persons than to the fact that from time to time those on the "Left" may be seen (or denounced) as belonging to the "Right," and vice versa. Lin Piao, among others, "waved the Red Flag to oppose the Red Flag." Chou En-lai, widely regarded as a "moderate," was once seen by Edgar Snow as a particularly radical Communist with a price on his head. This point is admitted when, speaking of the so-called "militant fundamentalists," Oksenberg and Goldstein innocently argue that "the mainland press today claims that they appeared 'ultra-leftist' but were in fact 'ultra-rightist'." In a trice the "militant fundamentalists" disappear, and "leftism" actually produces, as they put it, "a reassertion of traditional and in many ways Confucian values."

As for the "eclectic modernizers," there is nobody more "eclectic" than Mao himself, but he could be seen as an eclectic traditionalist. Finally, the last label used in the article is a very old friend but is most revealing; the options, it would appear, lie (as the authors point out in the last sentence) with the "conservatives." *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*

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